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This dissertation examines (a) how a professional organization dealing with 
‘dirty work’ (Hughes 1951, 1958) shape organizational practices and professional 
identity of its members in the process of seeking legitimacy and (b) how adaptation to 
a new task transforms these micro-institutional dynamics in the organization based on 
a case study of the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) and their peacekeeping 
participation. I utilize in-depth interviews with approximately 30 Japanese service 
members and survey data from 618 Japanese peacekeepers.   
Given an anti-militaristic culture in society and Constitutional restrictions 
against the possession of military power, the SDF have been developed as a 
constabulary military with limited legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy led the SDF to use 
symbolic management strategies to gain legitimacy, but their attempt unexpectedly 
put the organization into a ‘vicious circle of legitimation’ (Ashforth and Kreiner 
  
1999), in which the aggressive attempt to pursue legitimacy aggravated skepticism of 
the observers and failed to increase legitimacy. Nonetheless, the SDF survived as a 
dirty work organization to protect the purity of the larger society. Contexualized by 
these institutional environments, service members have developed highly 
constabulary, less masculine, and civilianized identities.  
Since the early 1990s peacekeeping participation combined with the 
transformation of the work force structure has gradually lifted dirty work status of the 
SDF and provided service members with positive possible selves in their professional 
life. Regardless, the stigmatized status continues to regularize service members’ 
behavior and professional identities. Increasing exposure to soldiers from other 
nations underscores their marginal position as military professionals. Japanese 
peacekeepers systematically focus on technical aspects to neutralize the militaristic 
nature of the contact.  
Moreover, the stringent rules of engagement (ROE) institutionalized by the 
anti-militarism sentiment in Japanese society help the SDF to maintain the 
consistency with the existing norms on the exercise of military power. At the same 
time, these imposed behavioral norms promote the fundamentally troubling, crisis-
bearing arrangements that may routinize harmful practice and risk the safety of 
service members in the field.  This dissertation contributes to the study of work 
organizations by illustrating the meaning creation and negotiation of identity in the 
micro-institutional dynamics in a socially stigmatized professional organization.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of human history, warfare has been an omnipresent social 
process (Andreski 1968; Wright 1965), which preceded the emergence of military 
institutions and the social role of soldiers (Segal and Gravino 1985). By contrast, 
peacekeeping is a contemporary social process that has been institutionalized as a 
primary mission in the post-Cold War military (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992; Segal and 
Segal 1993a). Although it is treated as if it were a brand-new mission that emerged in the 
early 1990s, UN peacekeeping has more than half a century long history as a secondary 
mission using military presence as a vehicle of achieving operational goals. Until the end 
of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were mostly conducted by troops from middle 
powers. Role conflict between the peacekeeper role and the soldier role was identified as 
an issue in the sociological literature on peacekeeping (Moskos 1976; Harris and Segal 
1985; Segal and Meeker 1985; Meeker and Segal 1987; Segal et al. 1987). However, due 
to its peripheral role as a military mission, peacekeeping missions did not cause any 
major organizational issues.  
Having increased its significance as a military mission in the 1990s, however, 
armed forces have been experiencing more organizational adaptation problems in the 
field, represented in high-profile cases such as torturing and killing a local young Somali 
man by Canadian Airborne soldiers in Somalia and the misjudgment of Dutch 
peacekeeping troops that led a massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. Researchers 
attributed the source of maladjustment problems to role overload and identity confusion 
among peacekeepers. In post Cold War peacekeeping, the professional identity of 
  2 
 
military peacekeepers is overloaded and reaches a breaking point when facing complex 
and ambiguous role demands as peacekeepers and soldiers in a confusing mission 
environment (see Franke 1999). Although most studies of peacekeeping assume a martial 
ethos as the universal core value that shapes the professional identity of soldiers (see 
Franke 1999), the recent maladaptation cases in Somalia and Bosnia revealed a surprising 
diversity in the ways in which individual soldiers and military organizations conform to 
norms of the immediate institutional environment of the organization, rather than 
institutional rules given in a particular mission environment. The institutional influence 
of social contexts in the larger society on its peacekeepers tends to be overlooked in the 
literature on military peacekeepers and their psychological states and attitudes.  
The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 
increased the number, scale, complexity, and coerciveness of peacekeeping operations 
and the diversity of those who carry out peacekeeping operations to an unprecedented 
level. The disappearance of East-West tension in Europe allowed the US and the 
permanent Security Council members to participate in multilateral peacekeeping 
operations free from a Cold War doctrine that excluded major powers from UN 
peacekeeping missions to maintain the political impartiality of the mission (Segal and 
Segal 1993a).1 Simultaneously, regional and intra-state armed conflicts in third world 
countries have surged in the absence of the bipolar tension between the United States and 
the former Soviet Union; they increased the demands for interventions led by the UN and 
regional multilateral organizations and expanded the spectrum of peacekeeping. 
Accumulating demands for a wider range of multilateral intervention, from humanitarian 
                                                 
1 Regarding the details of the exclusion doctrine, see Segal and Gravino (1985) and Segal and 
Eyre (1996).  
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assistance to military enforcement, highlighted the incongruence between military 
presence as a means of peacekeeping and war-fighting as a means of peacemaking (Segal 
and Segal 1993a).  
However, this incongruence was not new: using military presence as a means of 
peacekeeping was recognized as incongruent with warfighting —a traditional means of 
military affairs— in early traditional peacekeeping missions. In The Professional Soldier, 
Janowitz (1960) predicted the emerging change in the military in the age of nuclear 
deterrence and described it as transition from military forces to constabulary forces. 
Janowitz also anticipated that soldiers would experience difficulty adjusting to this 
transition because of its close resemblance to police work. There are three premises of 
traditional peacekeeping missions— political impartiality, limited use of force, and 
agreement of host parties—that are incongruent with a traditional war-fighting ethos. 
Being able to adjust themselves to constabulary norms and accomplish missions finding a 
positive side to the deployment in their career development (Segal and Meeker 1985), 
soldiers still experience role conflict (Moskos 1975 1976) and relative deprivation issues 
including boredom, frustration, and a sense of underutilization (Harris and Segal 1985; 
Segal, et al. 1987; Segal and Segal 1993a). 
Involvement of the United States and major powers in peacekeeping missions 
suddenly normalized troop contribution to peacekeeping missions as a diplomatic option, 
although national security policies and practices among member nations vary 
tremendously. This transition immediately called into question the reluctant posture of 
militarily low-profile major economic powers —Germany and Japan— when the UN 
Security Council sanctioned the use of force by a coalition of member states after the 
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Iraqi military invaded Kuwait in August 1990. For highly defense-oriented military 
organizations, such as the Bundeswehr and the Japan Self Defense Forces, peacekeeping 
was a mission that violates social norms of military action in society, which prohibit 
deployment of troops outside the territories. For Germany, the area of operations was 
within Germany and central Europe for territorial defense against communist power 
(Fleckenstein 2000). For Japan, it was limited to the territory for exclusively defensive 
operations (Tanaka 1997; Katzenstein 1996). After a storm of criticism from North 
American and European media, Germany resolved to contribute troops to peace 
operations overseas as a form of cooperation with its regional organizations such as 
NATO; Japan started sending troops to the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 after enacting a new law that allows the SDF to send troops 
to peacekeeping missions overseas. The increasing participation of different types of 
unconventional actors in contemporary peacekeeping missions sheds light on cognitive 
and normative powers of institutions and on the way in which peacekeeping missions are 
conceptualized and carried out in different socio-cultural contexts. Suppose military 
institutions represent social and cultural norms of host societies, as Fabian (1971) 
suggested, it is not universally true that peacekeeping participation has an adverse effect 
on the organizational culture and operations of the military.  
Contrary to most research findings on North American and European 
peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers show overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward 
their deployment experience and a high level of mission satisfaction across operations in 
Cambodia, the Golan Heights, and Mozambique (Ohi 1999; Kawano 2001 2002). 
Kawano (2002) describes the positive experience of Japanese peacekeepers as “a few 
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steps closer to “soldiers” through their participation in the UN peacekeeping operation” 
and noted that “contacts with the soldiers and people of different nationalities provoked a 
JSDF person’s sense of being a Japanese soldier”(p.271). Looking at the organizational 
history and socio-cultural context of contemporary Japanese society, the successful 
adjustment of Japanese service members to peacekeeping has more implications beyond 
the adequacy of the constabulary orientation to peacekeeping missions. Taking the 
negative reaction of the Japanese public to troop contribution to international 
peacekeeping missions, it is questionable whether exposure to soldiers from other armed 
forces has only a positive impact on Japanese service members, especially on their 
professional identity.  
Since its inception in 1954, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have been 
developed as a highly defense-oriented force with a strong constabulary ethos. Lack of 
organizational legitimacy under Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan’s 
possession of any military power and oversea deployment, has greatly impacted on 
legitimacy seeking strategies for organizational survival. Derived from the regulative 
issues of organizational legitimacy, there are number of social institutions and agencies 
that place institutional pressure on the way in which the SDF and individual service 
members conform to norms of the institutional environment. As the international 
responsibilities of Japan have grown, Japan’s engagement in international peacekeeping 
amplified concerns about her desire to be a military power (see Berger 1993; Halloran 
1994; Hook 1996; Drifte 2000). Many researchers are still concerned with the possibility 
of Japan’s rearmament, following Hans Morgenthau’s theory of power politics that 
assumes rearmament intention as an inevitable desire for a nation-state (Berger 1998). 
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As diversity in the international forces increases in post-Cold War peacekeeping, 
conducting a case study becomes more valuable to understand the social structures that 
regulate peacekeepers’ behavior and affect their identity formation. The temporary nature 
of the peacekeeping mission contributed to the difficulty of managing cultural diversity 
within international peacekeeping forces (Elron, et al. 2000). As the field becomes a more 
complex work environment at the juncture of diverse organizational and national 
cultures, peacekeepers increasingly need to take into consideration diversity in 
organizational and national cultures, language, skills and experience in peacekeeping, 
behavioral norms associated with rules of engagement (ROE), and the purpose of 
deployment among different contingents in the field. 
The purpose of the present dissertation is to understand how adaptation to 
peacekeeping missions affects organizational legitimacy and the professional identity of 
service members in a constabulary military. The Japanese armed forces are studied as a 
case. One notable feature of the Japanese armed forces is its constabulary ethos based on 
the peace Constitution and exclusively defensive national security policy. How was the 
constabulary ethos of the armed forces institutionalized in post-WWII Japan? How does 
the institutional environment of the SDF shape the professional identity of Japanese 
service members? To discuss organizational legitimacy and professional identity of 
service members, I examine the origin of the constabulary ethos in the SDF and changes 
in the socio-cultural context surrounding the Japanese military institution first. Another 
distinctive aspect of the Japanese armed forces is that they are socially tainted as a 
profession. Kawano (2001 2002) has found that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers 
were satisfied with their peacekeeping experience, unlike their North-American and 
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European counterparts. Is there any association between the socially marginalized status 
of the profession and the high level of satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers?  
Extending Segal’s social constructionism approach to peacekeeping, I apply 
“microinstitutional” theory with an emphasis on the process of identity formation and its 
reproduction (Zucker 1991; Wicks 2002). In addition to institutional bases of identity 
construction, I also introduce Ashforth and Kreiner’s (1999) refined theory of Everett 
Hughes’ (1951 1958) “dirty work” to examine the stigmatized status of the military 
profession in contemporary Japan. 
Being stigmatized in society, dirty work has received scant attention from 
organization researchers. Nevertheless, the study of dirty work and how people in 
socially marginalized jobs try to resolve their professional identity will provide us a 
profound insight in the negotiation of meaning in the workplace (Ashforth and Kreiner 
1999). The present dissertation can make contributions to the sociology of work by 
deepening our understanding of the function of dirty work in contemporary society. 
The present dissertation also will contribute to military sociology by applying 
microinstitutional theory to the study of peacekeeping. Conventional military sociology 
theories assume a universal definition of the military profession, and have limited 
explanatory power to large-scale change in the military institution such as adaptation to 
peacekeeping missions (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992; Segal, and Segal 1993a). In 
contrast, institutional theory allows us to conduct more comprehensive research on 
military peacekeepers from different nations with different levels of martial orientations 
of the military. Compared to soldiers in war-fighting oriented forces, there have been 
very few studies on how service members in constabulary forces define their professional 
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identity. It is also unknown how a constabulary orientation impacts service members’ 
appraisal of peacekeeping deployment experience and what organizational consequences 
of peacekeeping participation we should anticipate in a constabulary force.  
In the increasingly internationalized mission environment, some have pointed out 
unstandardized quality of assigned troops and various constraints on their involvement as 
an obstacle to mission effectiveness (see Mackinlay and Chopra 1993; Diehl 1993; 
Brooks 2003). The present dissertation will discuss the advantages and disadvantages to 
include military peacekeepers from countries with stringent constraints on activities. 
The findings will be presented in a chronological order, following the 
developmental process of the contemporary Japanese military institution. I identified the 
following three phases that are critical in the course of the development of the SDF 
regarding Japanese peacekeeping participation: (1) The emergence of the SDF (The post-
war peace constitution, the Korean War, and the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
in 1960) (1945-1960); (2) From High growth of the Japanese economy to the end of the 
Cold War (1961-1989); (3) The development of Japanese peacekeeping participation in 
the post Cold War period (1990 to present).  
In the chronological presentation of my arguments, I will start from the macro 
social formation of the institutional environment of the SDF and follow through micro-
organizational issues that constitute the impact of Japanese participation in multinational 
peacekeeping missions. Although identity formation and other micro social processes are 
fundamental components in the institutionalization processes, institutional theorists in 
sociology mostly focus on describing and explaining macro level development and 
effects of institutions. Sociological social psychologists, on the other hand, acknowledge 
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the importance of institutional effects on individuals’ attitudes; yet rarely have they 
integrated institutional factors into their analysis because of the complexity of 
organizational environments. SDF members’ professional identity is deeply rooted in the 
history of contemporary Japan so that the first two sections will be devoted to the 
examination of the historical and societal factors. Then, the third section will shift to 
more contemporary, micro-organizational issues in Japanese peacekeeping. Using survey 
data collected from SDF members formerly deployed to peacekeeping mission(s), I 
examine what aspects of peacekeeping experience affect Japanese peacekeepers’ 
psychological states, redeployment intention, and attitudes toward peacekeeping 
operations.  
Chapter 2 discusses the sociological significance of studying UN peacekeeping. 
Chapter 3 reviews previous sociological research on military peacekeepers and theories 
with an emphasis on new institutionalism in organizational sociology and identity 
theories, including the patterns of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping and relevant 
organizational issues. Chapter 4 provides research questions and hypotheses that lead the 
discussions in the present dissertation, and Chapter 5 describes the methods used to 
answer those research questions and test hypotheses. From Chapter 6 through Chapter 9, 
I discuss my findings in chronological order. Lastly, I draw conclusions in Chapter 10, 
combined with the significance and the limitations of the present dissertation from both 
theoretical and methodological aspects.  
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Chapter 2: Institutional Arrangement of Peacekeeping  
Significant Characteristics of Peacekeeping  
The demise of the East-West ideological tension in Europe changed institutional 
arrangements of UN peacekeeping, as well as similar peace support missions led by 
regional organizations. This major geopolitical shift made peacekeeping a premier 
military mission in the post-Cold War military. This shift exponentially expanded the 
spectrum of peacekeeping missions and brought not only the United States and 
permanent members of Security Council, but also militarily low-profile economic powers 
such as Germany and Japan, into the arena.  
After World War II, these two nations never stretched their military activities 
beyond their territories due to their Constitutional restrictions. However, once 
peacekeeping became institutionalized as a common strategy to maintain the peace, 
burden sharing among UN member nations through not only financial contributions but 
also military contributions, became a normative rule in the international community. This 
international normative environment surrounding peacekeeping is a globalization of 
international security through imposing the norms that reflect major actors’ national 
interests and policies on peripheral actors in international military affairs. The 
globalization of international security norms no longer allowed Japan and Germany to 
legitimately claim immunity from military contributions to international peacekeeping 
operations in order to conform to domestic norms and regulative restrictions. Regarding 
the obligation of troop contributions that became a norm in the international community, 
Paris (2003) argued that, from the viewpoint of sociological world polity theory, 
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peacekeeping operations are not the means of intervention for armed conflicts, but “the 
prisoner of global culture” in that international norms of appropriateness are given 
priority over effectiveness and control intervention strategies in peacekeeping operations.  
As a military mission, peacekeeping has a number of unique characteristics. One 
of the most distinctive characteristics of UN peacekeeping is the absence of a universal 
definition given by the UN or any other international organization. Although it does not 
appear in the UN Charter, “peacekeeping” became a common term used among member 
nations in the early 1960s when regional activities of small scale UN military units came 
to receive international recognition after the successful mission of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez in 1956 (Kozai 1991). Referring to the UN Charter, 
former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld described peacekeeping as “Chapter 
six and a half.” The term peacekeeping was not officially defined in the Charter; the 
definitional ambiguity came from the dual aspects of peacekeeping reflecting the 
principles in both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VI calls for the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, while Chapter VII allows the Security Council to take 
military action to mediate conflicts if diplomatic negotiation fails (Lewis 1992).2 The UN 
conceptualizes peacekeeping as an evolving technique of intervention, but does not give 
any succinct definition (see UN Department of Public Information 2002b). Because of 
                                                 
2 Article 33 in Chapter VI stipulates peaceful settlement of disputes as that “the parties to any dispute, 
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, 
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” 
Article 39 in Chapter VII set actions against threats to peace as that “the Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 41 provides non-militaristic measures 
to mediate disputes, and Article 42 specifies measures involving the use of armed forces including 
demonstrations, blockade, and other land, sea, and air operations employing the member nations’ 
armed forces.  
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this ambiguous definition, UN peacekeeping maintains the maximum flexibility and is 
able to virtually launch any type of military activities in order to resolve armed conflicts 
that will potentially be harmful to international security or that create inhumane 
consequences on people’s lives. As a result, the term “peacekeeping” is applied to a wide 
spectrum of activities from unarmed treaty verification to conflict intervention using 
force (Segal and Eyre 1996); scholars criticize the ambiguity of peacekeeping such that 
the term of peacekeeping has become “a term without meaning” to rationalize a wide 
range of UN-led military operations from election monitoring to food distribution in a 
post-conflict zone (Helms 1996: p.6). Fabian (1971) described peacekeepers as “soldiers 
without enemies,” which portrayed the ambiguous and conflicting nature of peacekeeping 
operations as a job for professional soldiers. His portrayal is still largely adequate 
although the mission environment is increasingly complex.  
Despite a wide range of applications of the concept today, peacekeeping is 
fundamentally a type of constabulary mission to intervene in armed conflicts using 
military presence as a means. Although peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s showed 
deviations, the following three principles are fundamentally the core of UN peacekeeping 
operations: (a) impartiality, (b) consent of host country, and (c) no use of force other than 
self-defense. Peacekeeping duty involves a very different way of thinking compared to 
traditional military missions. Reflecting the nature of military observer missions in the 
early period, peacekeeping missions fundamentally prohibit use of force beyond self-
defense although missions are carried out by the military. Military forces normally aim at 
destroying the enemy and their will to fight, while international peacekeeping forces use 
military presence as a means of maintaining cease-fires and assist the reconstruction 
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process of societies. Peacekeeping missions resemble police work. As long as 
peacekeeping was a secondary mission, the conceptual and strategic gaps between war 
fighting and peacekeeping were treated as temporary issues for the military organization. 
On the other hand, erosion of the boundary between the military and police work was 
anticipated in a large-scale geopolitical change after the end of World War II. 
 
The Origin of Peacekeeping Norms 
To discuss contemporary peacekeeping issues, it is necessary to understand how 
peacekeeping became legitimized and the shift of its institutional arrangements. Today’s 
peacekeeping emerged from the history of the failure to establish a collective security 
system in the League of Nations and the United Nations. The idea of collective security is 
found in a sixteenth century French politician Duc de Sully’s “le Grand Dessein d’Henri 
IV,” proposing to form an international force, composed of assigned troops from 15 
countries for the European Senat (Marriot 1939). Collective security is a mutual 
protection system among member nations in an international organization to prevent any 
of the member nations from threatening, destroying, or invading other member nations. 
This “in-group” rule makes collective security distinctive from an alliance system in that 
alliance is for the nations sharing a common interest to protect allied nations from 
outsiders. Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nation set the details of sanctions 
to penalize a violator using military and non-military measures, but it was too costly to 
implement. In fact, economic sanctions in Article 16-1 only took effect against Italy in 
the Italy-Ethiopia conflict in 1935; anticipated extensive damage among member nations 
in the implementation of military sanctions prevented the League from taking military 
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measures under Article 16 throughout its organizational history. Instead of Article 16, 
Article 11, which set a general guideline of collective measures to protect international 
peace, drew more attention for its significance in preventive diplomacy after the League 
committee successfully managed the conflict between Bulgaria and Greece without using 
force after a shooting between border patrols of the two sides in October 1925. Following 
Article 11, the League committee was summoned, and sent three military attaches from 
England, France, and Italy stationed in their embassies in Beograd to observe the 
withdrawal of both Bulgarian and Greek troops. The action taken by the League was 
highly praised as preventive diplomacy using military presence; the League enhanced the 
preventive diplomacy function implied in Article 11 and augmented the article by 
adopting a guideline and a treaty (Kozai 1991).  
The basic framework of using military presence as a means of preventive 
diplomacy started being institutionalized in the Bulgaria and Greece border conflict 
although the immediate predecessor of peacekeeping operations was the international 
force deployed to the Saar Basin (Saargebiet). The League of Nations formed an 
international force to maintain regional security for the plebiscite in the Saar Basin of 
Western Europe in 1934. The Nazi regime tried to annex the Saar Basin without the 
plebiscite, and potential Nazi-led boycotts and terrorist acts appeared to be beyond the 
capability of small, local police forces. To secure the region, the League authorized the 
international force that consisted of approximately 3,300 troops from Britain, Italy, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands (Segal and Gravino 1985; Lewis 1992). These nations were 
not the nations concerned, and were politically impartial on the plebiscite in the Saar 
Basin. Although the term peacekeeping was not invented yet, the Saar International Force 
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was called a “peace force” not a “fighting force” at that time (Lewis 1992).3 These early 
missions under the League of Nations also provided the three basic norms of 
peacekeeping: impartiality, consent of interested parties, and non-coercion. 
The Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations 
Since its inception, the UN has emphasized the maintenance of international 
peace as one of its organizational objectives, and authorized UN forces to use military 
power for conflict resolution, reflecting on the structural incapacity of the League of 
Nations to prevent World War II (The International Peace Cooperation Headquarter 2001). 
However, the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, which emerged 
soon after World War II, made it nearly impossible for the Security Council to gain 
consensus on conflict intervention in cases in which conflict would imperil the global 
security situation. Learning lessons from its predecessor, the UN developed a 
peacekeeping system as an alternative means of dealing with inter-state conflicts without 
unanimous decision-making in the Security Council in order to enable the peace 
functions of the UN in the bipolar Cold War system. UN peacekeeping operations started 
with sending unarmed military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO) to Palestine in 1948.4  
                                                 
3 In other occasions, the League of Nations used multinational forces in order to mediate the 
settlement of international disputes upon requests of member nations despite small numbers of 
successful cases. Before the Saar international force, the League of Nations attempted to mediate 
the conflict between Poland and Lithuania in 1920 with the international force, but the plan was 
never implemented. The League used an international force to mediate the Leticia Trapeze 
conflict between Columbia and Peru in 1933. In the Leticia conflict, the committee consisted of 
officers from the US, Brazil, and Spain, but the body of detachment was Colombian soldiers. 
Involvement of Columbian soldiers made the international force in the Leticia conflict a less 
politically impartial international force despite the fact that the locals in Columbia and Leticia 
would not welcome the intervention of soldiers from third parties. 
4 According to Fabian (1971), the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) 
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Figure 1 aligns these peacekeeping missions on the spectrum of missions based on 
three principles of peacekeeping missions: impartiality, use of force, and consent of the 
conflicting parties. Three types of peacekeeping missions ―observer missions, 
traditional peacekeeping missions, and second-generation (strategic) peacekeeping 
missions ― are in the figure as variations of peacekeeping missions. Although the present 
dissertation does not include enforcement mission as a type of peacekeeping mission, I 
added enforcement missions as an extreme end of deviation from peacekeeping to show 
the spectrum of peacekeeping missions.5 
Observation missions are implemented as an extension of pacific settlement of a 
dispute under Chapter VI, albeit military forces are used; they are also sharply distinctive 
from Chapter VII type enforcing military sanctions. Early observation missions, therefore, 
rigidly follow the three principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, host country consent, 
and no use (or minimal use) of force. These three principles were established through the 
first several unarmed observer missions for monitoring cease-fire agreements including 
the early two missions in the Balkans (UNSCOB) and Indonesia (UNCI), which are not 
classified as official missions of the UN any more, and the subsequent missions in the 
Middle East (UNTSO) and in South Asia (the United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan: UNMOGIP) in the late 1940s, and they became the basic norms of 
traditional peacekeeping missions. These unarmed observer missions could be  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1946-1954) should be the first UN peacekeeping mission. The mission investigated communist 
nations’ intrusion on the northern border of Greece, but this mission is not included in the United 
Nations’ official documents any more (Segal 1995). See Appendix A in Fabian (1971) about the 
mission details of UNSCOB.  
 
5 Although the Korean War and the Gulf War were two large military missions in which the 
United Nations was involved, enforcement missions should not be included in peacekeeping 
missions because the United Nations sanctions but not operate missions (Hillen 2000). 
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implemented without unanimous approval of the permanent Security Council members, 
and the success of these missions expanded the range of missions into so called 
traditional peacekeeping missions. 
Traditional peacekeeping. Relative to observation missions, traditional 
peacekeeping mission have been playing a more active role in the settlement of armed 
conflicts by occupying buffer zones between the hostile parties, and use force only if it is 
necessary to protect themselves in life-threatening situations. Traditional peacekeeping 
operations send small size units to the areas in which a cease-fire agreement has been 
concluded among the hostile parties, and assist the peace process and maintain cease-fire 
agreements as an impartial third party. Activities in the missions vary from cease-fire 
verification to occupying buffer zones. These missions are operated by small size 
multinational forces composed of peacekeepers from middle powers. The United Nations 
Emergency Force I (UNEF I) initiated in 1956 was the first mission of this kind, to 
supervise disengagement and occupy a buffer zone after Egypt nationalized the Suez 
Post-Cold War 
Peacekeeping 
Enforcement 
Actions 
Traditional 
Peacekeeping 
Observation 
Missions 
Non-coercive Coercive
Passive 
Impartiality  
Aggressiv
Consent of the 
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Parties 
Required Not 
Required 
(N i t t)
Figure 1: The Spectrum of UN Peacekeeping Missions
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Canal. Compared to the previous observation missions, the authorization process of 
UNEF I was notably different in that the mission was mandated by the General Assembly 
to avoid possible vetoes by France and Britain in the Security Council (Segal 1995). This 
11- year long mission formulated institutional rules of traditional peacekeeping missions 
for the subsequent missions regarding the principles and standards in operations 
(Fetherston 1994). As military operations that the United Nations authorizes, traditional 
peacekeeping missions have had a set of restrictions on political legitimacy and military 
authority that are congruent with those of the UN based on the three principles 
(impartiality, limited use of force, and consent of belligerents). These norms of UN 
peacekeeping restrict the composition and size of the force and operational structure, 
including equitable geographic representation of troops (Hillen 2000).  
Post-Cold War Peacekeeping Missions. Until the 1990s, UN peacekeeping 
missions were unlikely to be approved by the two superpowers; the United States and the 
former Soviet Union did not actively participate in UN peacekeeping missions following 
a Cold War doctrine that restricted their engagement in UN peacekeeping missions to 
maintain the political impartiality of those missions (Segal and Gravino 1985). These 
political situations made peacekeeping missions in the Cold War period unilateral, 
decentralized, and informal. The end of the Cold War removed political constraints on the 
scope and application of peacekeeping, and allowed the Security Council to more 
effectively mediate armed conflicts and send peacekeeping forces with extensive 
mandates. UN peacekeeping became a policy option in US politics, and Russia became a 
reasonable permanent member of the Security Council regarding the authorization of 
peacekeeping missions. This shift made it much easier for the Security Council 
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permanent members to directly engage in peacekeeping missions than in the past 
(Mackinlay and Chopra 1993). Institutionalization of peacekeeping as a political option 
expanded the diversity of participating nations in peacekeeping operations. 
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, UN peacekeeping has increased its 
political and operational complexity and become more differentiated from prior 
peacekeeping missions. Because of their complexity and wide range of activities, many 
peacekeeping missions launched after the end of the Cold War were named “second-
generation peacekeeping” and “strategic peacekeeping” (Dandeker and Gow 1997). 
Reflecting the expansion in the spectrum of peacekeeping missions, researchers have 
proposed different taxonomies of the missions emphasizing different aspects of the 
missions such as strategic (Hillen 2000), legal (Diehl 1993), and sociological (Dandeker 
and Gow 1997). From a sociological viewpoint, Dandeker and Gow (1997) called second 
generation missions “strategic peacekeeping,” referring to “operations in which an 
international force is inserted into a continuing conflict to assist in creating conditions for 
conflict termination, but without taking sides in the conflict”(p.329). A strategic 
peacekeeping operation is placed between traditional peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement with the possibility of being engaged in enforcement measures to some 
extent. According to Dandeker and Gow (1997), what makes strategic peacekeeping 
different from traditional peacekeeping are differences in strategic level (i.e., consent of 
the conflicting parties and the use of force) and the process to balance three different 
aspects of legitimation: (a) legal codes and normative values, (b) effective performance, 
and (c) popular support from a wide range of audiences.  
In the present dissertation, I will simply call the peacekeeping missions after the 
  20 
 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact “post-Cold War peacekeeping” to avoid confusion. The 
absence of the tension between two superpowers increased attention to intra-state civil 
wars and other regional armed conflicts that might imperil world peace. Demands for UN 
intervention steeply increased, and there have been a total of 59 peacekeeping missions 
since then (as of December 2004). Forty-one missions ─ nearly 70 percent of the total ─ 
were initiated in 1991 or later. This unprecedented increase of UN peacekeeping missions 
corresponded to the willingness of the UN to play a more active role in international 
peacekeeping activities. However, the intense and extensive involvement of the UN 
brought uncertainty and fluidity in peacekeeping that were rarely seen before.  
Actors in armed conflicts are not necessarily nation-states. Subnational-level 
hostile parties who do not consider international laws seriously are involved in the 
targeted conflicts of peacekeeping operations. Those actors more easily violate cease-fire 
agreements, and the mission environments become extremely unstable. In these missions, 
keeping the three traditional principles of peacekeeping became more difficult. As UN 
peacekeeping has increasingly dealt with intra-state conflicts, in which the principles for 
traditional peacekeeping are not promised but humanitarian intervention is necessary, we 
came to find more deviation from the three principles of traditional peacekeeping (Hillen 
2000).  
We also observed changes in the actors who carry out peacekeeping missions in 
the post-Cold War period. The Security Council came to support UN peacekeeping free 
from the Cold War peacekeeping doctrine that restricted participation of super powers, 
and some of the UN peacekeeping missions initiated in the early 1990s gained personnel 
contribution from the great powers. These two factors, and international expectations 
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regarding the stronger role of the UN, expanded UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s, and 
this tendency came to culmination with the success of the Gulf War. In August 1990, the 
UN Security Council sanctioned the use of force by a coalition of member states after the 
Iraqi military invaded Kuwait. The Gulf War was the first time in UN history that the use 
of force by a coalition of member states was authorized,6 and represented one of the 
extreme ends of the spectrum. It was a defining moment of multilateral peacekeeping. Its 
increasing significance transformed international peacekeeping, from a secondary 
mission with almost no troop contribution by major powers, into a means of burden 
sharing in global politics for many UN member nations.  
Expansion of UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War created two types 
of peacekeeping missions, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
Adopting Dandeker and Gow’s (1997) typology, we call the former strategic 
peacekeeping. Strategic peacekeeping is an expanded version of first generation 
peacekeeping, in which the UN assists a host country through the total process from 
peaceful negotiation for conflict resolution to assistance in building new national systems 
after an armed conflict. Strategic peacekeeping deviates less from the basic principles of 
traditional peacekeeping than peace-enforcement type missions such as the missions in 
Somalia and Bosnia. These two missions, initiated after the Gulf War, also reflected new 
directions of UN peacekeeping by the former Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 
(1992) An Agenda for Peace. Boutros-Ghali reconceptualized and tried to reinforce the 
peace functions of the United Nations, proposing his idea of expanded peacekeeping. He 
                                                 
6 A critical difference from the Korean War (1950-1953) is that the United Nations did not 
mandate the United States as a UN Command in the Gulf War even though the United States 
legitimized the use of force by the US-led coalition. In Korea, the UN was prepared for exercising 
limited oversight in its operations, while in the Gulf War it was not involved in any operational 
management of the coalition force (Hillen 2000). 
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revised the basic principle of traditional peacekeeping and added more coercive means to 
resolve the armed conflicts set forth in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Boutros-Ghali 
identified the following four peace functions of the United Nations in his An Agenda for 
Peace: (1) preventive diplomacy, (2) peacemaking, (3) peacekeeping, and (4) post-
conflict peace building. He separated peacekeeping into two, peacemaking by peaceful 
settlement and peacekeeping by enforcement measures. Peace-enforcement type missions 
represented the latter, in which use of force was authorized to arrest suspects who 
attacked UN workers and to disarm fortified groups. Boutros-Ghali also proposed to form 
peace-enforcement units specifically for restoring cease-fire agreements, supported by 
Article 40 of the UN Charter when the belligerents breach cease-fire agreements. In his 
idea, peace-enforcement units are separate military elements from UN multinational 
forces and the regular UN forces. His proposal emphasized some forms of enforcement 
measures to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping (Kamiya 2001).  
However, peace enforcement missions reflecting Boutros-Ghali’s new concept of 
peacekeeping immediately experienced a series of failures in the missions in Somalia and 
Bosnia. As a consequence he issued a supplement to the original text of An Agenda for 
Peace in January 1995. In the supplement, peacemaking was redefined as peaceful 
settlement for conflict resolution following the traditional definition, and the military 
enforcement means for conflict resolution were clearly separated as “sanction” from 
other means that require the consent of the engaged parties. Boutros-Ghali admitted the 
theoretical difference between peacekeeping and that of enforcement action and the 
United Nations’ limited capability to manage enforcement actions, albeit it is ideal to 
improve such functions in the long term. He virtually denied his idea of expanded 
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peacekeeping stating that “peacekeeping and use of force beyond self-defense are not on 
the continuums, but alternative techniques for conflict resolution” (Boutros-Ghali 
1995:p.35-36). Although it is not an official document, it is noteworthy that the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides a glossary of peacekeeping 
terminology. In the glossary, peacekeeping operations are defined as “non-combat 
military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent 
parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce 
agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement.” It does not 
include peace enforcement type missions.  
Introducing these tentative definitions does not clarify the conceptual variation of 
peacekeeping, rather it adds to the conceptual confusion. In the present dissertation, to 
avoid the confusion in use of terms, I use peacekeeping as the general term representing 
military observation missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, 
peace-building missions, and peace-making missions. I exclude peace-enforcement 
missions and humanitarian missions. I specify a certain type of peacekeeping mission if it 
is necessary. When I use the term peace operations, it includes all the above missions. 
The same rule is applied to which agency or organization (the United Nations or regional 
multilateral organizations) authorized a mission. If it is not specified, it includes both 
UN-led and regional organization-led missions.     
A series of failures of peace-enforcement missions in the early 1990s (e.g., The 
Srebrenica Massacre in Bosnia and Genocide in Rwanda) had a significant impact on 
budgets and the willingness of the participant nations’ involvement in UN peacekeeping 
activities, and the number and the budget of UN peacekeeping sharply dropped in the late 
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1990s. Recently UN peacekeeping gradually became active in multi-functional 
peacekeeping missions such as the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The constabulary 
nature of UN peacekeeping survived through this chaos in the early stage of the post Cold 
War peacekeeping, and it still serves as a primary principle of peacekeeping missions.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundation 
 
 
Globalization and Peacekeeping 
The globalization of economic activities, media, and electronic communication 
has been weakening the autonomy of the nation-state. In the wake of globalization, 
people become increasingly concerned about global scale security threats including 
transnational terrorism, organized crime, and threats to environmental security. The 
globalization of crime, capital, and power makes every national institution equally 
vulnerable, and this global condition of security promoted “structural multilateralism” or 
“multilateral interdependence” in the post-Cold War period (Castells 2004).   
The Gulf War, the first common threat to the global community in the post-Cold 
War period, revealed the growing tendency toward globalization of security. In this new 
security system, nation-states, including the most powerful nations, are no longer able to 
control their security decisions purely based on their own interests. Nation-states have to 
conform to an ever-changing output of interests and negotiations among states (Keohane 
2002) or to the growing global norms in the international community, so called “global 
culture” (Paris 2003). Once the Cold War blocs were dissolved, major international 
organizations actively support liberal democracy as a new standard of legitimate 
nationhood and take actions to promote it. However, in this movement, liberal democratic 
institutions and practices are promoted as the most appropriate model of domestic 
governance despite the existence of regions that should be rebuilt with non-state political 
structures to avoid the recurrence of violence. In other words, Western European states 
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continue to be major legitimate actors in liberal democracy and treated as a model for 
democratic governance. Post Cold War peacekeeping is a product of the global culture, 
and the global norms of peacekeeping practices started overriding the existing national 
security polices and norms within nation-states. The states that used to be financiers of 
operations but not actors in the field, such as Germany and Japan, could no longer avoid 
military contribution to international defense missions for the sake of global security. 
Combined with the expansion of activities in which international peacekeeping forces 
engage, in many societies, peacekeeping participation created a series of debates on how 
much unique conditions of each state should be taken into consideration in collective 
efforts to meet the globalization of security threats.   
In the early 1990s, there was a growing concern about the overwhelmingly white 
and Western dominant peacekeeping troops.7 In the late 1990s, the troops from non-
Western member nations outnumbered the troops from their Western counterparts. Now, 
as much as 75 percent of UN troops consist of contingents from developing countries 
(Weerts, et al. 2002).8 North East Asian nations still constitute only 3.15 percent of the 
total number of UN troops in 2002; the Japanese contingent represents 60 percent of 
those Asian troops (1.92 percent of the annual total number of UN troops) (UN 
Department of Peacekeeping 2002). As the presence of developing nations in 
peacekeeping operations has become visible, these nations expressed concerns about the 
                                                 
7 Europe and Asia-Pacific regions maintain approximately 30 percent of armed forces worldwide 
respectively. In 1993, however, European nations provided 46 percent of military personnel 
deployed to UN peace missions, while representation of East Asia and Pacific region was only 9 
percent despite the principle of adequate geographic representation of troop contributing nations. 
This was because domestic and regional situations significantly contributed to limited 
participation of some Asia-Pacific nations (Blechman and Vaccaro 1994). 
8 For example, as of April 2002, 73.6 percent of UN missions (29 out of 63 nations) consist of 
soldiers from developing countries. 
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dominance of Western nations in the administration of UN peacekeeping missions. 
Developing nations are concerned that Western nations’ interests and reliance on their 
own intelligence sources can undermine the impartiality of peacekeeping operations 
(Alley 1998).  
Reflecting the fact that the majority of peacekeeping forces in the Cold War era 
consisted of soldiers from Western nations, most studies of peacekeeping have been done 
by scholars from Western industrialized nations. However, as peacekeeping forces have 
become increasingly diverse, comparative peacekeeping research plays a significant role 
to broaden the horizon of contemporary military sociology research, addressing issues in 
military-to-military relations within multinational or coalition forces deployed to 
peacekeeping operations (Siebold 2001). On the other hand, Rubinstein (1993; 2003) 
noted that unique symbols and rituals in peacekeeping are cultural practices that allow 
diverse military troops to work together in the field. Most researchers have studied 
peacekeeping and military peacekeepers in an acultural manner while very few studies 
have found any unified form of culture in international peacekeeping forces. Yet, 
peacekeepers often need to reinterpret the things taken for granted in their home country, 
particularly their soldier role for a specific nation-state and peacekeeper role for the UN. 
Despite the international structure of the peacekeeping force, soldiers assigned to 
peacekeeping missions do not necessarily become internationalists or develop a unified 
culture as peacekeepers with their counterparts from other nations (Moskos 1975; Segal 
1996). Rather, peacekeepers make sense of their peacekeeping assignments in their own 
organizational context (Moskos 1975 1976; Segal and Segal 1993a). In a series of studies 
of American peacekeepers deployed to the Sinai MFO, Segal (2001) notes that the 
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peacekeeper role is one of many temporal, non-fighting roles that soldiers play. The 
temporal nature of the assignment prevents soldiers from internalizing the peacekeeper 
role as a part of their professional identity. The absence of unified culture in international 
forces suggests that peacekeeping researchers needs to pay more attention to the diversity 
in language, ethnicities, races, military traditions, and other aspects of soldiering among 
the contingents.  
 
The Military Profession and Peacekeeping 
A profession is an occupation which provides special or “esoteric service” to its 
clients based on “professed” practical and theoretical knowledge (Hughes 1965). Those 
who are in professions — professionals —hold “a license to deviate from lay conduct in 
action and in very mode of thought” in terms of their narrowly focused expertise. And 
such professional conduct is “an institutionalized deviation, in which there is a certain 
strain toward clear definition of situations and roles” (Hughes 1965:p.655-656).  
Military professionals hold a license to kill enemies for their country, and it 
provides the military profession with a unique quality and social status. The archetype of 
today’s professional armed forces emerged in eighteenth century Europe. By then, the 
officer Corps no longer consisted of members of a feudalistic warrior class or 
mercenaries. They were replaced by regular employees of the states with stable wages, 
and made their career by devoting their lives to the state. The professionalization of the 
officer Corps made it possible to distinguish the military from the civilian in society 
(Howard 1976). Thereafter the role and the characteristics of the military profession have 
shifted over time due to political, social, and technological changes. In the twentieth 
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century, technological developments drastically changed the way the armed forces 
conduct war. For example, conducting war with “mass armies,” composed of larger 
numbers of conscripts, was the dominant method of waging war in modern warfare; 
however, new technologies introduced during WWII made this “mobilization model” 
obsolete (Segal 1989). The two new technologies, nuclear weapons and airpower, 
eliminated the time and space gap between the homefront and the battlefield and no 
longer allow for the involved states to take time to recruit, train, and field their troops 
(Segal and Gravino 1985). These technological changes were the sign of the emerging 
change in the nature of the military profession.  
As the possibility of total war diminished in the age of deterrence, in the 
Professional Soldier, Janowitz (1960) predicted that the post-total war military would 
shift from war-fighting military forces to constabulary forces in the process of which 
military activities would accommodate arms control. Janowitz defined a constabulary 
force as a military that uses the minimum use of force and maintains a defensive posture, 
emphasizing constant readiness for deployment to maintain viable international relations 
rather than pursuing victories of war. A constabulary force is not entirely different from a 
traditional military force, rather a constabulary force maintains “continuity with past 
military experiences and traditions” (Janowitz 1960: p.418). It is a deviation as a result of 
the radical adaptation of the military to historical and social changes. In the constabulary 
force concept, the boundary between the peacetime and the wartime military 
establishment diminishes, and it caused a conceptual resemblance between the 
constabulary military and the police (Janowitz 1960).    
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For the military as a profession, Janowitz’s concept of constabulary force 
highlighted two potential problems in terms of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping. 
First, there is an occupational prestige issue regarding the distinctiveness of the 
profession. Janowitz predicted that the military would face persistent resistance by 
military personnel because the constabulary concept seems to degrade the role of the 
military profession to police work, which was considered to be lower in occupational 
prestige (Janowitz 1960). Second, beyond the loss of occupational prestige, changing the 
ethos that the organization valued for long time is not an easy task for an organization.  
The concept of a “profession” implies advanced education and prestige that 
entitles individuals in the profession to autonomy (Hughes 1958), and the application of 
the term profession was limited to very few occupations such as medicine, law, and 
clergy. Despite the centrality of the military in the development of modern societies,9 the 
military profession was added to the list of the professions fairly recently. The military 
became a profession in the service of the government, and an organization with 
achievement-based authority (Janowitz 1974). According to Feld (1964), the nature of the 
military profession separates it from other established professions such as medical 
doctors, lawyers, and the clergy. Feld argued that professional soldiers have limited 
levels of autonomy and operate within a stringent institutional structure of the 
                                                 
9 In the development process of modern societies, the military is regarded as a central player. 
From a neo-Marxist perspective, military forces were driving forces of the international 
expansion of capitalist industrial societies to gain raw materials and of modernization in many 
developing nations (Segal and Segal 1993ab). From a pragmatic viewpoint, military service is a 
form of civic education to test one’s democratic citizenship rights and obligation embedded in 
North American and European democratic polity (see Janowitz 1983).  
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organization. Roles, equipment, and information needed for particular missions are all 
specifically assigned to soldiers, and behavior and process are prescribed.  
In contrast, doctors and lawyers can practice more independently with minimum 
supervision and a loose affiliation with professional associations that give them 
credentials to practice their business. Although doctors and lawyers increasingly practice 
in bureaucratic organizations such as HMOs and large corporate law firms, their 
credentials still belong to individuals in the profession. In contrast, the military profession 
keeps its special status as a profession because individuals in the military profession 
legitimately engage in an otherwise socially prohibited activity – killing enemy 
combatants ― and have secret knowledge about the activity (Hughes 1958). In the 
military profession, the nobility of the profession is more sensitive to social interests and 
legitimacy. For this reason, military professionals felt threatened by the constabulary 
concept that would jeopardize their status as a profession by conflating the peacetime and 
wartime roles of the military and changing the fundamental definition of the profession.  
In a highly institutionalized organization such as the military, the organization 
often encounters a great deal of resistance when a core value of the organization is 
subject to change (Zucker 1977). According to Zucker (1977), the degree of 
institutionalization strongly affects resistance to change in organizational culture: the 
stronger the institutionalization is, the stronger the cultural uniformity across generations 
becomes. If the institutionalization is strong, cultural persistence, instead of social 
control, will enforce the maintenance of organizational culture through interpersonal 
interactions. This cultural resistance is consistent with Berger and Luckman’s (1967) 
notion of construction of social realities. In their theory, since social realities are 
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internalized into the individual through one’s own subjective life experiences, changes in 
realities are very difficult once they are shared as organizational knowledge, maintained 
and passed down from one generation to another. Zucker’s (1977) notion of cultural 
resistance to institutional changes explains the mechanism of resistance of soldiers 
against transformation to constabulary forces, which Janowitz anticipated in the post total 
war age. Because of the status dynamism and institutional power, soldiers feel threatened 
when their core task and skills related to warfighting were devalued or deemphasized in 
the mission (see Moskos 1976; Segal and Segal 1993a; Frank 1999). 
The Military Profession and Society  
In terms of the occupational prestige of the military profession, Janowitz 
described the military profession as a less privileged job in the U.S. (Janowitz 1960). 
However, compared to Japan, the social status of the military profession in the U.S. is 
esteemed and prestigious. In Japan, the status of the military profession is far from its 
American counterparts because of the lack of organizational legitimacy under the Peace 
Constitution.  
The status of a profession or occupation is not about the very nature of the work. 
Rather, social status of a profession differs from one society to another, depending on 
social, historical, and cultural contexts and needs. Everett Hughes (1958) defines the term 
“dirty work” as tasks and occupations that are viewed as physically, socially, or morally 
stigmatized in society. Accoring to Goffman (1963), stigma is a socially dishonored 
attribute that is associated with a negative social identity. Dirty work status is a type of 
stigma in society that is attributed to some occupations. However, dirty work or 
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stigmatized work is not necessarily a low status occupation.10 It is a unique status of a 
certain occupation because all the occupations have dirty work aspects to some extent 
(Hughes 1958). Dirty work status is the combination of intensity and the social meaning 
assigned to a certain occupation or a certain tasks.     
According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), physically stigmatized occupations 
perform their job in physically distasteful environments. They claim that coal miner, 
farmhand, firefighter, soldiers, and dentist are in this category. Socially stigmatized 
occupations involve regular contact with those who are stigmatized (e.g., Prison guard, 
AIDS aid worker, police detective, and psychiatric nurses). Morally stigmatized 
occupations are generally viewed as unethical because of their methods of approach (e.g., 
bill collector, paparazzi, and detectives) or the sinful nature of jobs (e.g., topless dancer, 
bouncer, and pawnbroker). Many occupations are tainted in multiple dimensions. For 
example, the military profession in some countries can be tainted in multiple domains 
(e.g., physical and moral domains), depending on political, historical, and cultural 
contexts.  
The military profession has more than one source of being dirty work. First, as 
exemplified in Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), soldiers perform their job in a physically 
dangerous and noxious environment (e.g., fighting in a desert with a full load of gear, wet 
trench, guerrilla operations in a jungle, and under sleep deprivation). Soldiers are also 
authorized to engage in socially prohibited conduct, killing enemies in combat. 
                                                 
10 I use the term occupation as an umbrella term to represent the categorization of one’s work. 
Profession, in contrast, is a subgroup of occupations that hold the high social status and expertise 
and knowledge. The role of professionalization and authority status that individuals gained 
through the process are considered as critical characteristics of the profession (Parsons 1964).  
The professional organization serves for the benefit of its own members rather than the interests 
of clients (Hughes 1952).  
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Compared to other professions, soldiers are also more likely to witness human death and 
suffering in the line of duty whether they do not engage in combat or not (e.g., 
humanitarian missions and rescue operations). These aspects of the profession are 
pragmatically legitimated by fulfilling the needs of the state, while the profession can be 
considered as socially or morally tainted, or both due to their actual tasks. Hughes (1958) 
calls the professional knowledge about socially prohibited conducts “guilty knowledge.” 
This knowledge provides the professions with the license to engage socially prohibited 
conduct, adds special quality and mystifies their job. These characteristics of military 
profession serve as exclusive membership and generate a distinctive set of norms. At the 
same time, the special license to conduct certain activities is routinely under scrutiny: “In 
the hearts of many laymen there burns a certain aggressive suspicion of all 
professionals…..In some people it flares up into raging and fanatical anger” (Hughes 
1958: p.82). The professional may see a situation in a longer, and larger perspective 
because of their possession of guilty knowledge. However, it can cause the tension 
between those who provide a service and those who receive it because “the professional 
mind…appears as a perversion of the common sense of what is urgent and what less 
urgent. The license to think in longer perspective thus may appear dangerous” (p.84).    
Dirty work status does not mean merely possessing a certain characteristic or 
attribute. It is not a sufficient condition to be stigmatized in society. A certain attribute 
can be a sufficient condition to be stigmatized only if a negative social meaning is 
attached to it in the eyes of others (Archer 1985). In this sense, dirty work status is 
socially constructed (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999) and can change over time.   
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Most often the traditional professions are viewed as essential in the human 
community; their job descriptions are believed to be unchanged overtime. In reality, as 
Morris Janowitz (1964) noted, the professions that are involved in basic human activities 
and needs would be called by another name that is most suitable to the definition of the 
profession in a given time in a given society.   
“If the human community were ever to free itself of diseases and illness, the 
world would not be without doctors...Likewise, a world without war would 
not be a world without soldiers…”(Janowitz 1964: p.11).  
 
In other words, the definition of a profession changes in interactions with non-
professional clients and their needs. According to Hughes (1958; 1965), professionals 
inevitably provide their services to non-professionals in a complex institutional setting. 
Through interactions with non-professionals, professionals discover different social 
realities that non-professionals bring in, and build an ethos and a system of 
rationalizations for appropriate behavior to maintain their positions. In terms of the 
relationship with clients, Miller (1999) noted an interesting perception of non-military 
peacekeepers (NGO and humanitarian workers) toward military peacekeepers. In her 
study, NGO workers were aware of the needs for military peacekeepers in the field to 
provide security to them, but they described the role of military peacekeepers to “do dirty 
jobs” for them. NGO workers and military peacekeepers are described as “strange 
bedfellows,” whose relationships are mostly characterized by mutual avoidance and 
hostility despite the fact they share similar tasks and limited physical space and resources 
in the field (Winslow, 2002). The significance of military peacekeepers’ presence and 
activities is not recognized by NGO workers, and both parties develop stereotypical 
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images of each other through their limited interactions (Miller, 1999; Pollick, 2000; 
Winslow, 2002). 
For military soldiers, the increasingly overlapping missions with civilian 
peacekeepers, inability to use force, lack of visibility, and ambiguous criteria of success 
in peacekeeping increasingly undermine the special qualities of the military profession. 
Although the special quality of the profession—a license to manage violence including 
kill enemy combatant for a state — partially contributes to dirty work status of the 
military profession, it is the major source that provide a special status with the military 
profession.  
Through interactions with the larger society, the military profession and its 
activities are uniquely defined and appropriated in a given time and in a given society. On 
one hand, as a widely established profession, military organizations loosely maintain 
common characteristics of the profession like the membership of a professional 
association (Avant 2000). On the other hand, despite the organizational goals and 
structure prescribed by the larger military profession community, military organizations 
show a surprisingly wide range of operational and cultural differences in response to 
regulations, norms, and cultural expectations in their host societies. For the same token, 
organizational adaptation to a new mission —such as peacekeeping — also reflects 
identity and rules such as ethics and behavioral standards that are consistent with those in 
their host society. Otherwise, the military will lose its legitimacy in society. Therefore, as 
Dandeker (1999) argued, organizational adaptation to peacekeeping shall vary depending 
on the general orientation of national security policy and military ethos valued in the 
armed forces.    
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Organizational Adaptability to Peacekeeping 
Although a constabulary force and a military force share “past military 
experiences and traditions,” the adaptation to the organizational environment created the 
distinctive difference in the nature of organizational practices, and these organizational 
practices reproduce the organization that is coherent with social norms and cultural 
values in the larger society. The mechanism of reproducing social structure within the 
organization will differentiate the organizational adaptability to an organizational change.  
Adaptation to peacekeeping as a primary mission is a large-scale organizational 
change in the post-Cold War military organization; it has been causing a major 
organizational transformation in structure, behavior, and attitudes in the armed forces 
contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. Organizational response and experience 
vary by the amount of pressure that organizations experience and by time and space in the 
strength of cognitive beliefs or normative controls (Scott 2003). In the organizational 
operation, an organization needs to conform to social values and the norms that prevail in 
the institutional environment. Those rules are generated in the institutional environment, 
namely the state, the world system, and any other social actor that is external to the 
organization and in higher status in the hierarchy (Thomas and Meyer 1984). Conformity 
to these external cultural and normative rules plays a key role in long-term organizational 
survival by controlling the legitimacy that the organization can enjoy. Organizational 
legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions”(Suchman 1995: p.574).  
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Organizational legitimacy cannot be gained solely by the efforts of the 
organization. It is given by cultural forces of collective observers— so called 
“organizational constituents” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990) or the “social audience” 
(Suchman 1995) —both of which are external to the organization. In this sense, 
legitimacy is socially constructed (Suchman 1995). In the process of organizational 
adaptation to peacekeeping, then how do individual military organizations maintain 
congruence between the organization and culturally and socially desirable behavior? 
Otherwise, legitimacy of the organization will decrease, and eventually lose access to the 
necessary societal resources to survive.  
Organizational culture represents shared values and norms providing behavioral 
and attitudinal standards for organizational members (O’Reilly and Chatman 1996) and 
provides a specific institutional model of social structure through shared meanings and 
norms (Smircich 1983; Davis 1984; Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994). Shared 
understanding of who they are ―sense of self― and what they should do are developed 
and maintained among organizational members through sense-making processes in the 
organization. Through these processes, organizational culture plays a critical role in 
organizational control and continuity, and embodies the identity of the members (Louis 
1983). However, it is often the case that peacekeepers have minimum contact with 
peacekeepers and civilians outside their own contingent to carry out their assignments in 
the field (Elron, et al. 2000; Segal and Eyre 1996). As a result, soldiers’ behavior and 
attitudes are largely subject to the regulations, normative expectations, and culture within 
the military organization and in the home society. In most cases, there is no unified form 
of peacekeeping culture (Segal 1996). 
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Expanding Dandeker’s (1999) typology of “adaptability” to peacekeeping, I 
present three types of armed forces with different organizational adaptability to illustrate 
the relationship between organizational legitimacy and peacekeeping. For him, 
adaptability to peacekeeping missions varies depending on the general orientation of 
national security policy and military ethos valued in the armed forces. Adaptability also 
can vary among job specialties within the force. Dandeker identified two types of 
societies, “societies equipped with a pronounced war-fighting ethos” (e.g., United States) 
and “societies equipped with a moderate war-fighting/national defense centered ethos” 
(e.g., Canada and the Nordic Nations). To depict new actors in post-Cold War 
peacekeeping missions, there should be a third type of society, which is equipped with a 
defense-centered “constabulary” ethos. Building on Dandeker’s (Dandeker and Gow 
1997; Dandeker 1999) typology of societal adaptation to peacekeeping, I illustrate the 
relationship between the shift of organizational orientation and military culture of 
developed countries before and after peacekeeping participation in the post-Cold War  
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period in Figure 2. Figure 2 indicates the change in military culture of troop contributing 
nations before and after the end of the Cold War. It should be noted that this 
categorization is merely a starting point for a comparative analysis and is not an attempt 
to rigidly categorize the change in military culture of any nation. 
Societies Equipped with Pronounced Military Ethos 
Through participation in post-Cold War peacekeeping missions, societies 
equipped with pronounced military ethos (indicated A in Figure 2) are shifting down to 
more constabulary orientations or concerned about demilitarization of the organization 
due to increasing peacekeeping participation. Soldiers in peacekeeping operations are 
required to engage more in diplomatic, goal-oriented tasks than any other military 
Military Culture
Military Force 
(Warrior Ethic) 
Constabulary Force 
(Constabulary Ethic) 
A: Society equipped with pronounced military ethos (e.g., United States) 
B: Society equipped with moderate military ethos (e.g., Sweden) 
C: Society equipped with highly constabulary ethos (e.g., Japan and Germany) 
Peacekeeping Participation 
A
A’ 
B
B’ 
C
C’ 
Cold War Era Post-Cold War Era 
Figure 2: Military Culture and Adaptation to Peacekeeping 
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mission despite the fact that warfighting remains the core of beliefs, values, and symbols 
that form an ideal type of soldier and military culture in the majority of armed forces. 
Despite the active involvement of the United States in UN peacekeeping operations after 
the end of the Cold War, the US military tends to regard these missions as distractions 
from the primary mission of fighting and winning America’s wars. The US Army chose 
to pursue its specialized excellence in combat skills rather than enhance its ability to 
provide military services in general (Segal and Eyre 1996).  
For example, the Army’s field manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, categorizes peace 
operations under Chapter 13 “Operations Other Than War.” Based on FM100-5, FM100-
23 Peace Operations (Department of the Army 1994) expanded the spectrum of 
operations, and specified three types of peace operations including support of diplomacy, 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Among the three categories, the doctrine places its 
emphasis on the latter two. This indicates that the concept of American peacekeeping 
involvement focuses on war-fighting aspects of peace operations. The definition of peace 
operation in FM100-23 serves as a regulatory description of American peacekeeping.  
Beyond such doctrinal guidance, the Army became less involved in specialized 
training for and deployment to peacekeeping missions due to budget cutting and 
downsizing in the early 1990s. The broadcasted image of a US soldier’s body dragged 
down the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993 deeply traumatized American society, 
and it led the United States to be muted in international peacekeeping missions in the mid 
and late 1990s. As war-fighting and peacekeeping operations became tightly coupled, the 
US Army started having trouble adapting to peacekeeping operations. First, although 
war-fighting oriented soldiers can be good peacekeepers (Moskos 1976; Segal and Segal 
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1993a), the appropriate role behavior of a soldier is incongruent with appropriate 
behavior for the peacekeeper role. U.S. combat soldiers who deployed to Macedonia did 
not believe that they would continue to play the peacekeeper role if Serbian soldiers 
invaded Macedonia (Miller 1997). For soldiers who are trained to be war fighters, 
ambiguity of the criteria for a successful mission is another issue in peacekeeping. 
Despite its success (there has not been a shot fired in anger in the Sinai in two decades), 
the Sinai MFO has never drawn the attention of the American public except when the 
tragic air crash in Gander, Newfoundland, in December 1985 killed 248 soldiers heading 
home from the Sinai (Segal and Segal 1993a). Peacekeeping missions do not draw as 
much public attention as do large military conflicts (Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal 2001) 
so that the social role and the significance of the military may diminish in the public eye. 
The more successful a peacekeeping mission is, the more invisible it is to the public 
(Segal and Waldman 1993). There are advantages in both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to evaluate the success of a peacekeeping mission, but the measures of 
success depend on the conceptualization of success, albeit researchers agree that the 
counterfactual measures (“what if” type assessment) are problematic (Druckman and 
Stern 1997). The lack of visibility of success in society diminishes psychological rewards 
and may lead to relative deprivation for service members who are assigned to 
peacekeeping missions especially in societies equipped with pronounced military ethos. 
Societies Characterized by Moderate Military Ethos 
Societies characterized by moderate military ethos (indicated B in Figure 2) tend 
to have a long history of peacekeeping participation from the Cold War period, and the 
organizational orientation of their military is not expected to change. However, the 
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increasing involvement of major powers in UN peacekeeping operations is threatening 
their established role in the international community. Canada, the Netherlands, 
Scandinavian nations, and other nations that comprise the so called middle powers, have 
been playing an active role in UN peacekeeping from the beginning. Yet, they are 
struggling with their role in post-Cold War peacekeeping and experiencing maladaptation 
in the field. Although their military cultures should be well suited to peacekeeping 
missions, involvement of the United States in post-Cold War peacekeeping led the 
middle powers to restructure their role in the international community. They used to be 
the main actors in traditional peacekeeping, and played a central role in the command 
structure, too.  
As the United States started actively being engaged in peacekeeping, the United 
States expressed reluctance to being under the command of other armed forces in 
peacekeeping missions. Middle powers maintain that their expertise in peacekeeping 
missions developed over time, but their expertise and experience have been called into 
question in post-Cold War peacekeeping.  
Maladaptation of peacekeepers from middle powers suggests that it is partially 
because subcultural differences among different job specialties are problematic to 
soldiers’ adjustment to the peacekeeper role, and partially because second generation or 
strategic peacekeeping missions require soldiers playing too many contradictory roles at 
the same time in a chaotic situation characterized by ambiguity between political and 
military dimensions of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period.  
For example, soldiers in the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) tortured and 
killed a local youth in Somalia in 1994. This incident shook the Canadian Forces and the 
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entire Canadian society, and consequentially the CAR was deactivated. Researchers 
conclude that the incident was an inappropriate manifestation of fighting ethos and 
subculture in the CAR (see Winslow, 1997). However, there is another pattern of 
malfunction of peacekeeping troops in the field. In July 1995, the Dutch military was 
accused of allowing a mass slaughter of Bosnian Muslim refugees in Srebrenica. The 
Dutch military peacekeepers —called Dutchbat— deployed to Srebrenica numbered only 
200, and Dutchbat assisted the Serbs in taking 8,000 Muslim men and boys out of the 
enclave in order to avoid immediate panic and humanitarian catastrophe, not expecting 
that the Serbs would kill 7,000 of those men and boys taken from the enclave. It became 
the worst massacre in the post-World War II history of Europe (The Netherlands Institute 
of War Documentation 2002).  
These incidents suggest that post Cold War peacekeeping requires soldiers to 
perform too many roles simultaneously in unpredictable mission situations. Peacekeepers 
have to chose and play the most appropriate role from the peacekeeper role, the soldier 
role, and the diplomat role. Since situational change is unpredictable and ambiguous, it is 
significantly confusing and difficult for soldiers to choose the most appropriate 
operational decision to meet the basic principles of UN peacekeeping. For example, 
frequent changes in mission objectives make the interpretation of the rules of engagement 
(ROE) ambiguous. The ROE are the norms and regulations that set standards for the 
legitimate use of force and for soldiers’ behavior so that the ambiguous interpretation of 
the ROE are a most confusing, frustrating, and demoralizing experience for peacekeepers 
(Franke 1999).  
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The Srebrenica incident caused the Dutch Cabinet to resign, and left Dutch 
society stunned. Dutch soldiers who deployed to Srebrenica suffered psychological 
difficulties due to their experience and unexpected consequences in Srebrenica. The 
media harshly criticized the error made by Dutchbat in that the Dutch soldiers did not 
fight back in the situation in which soldiers from other nations would have fought 
following the same rules of engagement (ROE).11 However, it is also worth pointing out 
that there are a number of ways of interpreting the same ROE in different national 
contexts (Franke 1999). It is not surprising that one country with a pronounced military 
posture will carry out ROE proactively, and another country with a pacifist posture will 
set a restrictive interpretation of ROE (Hill 2002). Peacekeepers’ behavior is greatly 
affected by a wider institutional environment surrounding the military, such as security 
policies, public opinion, and cultural norms of using force in the host society. The high 
profile maladaptation cases of middle power peacekeepers demonstrated that the 
increasing complexities in recent peacekeeping missions make peacekeeping assignments 
more than a temporary, non-military role that soldiers can play with a minor adjustment 
of their soldier role and behavioral pattern attached to it.  
Societies Characterized by a Constabulary Ethos 
 Societies characterized by a constabulary ethos (indicated C in Figure 2) include 
Germany, Japan, and other societies with highly constabulary ethics and anti-military 
cultures. The transformation of UN peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War made 
Germany and Japan, the ex-axis nations which had maintained low-profiles in military 
affairs, contribute their military manpower to UN peacekeeping missions as a part of 
                                                 
11 At the same time, there has been skepticism in Dutch Society that Dutchbat had somewhat 
helped with the massacre by letting the Serbian Army take male Muslim refugees.  
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burden sharing as state actors in global politics. The organizational transition due to 
participating in peacekeeping in the 1990s is not only uni-directional from a military 
force to a constabulary force, as we see in the cases of Germany and Japan. Post-WWII 
Japan and Germany have shared the fundamental posture regarding national security 
policy that taking military action is strictly constrained. Germany and Japan, however, 
chose different strategies in redirecting their national security policies in the post WW II 
period, although the two nations commonly place international organizations and their 
policies as the core value in their national security policies.  
The main missions of the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces) during the Cold 
War period were area-specific missions to contribute to the common defense of NATO, 
and particularly its own territory. The German armed forces were not authorized to 
participate in out of area operations. Reflecting geographic proximity to neighboring 
nations and membership in international communities such as the European Union, 
NATO, and the United Nations, Germany has a global perspective toward national 
security, unlike Japan. International organizations are highly regarded in German politics, 
and the German public is favorable to government policies that are consistent with 
policies of international organizations. German security policy is never to take military 
action except as a part of the Alliance or being with partners, but not using the 
Bundeswehr alone (Fleckenstein 2000). After Unification, the National People’s Army of 
the former German Democratic Republic was integrated into the Bundeswehr. In 1996 
the Bundeswehr established the crisis-reaction force, which can be mobilized for 
peacekeeping missions. It consists of more than 50,000 troops, approximately 16 percent 
of the entire German armed forces. This new structure significantly improved the 
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deployability of the Bundeswehr (The Economist 1995; Fleckenstein 2000). As the 
Bundeswehr becomes an international intervention force, Germany escapes from her 
uniquely subordinate role within the western military alliance (The Economist 1996). 
In Germany and Japan, unlike the United States, peacekeeping has drawn public 
attention to national security and military affairs more than ever in the post-Cold War 
world. Despite the remaining resistance and cautious utilization of military troops for 
peacekeeping missions overseas, military institutions in Germany and Japan have been 
moving from peripheral to a more central place in society. One of the concerns 
surrounding oversea deployment by Japan for international peacekeeping is its 
remilitarization. Some researchers expressed their concerns and studied national security 
issues in contemporary Japan from an assumption that a nation-state normally strives to 
develop military capability equivalent to its economic power (see Berger 1993; Hook 
1996; Drifte 2000). While such a macro-organizational issue remains a dominant 
concern, only few studies (Kawano 2001 2002; Ohi 1999) have been conducted on 
micro-organizational level issues associated with Japanese peacekeeping, albeit 
organizational changes will not take place without any change in dynamics at a micro-
organizational level.  
In contemporary Japan and Germany, there are very strong influences of societal 
history on contemporary cultural norms about use of military power. German 
peacekeepers may feel stress reflecting the host society’s mixed opinion about 
international peacekeeping operations (Kornhuber 1994, cited in Britt 1998), and the 
same logic may be applied to Japanese peacekeepers. In Japan, social and legal norms 
play a special role as the main determinants of national security policies; domestic 
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institutionalized norms are more influential than the international balance of power in the 
political decision making process on national security issues (Katzenstein 1996).  
Regulative constraints by Article 9 of the Constitution and deeply rooted anti-
militaristic norms are the institutional rules that contemporary Japanese armed forces 
have been dealing with since their inception. Specifically for Germany and Japan, the 
regional history and the remaining fear of remilitarizations of these ex-Axis nations may 
affect peacekeepers’ attitudes. Since the Japanese government is very sensitive about 
reactions from other Asian nations, attitudes of other Asian nations toward Japanese 
peacekeeping participation will continue to affect Japan’s policies on peacekeeping 
participation. Neighboring Asian nations are concerned about Japan’s remilitarization 
because of the brutal treatment these nations had to go through during the Japanese 
occupation in World War II. This collective memory of Japanese militarism keeps 
neighboring nations skeptical about Japanese overseas deployment to peacekeeping 
operations. The impact of these macro social and historical contexts may be subtle, but 
the contextual effect is critical to certain nations’ contingents when serving a mission in a 
specific region. 
 
Organizational Legitimacy and Peacekeeping 
As peacekeeping increased its importance as a military mission, researchers 
quickly became aware that traditional theories, which assume social structure is given, 
are not sufficient to analyze the changing nature of peacekeeping. It motivated military 
sociologists to study adaptation to peacekeeping as a social process (Segal, Segal, and 
Eyre 1992). Regardless of the theoretical robustness and explanatory power of the classic 
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theories (e.g., structural functional theory, conflict theory, and Weber’s theory of 
bureaucracy) (see Segal and Segal 1993b), peacekeeping research reveals that the 
theories assuming static social structure have limited explanatory power to examine 
social processes related to contemporary military organizations.  
To this theoretical inquiry, Segal and his colleagues (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992; 
Eyre, Segal, and Segal 1993) provided an answer by applying Berger and Luckmann’s 
(1966) social constructionist perspective in their research on American peacekeepers. 
Segal’s research articulated the social process in which the role of peacekeepers and 
peacekeeping missions are defined and redefined through various social actors in 
American society including policy makers, the media, soldiers, and their family members. 
His perspective embraces the significance of “organizational constituents” (Ashfort and 
Gibbs 1990) and “social audience” (Suchman 1995) in the formation of organizational 
legitimacy. They are agents of “convention” and “its validity is externally guaranteed by 
the probability that deviation from it within a given social group will result in a relatively 
general and practically significant reaction of disapproval” (Weber, 1924[1947]: p.127). 
For this reason, in the process of introducing a new task that contradicts the existing 
operations and organizational goals, a professional organization cannot ignore the 
external force that controls the deviation from cultural expectations in the larger society.   
According to Suchman (1995), organizational legitimacy is a general view that an 
organization meets socially constructed norms, values, and beliefs in its operations. For 
him, organizational legitimacy plays a significant role in conformity to cultural norms, 
symbols, beliefs, and rituals in the organizational environment (Weber, 1924[1947]; 
Suchman, 1995).  
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Legitimacy equips organizations with ‘persistence’ and ‘meaning’ and brings 
them stability and credibility. However, since organizational activities themselves cannot 
provide ‘stability’ and ‘credibility’ to organizations, organizations seek legitimacy that is 
given by collective observers (Perrow 1970; Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995). 
Once collective observers recognize and support the legitimacy of an organization, the 
organization starts the process of trust building. The organization replicates itself and 
builds trust and the meaning of certain institutionalized activities using the resources 
given by the observers. In this process, legitimacy influences how people understand 
organizations (Suchman 1995). As institutions are socially constructed archetypes for 
action, generated and maintained through interactions (Zucker 1977; Meyer and Rowan 
1977, Scott, et al. 2000), so is legitimacy also socially constructed as a core component of 
institutions. More precisely, the process of building legitimacy —legitimation— is a 
synonym to institutionalization processes in that institutions provide meanings and taken-
for-grantedness to every aspect of an organization (Suchman 1995). Suchman (1995) 
further elaborated the collective mechanism of organizational legitimacy. For him, 
legitimacy is shaped subjectively and sustained objectively through observers’ eyes to the 
organization. It also echoes consistency between the behavior of the legitimated 
organization and the shared belief of collective observers.  
This collective mechanism of legitimacy suggests that legitimacy is a lifeline for 
organizations to survive in social systems in which they are embedded. Organizations 
that fail to gain and maintain legitimacy in their activities are less likely to survive 
because observers no longer find the organization as worth existing (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). However, not every organization needs external support to the same degree. The 
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degree of necessity for legitimacy varies depending on what support an organization 
seeks: passive support or active support. Passive support is associated with sense making 
when an organization just needs to make sense out of a particular activity. In that case, an 
organization sets a low standard of legitimacy given by observers. Passive support 
requires a cultural-cognitive component of legitimacy while active support requires an 
evaluative and normative component of legitimacy (Suchman 1995).  
There are also different types of legitimacy that organizations can gain, maintain, 
and lose. Scott et al (2000) identified three dimensions of legitimacy based on his three 
pillars of institutions (Scott 1995): regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
structures. His typology is consistent with Weber’s notion of organization and legitimacy 
in the association between social action and an order (ordnung). According to Weber 
([1924]1947), organizations are considered to be legitimate to the extent that they 
conform to an order set by “law” (regulative legitimacy), “ethics” (normative legitimacy), 
and “conventions” (cultural legitimacy).    
Regulative legitimacy emphasizes conformity to legal rules, and legal sanction 
such as rewards and penalties. Legitimacy, in this sense, is legally sanctioned behavior 
(Scott, et al. 2000). Law coercively regulates and constrains one’s behavior while it 
provides conformity to collective ideologies shared in society. Paying close attention to 
conformity to collective values, Suchman (1995) developed the concept of pragmatic 
legitimacy as a regulative legitimacy, focusing on the function of regulative legitimacy in 
as social group. Pragmatic legitimacy is driven by the self-interests of most immediate 
observers of an organization. Self-interest based pragmatic legitimacy plays an important 
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role in conformity to legal rules because rules ultimately serve the collective interests in 
society.  
The second type of legitimacy, normative legitimacy, emphasizes normative 
affirmation for the organization and its activities (Suchman 1995; Scott, et al. 2000). 
Moral appropriateness of behavior is evaluated by the degree of internalization and 
compliance of collectively shared value systems in society. Normative rules bring values 
and norms into our organizational life, and at the same time, regulate our behavior as 
social obligation through role performance. Parsons (1956) argued that organizations 
conform to normative pressure to verify that the goals of their activities are coherent with 
general societal values in society. Organizations are also compelled to develop their 
procedures and structures in a way that they are coherent with the general societal values, 
and they become isomorphic with their institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Although isomorphic transformation helps an organization to survive in 
institutional environment, it does not always improve organizational efficiency 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
In contrast, cultural legitimacy emphasizes consistency with taken-for-granted 
behavior, and cultural legitimacy is a representation of social structure (Scott et al. 2000). 
Institutional environments provide the archetypes of social roles and behavioral rules and 
socially construct individual and collective social actors. These cultural rules regulate and 
evaluate our behavior based on their taken for grantedness. Institutionalized rules are not 
designed to pursue efficiency in organizational activities, but they are rational ways of 
combining procedure and practice. By becoming isomorphic with other organizations in 
identical institutional environments, organizations can gain the legitimacy and resources  
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to survive (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this process, organizations ritually adopt 
institutionalized rules, including structure, institutionalized products, services,  
techniques, policies, and programs, and they gain conformity and membership with other 
organizations.  
Although no organization can completely satisfy all observers (Suchman 1995), 
the multi-modality of legitimacy offers the organization and management a great deal of 
flexibility to manage legitimacy (Oliver 1991). In terms of management of legitimacy, 
Suchman (1995) emphasized the relationship between the organization and the 
institutional environment. In contrast, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) argued that the 
conditions under which the means of legitimation succeed to gain legitimacy or fail to do 
so are critical in the management of legitimacy.  
They proposed two more inclusive strategies of legitimation: substantive 
management and symbolic management (See Table 1).  Substantive management 
attempts to gain legitimacy by “real, material change in organizational goals, structures, 
and process or socially institutionalized practices” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.178). 
There are four primary strategies in substantive management: (a) role performance; (b) 
coercive isomorphism, (c) Altering resource dependencies; (d) Altering socially 
institutionalized practices. Another legitimation strategy is symbolic management. The 
goal of symbolic management strategies is to transform the meaning of acts without 
making any substantive change in organizational goals, organizational structures, and 
operational processes by (a) espousing socially acceptable goals; (b) denial and 
concealment; (c) redefining means and ends; (d) offering accounts; (e) offering 
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Table 1: Two Types of Legitimation Strategies 
1. Substantive Management Strategies 
Role Performance The organization may gain legitimacy from the 
constituents by fulfilling their performance 
expectations (e.g., “providing a good return on 
shareholder’s equity”). 
Coercive Isomorphism DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that the 
organization may gain legitimacy by adopting 
organizational design that conforms to the values, 
norms, and expectations of the constituents. It shows 
“the willingness and ability” to meet expectations.   
Altering Resource 
Dependencies 
To gain legitimacy, the organization may change the 
combination and level of resource dependence upon 
its constituents. This strategy will eventually alter the 
expectations of the constituents. 
Altering Social 
Institutionalized Practices 
The organization may introduce the existing 
regulations, social mores, and other “socially 
institutionalized practices” to accomplish goals 
through preferable means (e.g., Tabacco industry’s 
Champaign ads and funding on health and smoking). 
2. Symbolic Management Strategies 
Espousing Socially Acceptable 
Goals 
The organization may gain legitimacy by embracing 
socially desirable goals even though its real goals are 
still less socially desirable ones.  
Denial and Concealment The organization can hide or deny certain information 
about organizational activities that decrease 
legitimacy. 
Redefining Means and Ends The organization can reinterpret its history and 
redefine the meaning of its strategies and goals to 
meet the present social values. 
Offering Accounts Using “excuses” and “justification,” the organization 
can provide accounts on their behavior and allocate its 
responsibility in a desirable way to secure legitimacy. 
Offering Apologies By acknowledging responsibility for a negative event, 
the organization may minimize damage of losing 
legitimacy.  
Ceremonial Conformity Derived from Meyer and Rowan’s (1977 1978) 
concept, the organization can demonstrate conformity 
to the expectations of its constituents without making 
substantial changes.  
Source: Ashforth and Gibbs 1990 (p.178-179). 
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apologies; (f) ceremonial conformity (p.178-179).   
However, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. The boundary between 
substantive management strategies and symbolic management strategies is ambiguous. 
For example, coercive isomorphism (substantive management) and ceremonial 
conformity (symbolic management) resemble each other, but the latter exclusively 
focuses on its symbolic qualities. The more symbolic strategies become integrative parts 
of the culture, the more ambiguous the boundary may become. It is possible that a 
substantive management strategy can transform into a symbolic management strategy 
over time (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).   
Legitimation strategies differ when the nature of the challenge is performance-
related or value-related (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). For example, the incident in Somalia 
made the Canadian Forces defend its legitimacy, and eventually closed the Airborne 
Regiment to save the organization. In this case, Canadian society has no issues with 
sending troops to peacekeeping, but the troops failed to meet the performance expectation 
by torturing a local young man to death. In the case of the Canadian Forces, the issue was 
a performance challenge. The larger society accepts the concept of peacekeeping, but the 
troops failed to fulfill expectations. In this case, the organization solves the legitimation 
issue using substantive management strategies. In Japan, on the other hand, peacekeeping 
participation has evoked skepticism and criticism toward credibility of the SDF as a 
violation of the social values in society. There is a pragmatic need for sending troops to 
international peacekeeping missions in society, but there is limited cultural support. In the 
case of value challenge, the organization needs to meet the expectations of the 
constituents by using combinations of different symbolic management strategies.  
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In management of legitimacy, the purpose of legitimation shapes the overall 
dynamics of legitimation. The purpose of legitimation —extend, maintain, and defend— 
is the key determinant of the legitimation dynamics (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Each of 
the three phases has unique characteristics of legitimation process depending on the 
problematic nature of legitimacy, scrutiny by collective observers, and intensity of 
legitmation activities. 
Extending legitimacy becomes a goal of legitimation when “the organization is 
becoming established or is entering a new domain of activity or utilizing new structures 
or processes” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Because of its high activity and newness, the 
organization in extending legitimacy receives considerable attention, and become a target 
of intense public scrutiny. To win the trust of the constituents, the strategies to extend 
legitimacy should be intense, proactive to gain legitimacy.  
Maintaining legitimacy occurs when the organization has achieved “a threshold of 
endorsement sufficient for ongoing activity” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.182). In the 
organization that is maintaining legitimacy, there is no problem in legitimacy. For the 
same reason, public scrutiny and intensity of legitimation activities are both low. Using 
both substantial and symbolic management strategies, the organization engages in 
legitimation activities in a routine manner. 
Defending legitimacy occurs when the organization’s very legitimacy is 
threatened or legitimacy is problematic. To defend legitimacy, the organization almost 
exclusively engages in symbolic management to avoid threats. Legitimation activities, in 
this case, are more intense but reactive (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).  
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 In terms of peacekeeping participation, the purpose of legitimation changes over 
time within the force, and varies from one armed force to another (e.g., The Fijian armed 
forces send troops to earn foreign currency while Germany send troops as a part of its 
NATO missions). In the peacekeeping mission, armed forces need to extend legitimacy in 
order to enter a new domain of the mission and adjust the force structure or deployment 
processes. At the same time, armed forces maintain the existing organizational legitimacy 
to prove that role performance of the organization is not disrupted by a new mission and 
that legitimacy is not threatened.  
Despite a wide variety of strategies available to an organization, the organization 
needs special caution when it protests its legitimacy. The harder the organization protests 
its legitimacy, the less legitimacy it may gain. Since the need of legitimacy is greater in 
an organization with low legitimacy, the constituents tend to find the protest “self-
serving” and “manipulative.” The organization may be viewed as a “clumsy actor,” 
“nervous actor,” or “overacting actor” by the constituents and jeopardize its legitimacy. 
The organization loses its legitimacy by “protesting too much” (Ashforth and Gibbs 
1990: p.187). The harder the organization tries to get out the situation, the deeper it sinks. 
It is like quicksand for the organization in need of legitimation. Ashforth and Gibbs 
(1990) describe this chain reaction of decreasing legitimacy as “a vicious circle of 
legitimation” Organization legitimacy is an essential resource to organizational survival, 
but it is also a double-edged sword. The process of appealing legitimacy greatly matters 
to organizational survival.   
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Role Conflict and Identity Tension in Peacekeeping 
Since the early stage of UN peacekeeping, role conflict and identity issues have 
been repeatedly identified as one of the most important issues in the peacekeeping 
literature. In the simplest term, peacekeeping is views as a mission that may undermine 
the status of the military profession. For working adults, one’s profession represents the 
ideal of his or her work. It shapes one’s social identity, and ultimately of self (Hughes, 
1951; 1958). Therefore, something that may undermine the status of one’s profession can 
significantly impact one’s identity and self.   
Identities are the sets of socially constructed meanings that define who we are as 
persons, as role occupants, and as group members (Stryker 1980; Burke 2004). Although 
roles and identities are separate entities, they are inseparable in one’s self process. As a 
person plays multiple social roles in his or her social life, the person can have multiple 
identities. Identities come with normative expectations for appropriate role behavior that 
lead the self to behave in a certain way in a specific social setting (Thoits 1983). Role 
conflict arises when incongruity or incompatibility of the expectations associated with a 
role emerges (Rizzo, et al. 1970).  
In organizational settings, role conflicts have negative impacts on job satisfaction, 
physiological stress, and higher tension in work places (Sutherland and Cooper 1988). In 
peacekeeping, incongruence between the soldier role and the peacekeeper role is 
manifested in various stressors such as boredom (Harris and Segal 1985), sense of 
underutilization, cultural deprivation, lack of privacy, isolation, frustration, and 
powerlessness (Segal and Segal 1993a; Britt 1998; Bartone, et al. 1998). Among these 
stressors, boredom and frustration with being underutilized are severe in peacekeeping 
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and closely related to the professional identity of soldiers and affect their attitudes toward 
peacekeeping.  
Within one’s mind, an individual prioritizes multiple identities associated with 
his/her roles, which Stryker (1980) calls identity salience. Although for soldiers 
professional identity (a soldier identity) is not always the most salient among other 
identities (Woodruff 2003), the professional identity is generally a major component of 
self-definition because organizational members are often identified by their occupations 
and act upon their occupational roles (Van Maanen and Barley 1984).  
Following the premises of social identity theory, in the relationship with one’s 
immediate social environment, an individual classifies him/herself and others into various 
social categories such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, religious affiliations, and 
occupations. This social categorization provides a certain systemic order to one’s social 
world and the basis of ‘self reference’ by defining one’s place in society (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986). In contemporary social life, however, most adults play more than one 
social role, but plurality of one’s roles is the very source of role conflict. In the military 
profession, the prescribed roles of peacekeeper and soldiers are conflicting, but soldiers 
are often required to play both roles. As a result, soldiers may not adopt the role of 
peacekeeper into their identity domain although soldiers become experienced and skillful 
in managing tasks in peacekeeping missions (Britt 1998). If a social role that an 
individual plays is not congruent with normative rules of appropriate behavior prescribed 
by one’s salient identity, role conflict can heighten identity tension. 
Previous literature has consistently reported that peacekeepers generally comply 
with constabulary norms and perform well in the field (see Moskos 1975 1976; Segal and 
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Segal 1993a; Miller and Moskos 1995), while role conflict between the war-fighter role 
and peacekeeper role is troublesome for soldiers. For instance, American peacekeepers 
value the basic norms of peacekeeping, but their overall attitudes toward peacekeeping 
are still mixed because of the remaining ambiguity and conflict in the definition of 
peacekeeping (Segal and Tiggle 1997). In his Peace Soldiers, Moskos (1976) studied the 
contradictory role of peacekeepers in the field and raised Janowitz’s question about the 
military profession, whether or not peacekeeping would alter military socialization 
processes and lead military organization in a constabulary direction. Using a triangulation 
method including participant observation, in-depth interviews, and surveys with soldiers 
from seven nations assigned to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Moskos 
(1976) concluded that military personnel could adjust to their new constabulary missions 
applying their conventional military professionalism in order to manage the contradictory 
situations in peacekeeping. Moskos illustrated several incidents in which UN 
peacekeepers came under fire and lost their lives in UNFICYP and other UN 
peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. It is clear that contradictory situations for 
peacekeepers between their soldier role and their peacekeeper role have been persistent 
throughout the history of UN peacekeeping. Then UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld admitted the inherently confusing nature of UN peacekeeping and military 
peacekeepers’ role noting that “peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can 
do it” (Lewis 1992). This phrase symbolically illustrates the conflicting nature of 
peacekeeping as a military mission. 
Since the 1980s Segal and his associates have been studying American soldiers’ 
attitudes toward the constabulary nature of peacekeeping operations collecting data from 
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US Army soldiers deployed to the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The 
Sinai MFO was to buffer Egypt and Israel on the Sinai Peninsula after they signed the 
Camp David Accords in 1979. The Sinai MFO is a long-standing mission to which the 
United States has been contributing military troops for decades (Segal and Segal 
1993a).12 
 A series of Segal’s research (Harris and Segal 1975; Segal and Segal 1993a) 
illustrate the effect of boredom on soldiers’ psychological states during peacekeeping 
deployment. American riflemen standing guard in the Sinai rarely saw human beings 
except their own squad members throughout the course of deployment. They were 
isolated, bored, and underutilized their skills. As well as riflemen, medics felt in the same 
way: they did not have a chance to maintain their skills because they did not treat as 
many patients as they expected. In traditional peacekeeping, monotonous routines tend to 
continue throughout the deployment, but the professional training or experience of 
American troops does not teach them how to deal with monotonous, boring everyday life 
as a part of their soldier role. In the quiet and less stimulating mission environment, 
American paratroopers in the Sinai MFO significantly lost their interest and excitement in 
their assignment over time (pre-deployment: 87 percent; middle of deployment: 57 
percent) (Segal and Segal 1993a).  
                                                 
12 During the Cold War period, the United States was not engaged in UN peacekeeping missions 
to maintain the political impartiality of peacekeeping, albeit the US has made a great contribution 
in a peace operation, not under UN auspices- the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). 
Since the 1970s Segal and his associates have collected data from soldiers who deployed to the 
Sinai MFO for decades and covered topics ranging from the impact of peacekeeping missions on 
soldiers’ stress symptoms, morale, psychological adjustment process, to its organizational impact 
such as retention rate and readjustment upon return. 
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Segal and Segal (1993a) also reported relative deprivation among peacekeepers. 
Serving in a peaceful peacekeeping mission seems to be universally boring, but what 
makes peacekeepers bored is also socially constructed. For peacekeepers who served as 
combat soldiers in their homeland and kept busy schedules of training and exercises in 
garrison, monotonous routines in traditional peacekeeping are boring in contrast with 
their active life style back home. Even for American soldiers without combat experience, 
they feel underutilized because they felt that their skills and knowledge gained in combat 
training back home were wasted. These results suggest that soldiers understand what they 
should do through their personal experiences, not through prescribed description of what 
peacekeeping is and what peacekeepers should do. 
Role conflict questions the identity of soldiers and confuses one’s adequate 
behavioral choice to fulfill the role, and consequentially increases psychological 
distress.13 In North American and European armed forces, using military presence as a 
vehicle is often contradictory to the traditional military profession and soldiers’ 
professional identity. As a result, role conflict between the peacekeeper role and war-
fighter role often causes not only attitudinal changes but also psychological distress 
among peacekeepers (see Bartone, et al. 1998; Britt 1998; Franke 1999).  
                                                 
13 In sociological stress theory, stress is viewed as a systematic consequence of social 
arrangements, not merely an intrapsychological process (Aneshensel, et al. 1991; Pearlin 1999). 
Stress arises from discrepancies between living conditions and the individual’s characteristics 
including personal needs, values, perceptions, resources, and skills (Aneshensel 1992). One’s 
position in a work organization is one of social arrangements that individuals live with in their 
daily life. In our social life, roles inform us about broader social organizations as well as the 
individual's behavior in terms of the psychological consequences of structural arrangements. 
Because people are socialized and build their value system in their roles (Pearlin 1989), the same 
role may not affect different groups of people to the same extent. In peacekeeping context, 
peacekeepers from different social and cultural groups may take peacekeeper role differently and 
can be vulnerable to different sources of stresses. 
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Although it is very important for soldiers to integrate the peacekeeper role into 
their identity (Britt 1998), numbers of sources of ambiguity in current peacekeeping 
make it more difficult for soldiers to do so. The following aspects of issues can be 
sources of ambiguity in the field: unclear rules of engagement (ROE) for self defense, 
lack of proper training, restricted autonomous acts against threat and danger, unclear 
criteria for successful peacekeeping, and legitimacy of the relationship between 
peacekeeper role and soldier identity (Britt 1998). At the organizational level, mission 
ambiguity causes confusing command structure, unstable mission environment, and 
unclear goals of the mission; at the individual level, it leads peacekeepers to experience 
role ambiguity. Role ambiguity is the degree to which clear information is lacking with 
regard to the expectations related to a social role (Rizzo, et al. 1970). Role ambiguity 
decreases job performance and increases job dissatisfaction and intention to leave the job 
(Sutherland and Cooper 1988). The limited use of force also becomes a constraint and 
increases the sense of helplessness for those who are trained to fight against a hostile 
enemy. Research findings have consistently shown that peacekeepers felt frustrated 
(Johansson 1997; Bartone, et al. 1998) and helpless (Ward 1997) with the restricted use 
of force in peacekeeping missions.  
Wicks (2002) conducted a case study of the 1992 Westray mine explosion in 
Nova Scotia, Canada, to study these institutional bases of identity among the coal miners, 
and how gender identity become more salient among them, let them continue hazardous 
behavior in the mine operations, and eventually lost 26 miners in the accident. Applying 
Castells’s (2004) concept of “legitimizing identity” (p.8), Wicks (2002) stresses the 
power of dominant institutions in society over one’s identity formation and how it 
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legitimize one’s social behavior in organizations. In adaptation to peacekeeping, a certain 
identity that nation-states legitimize demands peacekeepers to manage the two 
increasingly incongruent roles: the soldier role and the peacekeeper role.  
Soldiers’ Attitudes toward Peacekeeping 
In addition to professional identity, soldiers’ attitudes toward the mission, their 
job, and the organization are affected by peacekeeping deployment experience. Segal et 
al. (1984) found that Army paratroopers performed well in the mission, while the troops 
increasingly felt that the mission was not appropriate for them because it did not require 
special skills in the field. Their feeling that a peacekeeping assignment is positive in 
career development also diminished over time. Using the same data, although most 
paratroopers felt bored by the assignment in the Sinai (Segal and Gravino 1985; Harris 
and Segal 1985), Segal and Meeker (1985) found that the stronger the perceived benefit 
of peacekeeping to their career, the smoother paratroopers’ adaptation became. They also 
found that a certain aspect of military professionalism (obedience to orders) was another 
key factor determining peacekeepers’ attitudes toward peacekeeping and their adaptation. 
These two studies (Segal, et al. 1984; Segal and Meeker 1985) did not find any inverse 
relationship between combat orientation and attitudes toward peacekeeping missions 
while soldiers deployed to peacekeeping missions developed a complex view of 
peacekeeping and other military mission through their firsthand mission experience.  
In a study of American reserve soldiers deployed to the Sinai MFO, Segal and 
Tiggle (1997) found surprisingly little difference in attitudes between reserve soldiers and 
active-duty soldiers. Although American soldiers do not wholly reject the constabulary 
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role, their data support Janowitz’s expectation that American soldiers would resist the 
constabulary role and missions (Segal, Reed, and Rohall 1998).  
In a study of Italian peacekeepers deployed to Albania and Somalia, Battistelli 
(1997) found that professional soldiers motivated by economic considerations were not 
satisfied with the mission compared to the soldiers who are motivated with altruistic 
causes and the desire for new personal experience, while draftees did not differ in their 
degree of satisfaction based on motivations. Battistelli (1997) suggested that this may be 
because the reference group of professional soldiers is their civilian counterparts who 
earn equal or more income without hardship or risks in the field. These findings show 
that soldiers’ attitudes toward peacekeeping depend on job specialties, active-reserve 
status, and nationalities.  
Research on Japanese Peacekeepers  
There have been a number of studies of peacekeepers from societies equipped 
with pronounced military ethos and moderate military ethos while there are very few 
studies of peacekeepers from societies equipped with a constabulary ethos, namely 
Germany and Japan. Because of limited organizational cooperation with academic 
research on the SDF, there have been very few academic studies of Japanese 
peacekeepers.14 All of these studies have been conducted by in-house researchers in the 
Defense Agency and SDF officers at post-graduate programs at the Defense Academy. 
One of the most important findings in these studies is that unlike North American and 
most European peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers show high levels of satisfaction and 
                                                 
14 The Defense Agency and Japanese academics have not developed friendly relationships. 
Regarding the current research environment of Japanese military sociology, see Kurashina (2003). 
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positive attitudes toward the mission in traditional peacekeeping operations. Kawano 
(2001; 2002) collected survey data from 618 former SDF peacekeepers deployed to 
Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. Approximately 74.8 percent of 
respondents agreed that the peacekeeping operation in which they participated was more 
interesting than their domestic missions. More than 80 percent of respondents valued 
peacekeeping missions higher than their domestic missions. Only 8.3 percent felt bored in 
their peacekeeping assignment even though Japanese peacekeepers only deployed to 
places where the security condition was relatively stable such as Cambodia, 
Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. The assignments in these missions were limited to 
logistics, engineering, and other support jobs. These results suggest the difference in 
socialization and organizational orientation between a military force and a constabulary 
force and interesting dynamics of identity among members of a constabulary force.  
A study shows that Japanese peacekeepers place their priority on the missions that 
could directly contribute to Japanese citizens’ interests. Despite the similarity in mission 
characteristics between international humanitarian aid missions and domestic disaster 
relief missions, domestic disaster relief missions are perceived as more important because 
the beneficiary is Japanese people (Ohi 1999). This result is consistent with Kawano’s 
(2002) finding that Japanese peacekeepers perceived that peacekeeping is a good training 
opportunity for Defense Act (bouei shutsudou) for territorial defense against invasion of 
an enemy. This result suggests the domestic mission-oriented attitude among Japanese 
service members. Japanese peacekeepers are willing to deploy to peacekeeping 
operations and humanitarian aid missions overseas if participation in those missions can 
contribute to societal benefits.  
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Researchers also have found a generational gap in peacekeepers’ attitudes toward 
the mission. Organization-centered attitudes among Japanese peacekeepers were not 
always dominant across generations or rank (Ohi 1999; Kawano 2001). According to 
Kawano (2001), the younger peacekeepers tend to see more materialistic and 
individualistic aspects of deployment as their motivation and perceived rewards in their 
peacekeeping experience. Regarding the motivation for deployment, peacekeepers in 
their 20s showed individualistic reasons as their primary motivation, such as “challenge 
to a new mission,” “adventure and curiosity (about foreign countries),” and “challenging 
my own abilities.” On the other hand, peacekeepers in their 40s showed more altruistic 
motivations as well as individualistic motivations. Peacekeepers over 40 years old were 
motivated to participate in peacekeeping because they would like to “contribute to world 
peace” and “improve the image of Japan.” Differences in deployment motivation should 
be further examined as an intervening variable between social disposition of SDF 
members and their attitudes toward peacekeeping.    
Mission satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers is another noteworthy aspect 
of their adaptation to peacekeeping deployment. All the studies show that Japanese 
peacekeepers are highly satisfied with their peacekeeping deployment (Ohi 1999; Satoh 
2001; Kawano 2001). Ohi’s (1999)15 research on sense of mission and attitudes among 
Japanese peacekeepers deployed to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) argued that the present situation can be viewed as a better and relatively 
satisfactory situation if Japanese peacekeepers are old enough to personally experience 
                                                 
15 Ohi (1999) used three different data sources for his research. He conducted a self-administered 
survey with 136 former peacekeepers, and gained a 73.5 percent response rate (100 respondents). 
He also did in-depth interviews with 11 former peacekeepers and used diaries from a few 
interviewees for his analysis. 
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negative attitudes of the general public toward the SDF. Ohi found that peacekeepers also 
evaluated their present situation as unsatisfactory when their reference group was other 
armed forces that possess higher social status and receive sufficient support and respect 
from their people. Kawano’s (2001) findings suggest a complex structure of Japanese 
peacekeepers’ mission satisfaction. Although Japanese service members claim that they 
are a “half-baked” military (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002), nearly 48.7 percent of the 
respondents thought that the SDF had better or the same capability compared to other 
contingents. Some of the respondents in Kawano’s (2001) study expressed their mixed 
feeling that they were proud of their superiorities in equipment, technology, and 
discipline, but admitted that they lacked combat readiness. For example, compared to 
French soldiers, JSDF members deployed to UNTAC in Cambodia did not adequately 
react to a possible armed attack. On the other hand, some peacekeepers thought that 
peacekeeping was a great opportunity for them to reappraise the wealth and safety of 
Japan.  
 Ohi (1999) found differences in perceived value among peacekeepers from 
different socialization backgrounds in their professional life. Officers valued territorial 
defense oriented more than constabulary missions such as disaster relief and 
peacekeeping, compared to Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs). Among officers, 
National Defense Academy graduates valued territorial defense related missions more 
than did civilian university graduates. This result might reflect the socialization process 
of National Defense Academy graduates as military professionals which started their 
career much earlier than officers who graduated from civilian universities. Reference 
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groups in the socialization process of National Defense Academy graduates might be 
traditional military officers such as American military officers. 
Regarding the internal construct of mission satisfaction among Japanese 
peacekeepers, Satoh (2001) used Kawano’s survey data and analyzed satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction factors in perceived mission experience. Satoh (2001) tested Herzberg’s 
(1966) model of the relationship between perceived job environments and satisfaction 
and motivation. Herzberg (1966) identified satisfaction factors and dissatisfaction factors 
in perceived mission environments, and suggested that perceived mission environments 
are strongly associated with job satisfaction, while dissatisfaction factors would not 
improve job satisfaction if they were reduced. In Satoh’s (2001) research, it is worthwhile 
noting that satisfaction factors showed strong correlations with both personal and 
organization-oriented motivations for deployment. However, examining the relative 
explanatory power of satisfaction and dissatisfaction scales keeps us from examining 
what aspects of the mission are associated with satisfaction and motivation. Another 
problem with Satoh’s research is that he did not test his hypotheses in a single integrative 
model: he separated segments of the processes of attitude formation into three parts and 
examined them respectively. He examined the correlation between pre-deployment 
motivation and perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors, perceived satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction factors and overall mission satisfaction, and perceived satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction factors and redeployment intention.   
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Dirty Work and Professional Identity  
At the macro-social level, the military profession is generally considered as “dirty 
work,” more so in Japanese society. In the micro-level institutionalization process, 
identity formation is a core process in constructing shared understanding of realities; 
identity is a fundamental element of subjective reality and has a dialectical relationship 
with society (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Identities are the sets of socially constructed 
meanings to define who we are as persons, as role occupants, and as group members 
(Stryker 1980; Burke 2004). Identities come with normative expectations for appropriate 
role behavior, which lead the self to behave in a certain way in a specific social setting 
(Thoits 1983). Social identity is defined as “the groups, statuses, or categories to which 
an individual is socially recognized as belonging” (p.10: Rosenberg 1979). Others can 
also attribute certain social identities to those who display the traits such as “stigma” 
(Goffman 1963). Identity has been recognized as a central construct that affects both 
individual satisfaction and organizational effectiveness (O’Reilly and Chatman 1986).  
As a central component of creating social realities, identity formation reflects the 
social structure of the host society such that:  
“…identity formation involves a process of social construction of meaning in 
which particular cultural attributes, such as gender or organizational role, are 
given priority over other sources of meaning. The social contexts in which 
identity formation occurs contain a set of power relations embedded in discourse 
and institutionalized organization practices” (p.309-310: Wicks 2002).  
 
Institutionalized organizational practices shape how individuals in an organization 
define themselves and develop meaning through their interpersonal relationships. In the 
process of legitimacy seeking, the external environment places pressures on individuals 
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and organizations to attempt conformity with normative rules created by the institutional 
environment. In this sense, identity is not entirely under the control of individuals, but not 
entirely shaped by social institutions either (Wicks 2002). In such restricted situations, 
individuals still take as much initiative as possible in identity formation by engaging in 
the process of social categorization, which allows individuals to organize their 
organizational environment by sorting out ingroup and outgroup members (Tajfel 1981; 
Tajfel and Turner 1985). Thus, the present dissertation introduces the “dirty work” 
framework originally invoked by Everett Hughes (1951; 1958) to understand the aspects 
of identity of Japanese service members that are not under their control. 
Managing Dirty Work 
According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), despite their devalued identity given 
by society, people in dirty work do not just accept and internalize the identity. On the 
contrary, people in the devalued occupation can form a strong culture and build self-
enhancing identity though a number of strategies. Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) propose 
three techniques to manage dirty work status: reframing, recalibrating, and refocusing.  
Reframing: a technique to transform the meaning associated with a stigmatized 
occupation. Asforth and Kreiner (1999) identify neutralization and infusing as reframing 
techniques. They emphasize Sykes and Matza’s (1957) ‘denial of responsibility,’ ‘denial 
of injury,’ and ‘denial of victim’ as important neutralization techniques in the 
management of dirty work. In denial of responsibility, people in dirty work insist that 
they are simply doing their job (Ashfort and Krainer 1999). In the explanation of why 
people are not responsible, they claim that they have no choice to avoid engaging in this 
occupation. Therefore, people in dirty work are immune to blame and normal for 
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engaging in the occupation (Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2003). Denial of injury and 
denial of victim play an important role in managing particularly in morally stigmatized 
occupations because of their exploitation such as pimps and yellow paper journalists. In 
both techniques, stigmatized individuals do not claim the innocence of victims or the 
injured. Rather, they perceive victims and the injured as conscious participants in their 
professional business encounters.  
The other technique, infusing, is to transform the stigma into a valued attribute by 
introducing a positive value, as one of the techniques for reframing. Although Ashforth 
and Kreiner (1999) distinguished infusing from neutralization, the infusing technique is 
virtually identical to Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization technique of managing 
deviant identity called “appealing to higher or other loyalties.” The first technique is 
neutralization. In neutralization techniques, stigmatized individuals accept the 
stigmatized attribute but provide reinterpretation of why they should not be considered as 
stigmatized (Sandstorm, et al 2003). In this sense, neutralization and infusing are 
complementing one another in the function of negating and transforming the stigma 
attached to the occupation (Ashfort and Kreiner 1999).  
Recalibrating: Recalibrating is a technique of adjusting the perceptual and 
evaluative standards of a dirty work attribute in order to make significantly large negative 
characteristics of the occupation less important. This technique also helps emphasize the 
small but positive characteristics more. The recalibrating technique does not transform 
the meaning of the dirty work itself, but it changes the importance of the stigma 
associated with the occupation.  
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Refocusing: Refocusing is a technique to shift from the stigmatized features of the 
work to the non-stigmatized features. Whereas reframing actively transforms the 
stigmatized properties, refocusing deliberately ignores the stigmatized characteristic of 
the occupation (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). For example, medical school students 
transform their physical contact with patients into a “complex intellectual puzzle” 
(intellectualization) or into a “mechanical or analytic problem” (Smith and Kleinman 
1989). Arluke (1996) also found similar emotional management strategies among animal 
shelter workers who have to euthanize animals routinely. The workers emphasized how 
skillfully they could perform lethal injection to let animals die as peaceful as possible. To 
manage uncomfortable emotions associated with the licensed tasks in the medical 
profession, medical students informally learn a form of emotional detachment in order to 
cognitively refocus the nature of their tasks (Lief and Fox 1963; Smith and Kleinman, 
1989). These techniques are “to transform the meaning of the stigmatized work by 
simultaneously negating or devaluating negative attributions and creating or revaluing 
positive ones” (p.421). By utilizing these techniques, the occupation is justified and 
become more tolerable and even attractive to both insiders and outsiders.  
Normalization Strategies. Individuals in dirty work have another option to 
manage dirty work identity by avoiding revelation of their tainted attribute. When 
individuals try to avoid revealing a devalued label attached to their stigmatized attributes, 
they engage in normalization by hiding tainted attributes and keeping a normal self-
presentation. Normalization strategies include passing, covering, and insulating. When 
people use passing techniques, they present themselves as if they do not have stigmatized 
attributes and allocate their identity differently from their actual attribute. When 
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stigmatized individuals cannot use passing techniques because attributes cannot be 
concealed, they use covering technique by disguising their real attributes. Passing and 
covering required stigmatized individuals to lead painful double lives while the third 
technique, insulating, does not require active disguise and hidden alienation. Some 
stigmatized individuals carefully choose with whom they interact, and limit their social 
interaction within a select group of confidants (Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2003).   
Institutional Characteristics of Dirty Work 
In the social construction of dirtiness, agents and social actors outside the 
organization play an important role in the oppositional identity work in dirty work 
subcultures (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). Individuals in dirty work can negotiate with 
outsiders by attacking the legitimacy of social organizations and institutions (‘condemn 
the condemners’) (Sykes and Matza 1957). Although the influence of institutions and 
organizations on one’s identity is supposed to be negotiable between individuals and 
these institutions and organizations, identities provided by dominant institutions can 
become individual identities when social actors internalize the identity given by dominant 
institutions (Wicks 2002; Castells 2004).  
Taking into consideration socio-cultural factors associated with the Japanese 
interdependent self and temporal factors, Markus and Oyserman’s (1993) sociocultural 
self model can depicts the ever-changing nature of Japanese service members’ selves. 
The sociocultural self model integrates two aspects of self, the social embeddedness of 
self and temporal nature of self. The socially embedded self depicts self as a socially 
embedded entity that maintains reciprocal relationships with immediate and macro social 
environments.  
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As previously pointed out, social status of a profession can change over time. The 
sociocultural self model also covers the temporal nature of the self in the past, current, 
and the future based on an idea that the self-concept and identity are multi-faceted, 
actively changing an “array of accessible self-knowledge” (p.191: Oyserman and Markus 
1993) rather than a single, fixed entity.  
Although there is a temporal nature of self processes, individuals maintain 
enduring structures of self that help them maintain consistency in interpreting their 
experience over time. Markus (1977) named the enduring structure of self “self-
schemas”; Stryker (1987) called it salient identity. Self-schemas are cognitive 
generalizations about the self derived from one’s past experiences including actions, 
characteristics, and skills (Markus 1977).   
The enduring structure of self facilitate one’s present and future actions for a 
given domain as “representations of the self in the future” or “possible selves” (p.954: 
Markus and Nurius 1986). Possible selves are defined as “the ideal selves that we would 
very much like to become” (p.954: Markus and Nurius 1986). At the same time, possible 
selves are not solely constructed by favorable self images. Possible selves include the 
selves that individuals may become and the selves that they are afraid of becoming. In 
some cases, if a person successfully avoids becoming certain selves that he or she is 
afraid of becoming, it can be considered as achieving favorable possible selves. Possible 
selves are not the current selves that are well grounded in individuals’ past experience so 
that they are vulnerable to the situations that provide conflicting information about the 
self. They are the future projection based on self-knowledge that is available from past 
experiences. In this sense, possible selves bridge between the self-concept and motivation 
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by providing personalized self-schema of self-knowledge. Figure 3 illustrates the past, 
present, and future selves of Japanese service members. Despite the difference in 
emphasis, researchers agree that identities need constant validation to sustain their 
meaning (Markus and Nurius 1986) while temporal and special elements of self, such as 
social and cultural contexts, should be taken into consideration in the comparative study 
of identities in a socially and politically controversial professional organization such as 
the Japanese armed forces.  
 
 
Figure 3. The Sociocultural Self of Japanese Service Members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This model is adopted from the Sociocultural Self Model by Oyserman and Markus (1993)  
and modified by the author.  
Possible 
Current
Past
Sociocultural Context 
• Work Place (SDF) 
• Family Relationship 
• Education (Meritocracy) 
• Social Class 
• Historical Events 
(WWII, Article 9, the end of 
the Cold War, Subway Serine 
Attack, Hanshin Earth Quake) 
• National-Regional  
Situations (Japan-US 
Security Treaty, North Korea) 
Process
• Organize Experience (interpret, integrate) 
• Regulate Affect (Defend, Promote) 
• Motivate Behavior (Personalize Goals, 
Provide Incentives) 
Stigmatized Ambiguous Normal? 
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Individual-level responses to a large-scale organizational change cannot be separated 
from institutional environments that shape organizational forms, structures, and processes 
of the military organization. Zucker (1991) stresses the institutional pressure embedded in 
organizational contexts that regulate one’s behavior in a culturally consistent but not 
rationalized way. However, little attention has been given to the relationship between 
institutions and individual workers in the organization studies literature.  
Taking Zucker’s (1991) perspective into account, social and historical contexts 
serve as ‘constitutive forces’ that shape one’s identity even though individuals actively 
participate in the identity formation process. The more individuals in an organization. 
internalize institutional forces, the more those institutional forces become influential in 
identity formation in organizational settings (Wicks 2002). This perspective suggests that, 
unlike DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) isomorphism of organizations in a competitive 
environment, the immediate institutional environment surrounding an organization can 
lead the organization to diverge from a successful organization within the same 
organizational sector to gain legitimacy and survive. Taken together, the present 
dissertation is trying to integrate the effect of socio-cultural contexts into the multi-
layered analytical model of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping by applying both 
neo-institutionalism in organizational sociology and an identity theory. She finds that 
studying the micro-institutional effects on lower level individuals in an organization has a 
significant implication on the organizational study.    
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Chapter 4: Research Questions and Hypotheses   
 
The existing literature on contemporary Japanese national security has mostly 
excluded the organizational aspects of the military from the scope of research. Most 
researchers have focused on macro-social issues of Japan’s security, specifically focusing 
on civil-military control and the legality of the SDF under the legislative constraint based 
on Article 9. Their primary concern is Japan’s remilitarization or “normalization” of 
Japan as a major political power (see Emmerson 1971; Emmerson and Humphreys 1973; 
Berger 1993 1998; Hook 1996; Drifte 2000). Implicitly and explicitly, they share a 
common assumption that a normal nation-state desires to build up military power 
compatible with its economic power. For them, this seems to be a natural desire 
considering Japan’s ultra militarism before and during WWII. Compared to political 
scientists, sociologists and anthropologists are more interested in organizational aspects 
of the SDF and civil-military relations (see Ohi 1999; Kawano 2001 2002; Frühstück and 
Ben-Ari 2002). However, for some researchers, their assumptions are far from being 
neutral. For example, Frühstück and Ben-Ari’s study (2002) criticized previous 
researchers’ prescribed and biased view, while their claim is contradicted by stating that 
the SDF is an organization that “disguises” its violent nature and manipulates the general 
public with various techniques (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002).  
Taking the above condition of the research field into consideration, the present 
dissertation approaches the Japan Self Defense Forces as a professional organization that 
is facing a large-scale organizational change: adaptation to peacekeeping. Adaptation to 
peacekeeping as a primary mission is a global-level trend of the post-Cold War military 
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although peacekeeping is not entirely a new mission. I set the grand purposes of the 
present dissertation as follows: (a) to describe what institutional environments 
surrounding the SDF have filtered through and constituted the military profession in 
contemporary Japan, and (b) to examine how peacekeeping participation affects Japanese 
service members’ professional identity and their attitudes towards their jobs and the 
organization.  
Corresponding to the change in the organizational environments surrounding the 
SDF, I identified the following three phases in the course of the development of 
contemporary Japanese armed forces and peacekeeping participation:  
(1) The emergence of the SDF (The post-war peace constitution, the Korean War, 
and the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960) (1945-1960) 
(2) From High growth of the Japanese economy to the end of the Cold War (1961-
1989) 
(3) The development of Japanese peacekeeping participation in the post Cold War 
period (1990 to present)  
In the presentation of my discussions by the chronology of events, I will address 
questions from macro to micro levels of social structure that are related to the impact of 
Japanese participation in multinational peacekeeping missions. I will guide the present 
dissertation with the following research questions.  
1. Formation of the Contemporary Japanese Military Institution: Anti-military 
culture has been playing a central role in Japan’s national security policy (Berger 1996), 
but its influence on the military ethos valued in the armed forces has not been studied 
systematically. How has the contemporary Japanese military institution been developed 
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and shaped by the general orientation of national security policy and military ethos 
valued in the SDF?  
2. Contexualizing the Constabulary Ethos: Symbolic Management and the 
Professional Identity: The Constitutional restriction gave the SDF limited legitimacy and 
caused hostility by the general public to the SDF. How has the SDF managed the lack of 
organizational legitimacy? How do the cultural understanding and the stigmatized image 
of the organization shape SDF members’ professional identity (sense of selves)?  
3. Peacekeeping Participation and Organizational Legitimacy, Professional 
Identity, and Attitudes toward the Organization: Facing a large-scale organizational 
change led by peacekeeping participation, what individual, organizational, and societal 
factors are significantly associated with Japanese peacekeepers’ attitudes toward their 
mission and organization?  
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The institutionalization process of peacekeeping requires both 
desinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization of the existing social definitions about 
national security, the military, and soldiers. Processes occur at multiple levels of the 
organization and of social structure. To understand the impact of peacekeeping 
participation on service members, I will examine how society institutionalizes the 
military institution and how particularities of the contemporary Japanese military 
institution affect service members’ professional identity formation and process.  
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Formation of the Contemporary Japanese Military Institution 
In terms of the first phase in the organizational history of the SDF, I will analyze 
the social processes in which the SDF became isolated from the larger society in post 
WWII Japan. The SDF is conceptualized as a gunji soshiki (armed forces), but not guntai 
(the military). How has this ambiguous and complex definition of the military been 
institutionalized and maintained? What social and political events have affected or shaped 
the definition? Using archival historical data, I will examine social processes answering 
the following research question. 
Research Question 1. How has the existing social definition of the SDF been 
developed and affected the organizational concept?  
 
Contexualizing the Constabulary Ethos 
After the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the SDF had to 
constantly deal with a negative organizational image in society. The renewal of the US-
Japan Security Treaty formed the basis of an anti-military culture in post WWII Japan, 
which isolated the SDF from the larger society. The expansion of the Japanese economy 
and the stable regional security situation in the Cold War period enforced the separation 
and even stigmatized the military organization within society. Taking into consideration 
these organizational environments, my analysis on the second phase will come down to 
the meso-social level. Multiple political events in the early stage of the reconstruction 
process isolated the SDF from the larger society, and developed a stigmatized image of 
the organization. I hypothesize that the organization lost its legitimacy in the course of 
establishment. In the second phase, to regain organizational legitimacy, the organization 
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has made tremendous efforts to improve its public image. At the same time, previous 
research repeatedly pointed out that SDF members internalized the public image of the 
organization and behave very consciously (Ohi 1999; Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002). With 
these findings, the following two research questions will lead the second section of the 
dissertation.  
Research Question 2-1. What strategies have the SDF used to manage the 
lack of organizational legitimacy?  
Research Question 2-2. How has the status of organizational legitimacy 
impacted the culture of the SDF and its members’ professional identity?  
 
Deployment Experience, Professional Identity, and Attitudes  
Finally, I will shift my focus to the most contemporary phase focusing on the 
development of Japanese peacekeeping and its impact on individual level outcomes from 
a sociological perspective. Regarding organizational and individual level outcomes, I will 
examine the professional identity of Japanese peacekeepers and their attitudes toward 
peacekeeping deployment. In the analysis of this phase, I will draw on interview data to 
understand the professional identity of Japanese peacekeepers. I will also use survey data 
to examine organizational and individual outcomes of peacekeeping participation. 
Regarding the third phase, I will answer the following three questions: (A) subjective 
understanding of peacekeeper role: How do SDF personnel understand their peacekeeper 
role? (B) Subjective evaluation of deployment experience: How do SDF personnel assess 
their deployment experience? (C) Peacekeepers’ attitudes toward peacekeeping missions: 
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How does peacekeeping experience affect peacekeepers’ attitudes and their psychological 
states?  
(A) Understanding of the peacekeeping role and deployment experience: As 
reviewed earlier, Japanese peacekeepers were generally highly satisfied with their 
deployment experience (Kawano 2002), compared with American peacekeepers. 
However, in many cases, large-scale organizational transitions impact organizational 
members by threatening their professional identity and changing the nature of their job; 
life events and living conditions in one’s social roles can negatively or positively affect 
one’s attitudes and psychological states depending on the subjective meaning of the 
events to the individual, more specifically to one’s emotions. However, the meanings that 
individuals attach to their social roles are ignored or indirectly measured in previous 
research and are very difficult to measure in survey questionnaires (Simon 1997). To 
overcome such shortcomings, I have drawn interview data from SDF members both with 
and without peacekeeping deployment experience to compare these two groups and 
analyze the effect of deployment experience on their perception of the organization, 
peacekeeping, and their roles. Compared to their fellow SDF personnel with no 
peacekeeping experience, did SDF members with prior peacekeeping experience perceive 
the SDF as a military organization differently? In terms of professional identity, how do 
the members with peacekeeping deployment experience understand who they are and 
what they should do as military professionals?  
Research Question 3-1. Did peacekeeping deployment change Japanese 
service members’ professional identity? If so, how and in what way did it 
change?  
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Did the perception of peacekeepers toward the organization and their career in the 
SDF change before and after their deployment? Thus, I will examine the following 
questions using interview data.  
Research Question 3-2. How did Japanese service members perceive their 
deployment experience in relation to the existing organizational missions and 
culture?  
 
(B) Peacekeepers’ Evaluation of the Organization and Satisfaction: Stressors that 
peacekeepers from North America and European nations have experienced are mostly 
grounded in role conflict between their soldier role and peacekeeper role; however, those 
findings have never been critically examined in comparison with peacekeepers from 
armed forces with a constabulary orientation. On the other hand, despite their interesting 
findings on attitudes of Japanese peacekeepers toward their deployment experience, 
Japanese peacekeeping studies (Kawano 2001 2002; Ohi,1999; Satoh 2002) did not give 
a comprehensive, overall picture of Japanese peacekeepers’ attitudes and organizational 
outcomes. Their statistical analyses also did not go beyond bivariate relationships or 
internal constructs of very specific concepts. It is misleading to discuss causal 
relationships using survey date without adequate statistical analysis. As a result, none of 
those three studies identified what factors contribute to attitudes toward peacekeeping 
missions and examined how much variance those independent variables can explain in 
dependent variables. Using a single predictor variable often produces inadequate 
descriptions about a social phenomenon because more than one variable significantly and 
uniquely affect the response variable (Neter, et al. 1996). In the real social context, 
multiple social factors come into play and affect one’s attitudes and psychological states. 
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Statistical analysis with more than one predictor variable should be conducted to 
understand what social and organizational factors contribute to peacekeepers’ attitudes 
toward their mission and psychological states. The present dissertation explores the 
relationship between peacekeepers’ deployment experience and psychological outcomes 
associated with their professional identity. To assess the value of one’s own deployment 
experience, mission satisfaction will be introduced based on an assumption that daily 
deployment experience will directly affect one’s satisfaction with the mission. At the 
same time, I introduce demographic variables that in previous research have shown 
interesting patterns, such as age. Regarding the age effect, Ohi (1999) noted that jieikan 
age 40 or older in his study expressed a perceived improvement in the social status of the 
SDF compared to the past. To separate the effect of deployment from one’s psychological 
predisposition prior to deployment, I introduce motivation into the analysis.  
Deployment Motivation. Identities can lead the individual to have specific 
motivations in role performance (Burke and Reitzes 1991). In work settings, values 
induce valence on objects, behavior, or states of affairs, and hold the ability to motivate 
goal-oriented behavior (French and Kahn 1962). If the individual has a strong 
professional identity, he or she may hold strong motivation about accomplishing the task 
(organization-oriented motivation). At the same time, an individual may not have a strong 
professional identity, but still perceive a certain task as his or her personal goal (personal 
motivation). James and McIntyre (1996) suggested that individuals with high motivation 
for personal accomplishment would enjoy a certain type of demanding situations as an 
opportunity to challenge their abilities. Among German peacekeepers, support from 
immediate personal contacts had a strong correlation with their motivation (Biehl and 
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Mackewitsch 2002). To examine the impact of deployment motivations on peacekeepers’ 
perception about the organization and mission satisfaction, I identify three primary 
motivations, organization-oriented motivation, personal motivation, and balanced 
motivation. I will compare the effect of these motivations on mission satisfaction and 
perceptions about the organization. 
Hypothesis 4-1. Peacekeepers who have organization-oriented motivations 
will be more satisfied with the mission than those who have personal 
motivations.  
Hypothesis 4-2. Peacekeepers who show high levels of organization-
oriented motivation will more highly value the potential of the SDF than 
those who do not. 
Perceived Benefits of Peacekeeping and Peacekeepers’ Attitudes. Kawano (2001; 
2002) reported that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers viewed their experience of 
peacekeeping missions would be helpful to their primary missions such as a mission for 
territorial defense boei shutsudo (Defense Act) and chian shutsudo (Security Act).16 
American researchers have consistently found that there is a perceived gap between 
peacekeeping and combat and that special training is required (Segal and Segal 1993a; 
Segal and Tiggle 1997; Miller 1997). Compared to American peacekeepers, Japanese 
peacekeepers’ positive view of the relationship between peacekeeping and primary 
                                                 
16 Defense Act: Article 76 of Self Defense Force Law prescribes that Prime Minister can order 
the SDF to dispatch all the troops or part of them to defend the nation when an external threat 
conducts attack Japan with force or when it is apparent that Japan is facing armed attack from an 
external threat.  
Security Act: Article 78 of Self Defense Force Law prescribes that Prime Minister can order the 
SDF to dispatch all the troops or part of them to defend the nation when ordinal level of police 
force cannot maintain public order facing indirect invasion and other emergency situations.   
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missions is worthwhile studying in relation with peacekeepers’ mission satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 4-3. Japanese peacekeepers who think that peacekeeping is 
useful for domestic missions will be more satisfied with the mission. 
Hypothesis 4-4. Japanese peacekeepers who think that peacekeeping is 
useful for domestic missions will have a favorable view about the 
organization. 
 
Mission Experience and Psychological States. Although Japanese peacekeepers 
are generally satisfied with their deployment experience, it is unclear what aspects of 
mission experience contributed to their satisfaction. Based on the previous studies of 
Japanese peacekeepers (Kawano 2002; Ohi 1999), I introduce interpersonal role conflict, 
mission difficulties, personal accomplishment, and level of stress as key variables to 
assess the relative influence of mission experience on peacekeepers’ view about the 
organization and satisfaction.  
Hypothesis 4-5. Japanese peacekeepers who had negative experiences in the 
field will be less satisfied with the mission. 
Hypothesis 4-6. Japanese peacekeepers who had negative experiences in the 
field will have a less favorable view about the organization. 
Hypothesis 4-7. The higher level of stress peacekeepers experience in the 
field, the less satisfied they will become.   
Hypothesis 4-8. Japanese peacekeepers who made personal-level of 
accomplishment in the field will be more satisfied with deployment than who 
had not.   
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Hypothesis 4-9. Japanese peacekeepers who made personal-level of 
accomplishment in the field have a less favorable view about the 
organization.   
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Chapter 5: Methods  
The present dissertation is a single-case, exploratory study of Japanese 
peacekeeping and its impact on organizational outcomes. Although this dissertation does 
not have a control group that represents the armed forces equipped with different 
organizational concepts (e.g. pronounced warrior ethos, and moderate warrior ethos), 
North American and European nations serve as a “shadow” control group. Japanese 
armed forces exhibit very distinctive characteristics as a military organization and an 
actor in UN peacekeeping because of Japan’s exclusively defensive national security 
policy. As an exploratory case study, the dissertation attempts to identify research 
questions and hypotheses for future research or to assess the feasibility of the desired 
research procedures. 
I will use a triangulation research design, a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, to explore a broad range of organizational issues. My data analysis 
will be presented in chronological order. I identified the following three phases: (1) The 
emergence of the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the renewal of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty (1945-1960); (2) The aftermath the renewal of the US-Japan Security 
Treaty to the end of the Cold War (1961-1989); (3) The development of Japanese 
peacekeeping participation in the post Cold War period (1990 to present). In the 
chronological presentation of my analysis, I will start from macro social issues and 
follow through to micro level issues that constitute the impact of Japanese participation in 
multinational peacekeeping missions. As my discussion proceeds from the first phase 
through the third phase, the level of analysis will also shift from macro level social 
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structure toward micro level social structure. The more the contemporary issues I will 
discuss on Japanese peacekeeping, the more micro will be the issues involved in my 
analysis.  
The first section will analyze macro-social level relationships between 
peacekeeping and society, and explores the social construction of the military and of 
peacekeeping operations in Japan to fully understand the social processes that shape the 
organizational culture of the SDF and the basis of professional identity of SDF members. 
The second section will be devoted to examining how those social and cultural norms 
about the military shaped the social definition the Japan Self Defense Forces in 
contemporary Japan and affect organizational norms of activities and behavioral 
standards, and organizational images. The third section will deal with more contemporary 
issues directly related to peacekeeping participation. I will examine subjective level 
impacts of peacekeeping participation among SDF members, using in-depth interviews 
and statistical data analysis from an attitudinal survey in order to understand the 
professional identity of Japanese peacekeepers and their deployment experiences.  
 
Archival Data Analysis for Institutionalization Process of Peacekeeping 
Archival data will be used to examine civil-military relations in post-WWII Japan. 
I will describe social opportunities of the general population to understand the SDF in 
their daily life, using demographic indicators and governmental public opinion poll 
results. Archival data are also used to examine how the public image of the armed forces 
shaped the professional identity of the SDF. Shared meanings evolved in the 
institutionalization process provide an organization its unique ethos, and the ethos is 
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conveyed as beliefs, norms, rituals, languages and other cultural forms (Smircich 1983) 
as the organizational control mechanism. I will analyze the evolving shared meanings of 
relevant concepts in security issues, including the definitions of the military (guntai), the 
SDF (jieitai), soldiers (gunjin) and civilians (bunmin), international deployment, and use 
of force (rule of engagement: ROE) in peacekeeping missions. I also examine 
organizational stories and language use as cultural manifestations that reflect the way in 
which the SDF negotiate the public image of the armed forces. Examining cultural forms 
will provide important information about what SDF members think about who they are 
and what they use as behavioral standards in their daily lives. 
1. Official interpretations of the following terms throughout the post WWII 
period regarding (a) the definition of the SDF as a military organization; (b) the 
definition of the civilian; (c) Article 9 and the SDF; (c) Article 9 and overseas 
deployment.  
2. Biennial government polls on national security issues from 1965 to 2002. 
3. Official statistics on educational levels of SDF members, enlistment rates, 
ratios of SDF recruits to the youth population over time 
4. Textual and graphic promotional materials for the public including the video 
clip of Japanese peacekeeping (10-year anniversary) and promotional materials 
about activities of SDF.  
Analysis of Interview Data and Textual Data 
The second section will examine how SDF members perceive their peacekeeper 
role and deployment experience, using interviews and the responses to open-ended 
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questions in Kawano’s (2001; 2002) survey. I gained access to Kawano’s data with his 
permission for the present dissertation. SDF members without deployment experience 
will be employed as a comparison group in the interviews. 
In-depth Interview 
Procedure and Sampling. Since the SDF is a relatively isolated work 
organization, and it is hard to locate members with peacekeeping experience, I employed 
a snowball sampling method to contact interviewees. In interview sessions in both East 
Timor and Japan, snowball sampling started from the key informant, a commanding 
officer of the Self Defense Forces. There is another key informant, a company officer, 
who introduced interviewees to me in Japan.  
Field Research in East Timor (Timore-Lesta) and Follow-up interviews. In July 
2002, I visited the Japanese Contingent in Dili, East Timor for a week to observe the 
mission environment, reactions of the local community to the presence of the Japanese 
contingent, and to conduct unstructured interviews with Japanese peacekeepers. I 
conducted in-depth interviews with 2 officers (1 woman), 1 warrant officer, and 4 non-
Commissioned officers of the Ground Self Defense Force. I spent 4 days as an interpreter 
with 3 NCOs during their vacation. In May 2003, I conducted follow-up interviews with 
1 officer and 1 warrant officer, whom I interviewed in East Timor. Interviews with the 
two peacekeepers were held in Tokyo and Sendai. I also conducted an additional 
interview with an Air Self Defense officer, who was deployed to West Timor for airlift 
assistance from November 1999 to January 2000. Interviews were conducted in a face-to-
face setting, and each interview took 30 minutes to 4 hours.  
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Interviews with the 1st Air Transportation Squadron members at Komaki Air Base, 
Aichi (Japan).  In early July 2003, the Japanese government authorized sending Air Self 
Defense troops to Iraq for airlift assistance. The 1st Air Transportation Squadron, 
specifically assigned to peacekeeping operations with 24-hour stand-by, started training 
sessions for 200 tentatively assigned members and preparing to send troops mid or late 
July. I visited Komaki Air Base from July 22 through July 24 to conduct interviews with 
4 officers and 3 NCOs, who have peacekeeping deployment experience. Each interview 
was 15-20 minute-long in a face-to-face setting.  
Interviews with the 10th Brigade members at Moriyama Station, Aichi (Japan).  
The 10th Brigade belongs to the Central Division of the Ground Self Defense Force, and 
has sent troops to Cambodia and the Golan Heights before. I visited Moriyama Station 
while I visited Komaki Air Base in July 2003 to conduct interviews with 3 officers and 2 
enlisted personnel previously deployed to a peacekeeping operation.  
Interviews with service members without peacekeeping deployment experience.  I 
also conducted interviews with ASDF personnel with no prior peacekeeping deployment 
experience (5 officers, Officer Candidates, and NCOs) in Nara Air Base (Nara, Japan) in 
May 2002. In Nara Air Base, I also conducted a focus group with 18 officer candidates of 
the Air Self Defense Force. I conducted interviews with Air Self Defense Force members 
with no prior peacekeeping deployment experience in Komaki Air Base (Aichi, Japan) in 
July 2002.  
  Questions. I asked a different set of questions for SDF members who 
experienced peacekeeping deployment and those who did not. In Komaki Air Base and 
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Moriyama Station, my interviews were semi-structured due to the arrangement of 
interviews provided by the public affairs office in each site.  
A. Questions for members with prior peacekeeping deployment experience 
a) Did peacekeeping deployment change your way of thinking and attitudes 
toward your duty? If so, please explain how it impacted your life as a SDF 
member.  
b) What is the event in the deployment that most impacted you?  
c) Could you easily adjust to Japanese culture and lifestyle when you come 
back from deployment? 
B. Questions for members without prior peacekeeping deployment experience  
a) How does working at the 1st Air Transportation Squadron impact your 
attitudes toward your job? 
b) Do you notice any difference in the organization after the SDF started 
participating in UN peacekeeping? If so, please explain. 
c) Is there any change in your attitudes toward your job or the SDF in general 
after the SDF started participating in UN peacekeeping? If you joined the 
service recently, how did Japanese engagement in UN peacekeeping 
missions affect your decision making to join the SDF?   
Open-ended Questions and Responses 
The four aspects that I questioned in in-depth interviews will be also examined 
through the analysis of responses to the following four open-ended questions in an 
attitudinal survey collected from 618 former peacekeepers in 1999. The respondents are 
mostly Ground Self Defense Force members. 
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a) The general comments on the survey: “If you have any additional comments 
about the questions above, your opinion and problems that you would like to point 
out about peacekeeping participation of the SDF in general, please feel free to 
write them down in the box below.” 
b) Comparison to other armed forces: “Please tell us your opinion about what are 
advantages and disadvantages of the Japan Self Defense Force compared to other 
armed forces?” 
c) Interpersonal Relationships: “Regarding interpersonal relationships in your unit 
(during deployment), what was the most severe issue?”  
d) Mission Satisfaction: Could you tell us the reason why you feel satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the peacekeeping deployment in which you participated?  
 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
In the third section, I will use descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations, and 
multivariate regression models to see the relative contribution of deployment experiences 
to three major organizational outcomes. As I discussed earlier, Satoh (2001) chose both 
items about perception about deployment experience and factual matters to extract 
perceived mission environments. Taking a different approach, I ran a factor analysis to 
extract primary dimensions of perceived deployment experience only using the items on 
one’s subjective evaluation about his deployment experience.  
First, in order to find out the significant association between predictor variables 
and dependent variables, I obtained the zero order correlations among those variables. 
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Secondly, multivariate regression models were constructed for both the level of 
psychological distress and mission satisfaction, in order to see the relative contribution of 
each independent variable to the peacekeepers' psychological well-being during their 
deployment. Each analytical model was constructed for three dependent variables. 
Variables related to those significant deployment experiences extracted in the previous 
section and basic demographic variables were run against two organizational outcomes, 
psychological distress and mission satisfaction, in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression models. The total association of independent variables on each dependent 
variable was also examined in the model.  
Data and Sample 
The analysis is based on survey data collected from the Japan Self Defense Forces 
(SDF) personnel who have deployment experience in one or more than one of the 
following UN peacekeeping missions: UNTAC (United Nations Transition Authority in 
Cambodia), ONUMOZ (United Nations Mission in Mozambique), and UNDOF (United 
Nations Disengagement Force). The data was collected by the Japan National Defense 
Academy in March 1999, and the survey was conducted as a self-administered mail 
survey. The sample was drawn from two groups of the SDF personnel who had 
deployment experience in UN peacekeeping operations. The first group was the 1,200 
SDF personnel who deployed to the UNTAC. Fifty percent of the personnel (600 
personnel) deployed to the UNTAC were sampled for the survey. The second group was 
approximately 400 personnel deployed to the ONUMOZ (154 personnel), the UNDOF 
(252 personnel), or both. The questionnaire was sent to all the SDF members who 
deployed to ONUMOZ and UNDOF. Regarding the UNDOF, the sample was all the 
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personnel who returned from the mission before March 1999. A total of 1,000 SDF 
personnel received the questionnaire in the mail, and 618 personnel returned the 
questionnaire. There was 7 percent non-response rate due to seventy questionnaires that 
were returned because of undeliverable addresses. The response rate after taking these out 
from the denominator was 66 percent. All respondents were male, and most of the 
respondents were Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) personnel. The sample consisted of 
19 percent officers and 81 percent enlisted personnel. Approximately 38 percent were 20-
29 years old; 42.5 percent were 30-39 years old; 19.8 percent were 40-49 years old. Over 
half of the sample was married (56 percent), and 44 percent had children.  
Dependent Variables 
I choose mission satisfaction and perceived organizational potential as dependent 
variables to assess organizational impacts of peacekeeping experience.  
Mission Satisfaction (SATISFY) is measured by an item asking the degree of 
one’s satisfaction with the mission. “Regarding the peacekeeping mission in which you 
participated, how satisfied are you?” Respondents chose one of the four choices: 1= “I 
am very much satisfied”; 2= “I am somewhat satisfied”; 3= “I am not so satisfied”; 4= “I 
am not satisfied at all.” Responses 3 and 4 were combined and recoded as 3.  
Perceived Organizational Potential (ORGPOWER) is measured by an item 
asking one’s evaluation of the SDF compared to the armed forces of other nations: 
“Comparing the armed forces of other nations and the SDF, please mark the statement 
that is the closest to your evaluation of the SDF?” Respondents chose one of the four 
choices with a don’t know option: 1= “The SDF is better than almost all the armed forces 
of other nations”; 2= “The SDF is the same as the armed forces of other nations”; 3= 
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“The SDF is slightly inferior to the armed forces of other nations”; 4= “I cannot 
generalize because there are advantages and disadvantages (in the SDF compared to the 
armed forces of other nations).” I reversed coded the original order of the options 
(1,2,3,4,5) into (1,2,4,3), then reverse coded them: 4= “The SDF is better than almost all 
the armed forces of other nations”; 3= “The SDF is the same as the armed forces of other 
nations”; 2= “I cannot generalize because there are advantages and disadvantages; 1= 
“The SDF is slightly inferior to the armed forces of other nations.” 
Independent Variables 
 This study examines how much variance the following groups of variables would 
explain in the level of organizational outcomes, specifically level of stress and 
redeployment intentions: (1) demographic and background variables; (2) motivations for 
peacekeeping participation; (3) interpersonal conflict and group variables; (4) perceived 
deployment experience; (5) meaning of peacekeeping (6) work values and ethic.  
(1) Control Variables: 
Young (YOUNG)17 is a recoded variable based on peacekeepers’ age during the 
deployment. If a peacekeeper is equal to or younger than 29 years old, the individual is 
coded into 1. Otherwise, peacekeepers are coded into 0.   
Education (EDUC) indicates the highest education level that the individual ever 
attended, which has four categories of the individual’s education: 1=Junior High School; 
                                                 
17  In his bivariate analysis, Kawano (2002) found that there is a generational difference in 
attitudes toward the organization and peacekeeping among Japanese peacekeepers. To examine 
the impact of generation under the multivariate analysis, I created two dummy variables to 
represent younger and older generations.  
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2 =High School; 3 =Technical and Vocational School18; 4=Community College/4-year 
College.  
Mission. Respondent’s mission is coded as “Cambodia (UNTAC),” 
“Mozambique (ONUMOZ),” and “Golan Heights (UNDOF).” In analysis, I use dummy 
variables that contrast “Cambodia (UNTAC)” and “Mozambique (ONUMOZ)” 19 
categories with the “Golan Heights” category.  
(2) Motivations for Peacekeeping Deployment: 
The following scales called the organization-oriented motivation scale and 
individualistic motivation scale are used to assess motivations for peacekeeping 
deployment. These two scales were created by principal component analysis for 8 
questions about one’s motivations for peacekeeping deployment. 
The organization-oriented motivation scale (ORGMTV) consists of 5 items 
about the degree a specific reason contributed to a respondent’s peacekeeping 
participation. The 5 items are “Peacekeeping participation would improve the image of 
the Japan Self Defense Force”; “Peacekeeping participation would contribute to 
improving the image and status of Japan in the international community”; “I would like 
to help the local population”; “International contribution is an important mission for the 
Japan Self Defense Forces”; “I wanted to contribute to world peace by myself.” The 
                                                 
18 Most Japanese technical/vocational schools require high school diplomat for applicants.  
19 I chose the following two dummy variables to contrast the difference in the nature of the 
missions. UNTAC was the first Japanese peacekeeping mission, and a relatively unstable mission 
environment. On the other hand, UNDOF was held in a very stable condition when the 
respondents were deployed to their mission although the recent situations in the Middle East 
became more unpredictable reflecting the intensifying Israel-Palestine conflict and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in early 2003. 
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respondents used a four-point scale (“1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree”) to 
answer the degree of agreement with the items. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) 
for the scale is 0.83.  
The personal motivation scale consists of 3 items about the degree to which a 
specific reason contributed to a respondent’s peacekeeping participation. The 3 items are 
“Peacekeeping participation would be useful for my career development and promotion 
after deployment”; “I will receive deployment benefit”; “Japanese people and the media 
would pay attention to us.” The respondents used a four-point scale (“1=strongly agree” 
to “4= strongly disagree”) to answer the degree of agreement with the items. The 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) for the scale is 0.71. 
 
(3) Interpersonal Role Conflict and Group Factors: 
Horizontal Interpersonal Conflict (INTER) is an item asking about general 
conditions of interpersonal relationships in a unit to which the individual belonged during 
deployment, using a three-point scale: 1=“Interpersonal relationship was generally well 
kept”; 2= “There were small problems of interpersonal relationships, but they did not 
impact unit morale”; 3= “There were interpersonal relationship problems and they did 
have negative impact on unit morale.” Mean value is 1.459; standard deviation is 0.636.  
Conflict with Superior (VERTICAL) is a question that asks about the frequency 
of vertical interpersonal conflict using a four-point scale: 1= “often”; 2= “sometimes”; 3= 
“rarely”; 4= “Never.”  The question is “How often did you experience conflicts with your 
superiors regarding decision making at work during peacekeeping deployment?” I reverse 
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coded the variable, and the responses were coded as 4= “often”; 3= “sometimes”; 2= 
“rarely”; 1= “Never.” Mean value is 1.319; standard deviation is 0.576.   
Unit Cohesion (COHESION) is an item asking about unit cohesion during 
deployment, using a four-level scale: 1=“(Unit) Cohesion remained high throughout the 
deployment,” 2= “ Cohesion was not high in the beginning (in the training prior to 
deployment), but it improved after we started working in the peacekeeping site,” 3= 
“Cohesion was high in the beginning (in the training prior to deployment), but it declined 
after we started working in the peacekeeping site,” 4= “Cohesion was not high 
throughout the deployment.” The responses were recoded to adjust the variable to be a 
more comprehensive ordinal scale by combining options 2 and 3 and performing reverse 
coding. The responses were recoded as 1= “Cohesion was not high throughout the 
deployment,” 2= “Cohesion changed over time,” 3= “Cohesion remained high throughout 
the deployment.” 
Mission Difficulty (DIFF) is a scale consisting of 4 variables to measure negative 
job characteristics that Japanese peacekeepers experienced in the mission, generated by 
principal component analysis of job characteristics in the mission. The 4 items are 
uncertainty-induced difficulty, role ambiguity-induced difficulties, busyness, and the 
similarity between their job in Japan and in the mission.  
Uncertainty-induced difficulty was assessed with the following item: “I had a 
very difficult time because job assignment in the mission was not clear.” Role ambiguity-
induced difficulty was measured with the following item: “I experienced anxiety or 
difficulty doing my job because the mission condition was fluid and unpredictable.” 
Busyness was assessed by the degree of agreement with the statement, “I felt busier in the 
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peacekeeping mission than in Japan.” The last item was assessed with the item, “I could 
do my job in the same way as I did in Japan.” All the 4 questions were measured with a 
four-point scale from “1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree,” and responses are 
reverse coded. The scores for the 4 items were added and divided by 4. The reliability 
coefficient, Cronbach’s α, for the 8 items in the scale is 0.82.  
(4) Perception about Peacekeeping: 
The following two items are included to assess peacekeepers’ subjective 
understanding of what peacekeeping is in this study.  
Good for Defense Act (DEFENSE) is a question asking one’s personal view 
about whether or not peacekeeping participation is good for the Defense Act (Bouei 
Shutsudou) or not. The Defense Act is an emergency measure to deploy SDF troops when 
Japanese territory is violated by an enemy. The question was measured with a four-point 
scale from “1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree,” and responses are reverse 
coded.  Mean value is 3.320; standard deviation is 0.899.  
Suitability to peacekeeping (MATCH) is measured by an item asking who 
should participate in peacekeeping operations: “Do you think that only the SDF can do 
the job in the peacekeeping mission or do you think that other than the SDF can do the 
same job?” A four-point scale was used to answer this question: 1= only can the SDF do 
the job; 2= The SDF is most suitable although other organizations can do the job; 3= 
Organizations other than the SDF can do the job well; 4= I do not know. Mean value is 
2.462; standard deviation is 0.558.  
(5) Psychological states: 
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Relative Stress Level (STRESS) indicates stress level during deployment 
compared to that of being in Japan. The variable is measured by a question asking the 
degree of agreement with the following item: “Compared to Japan, I felt more stressed.” 
Respondents used a four-point scale (“1=strongly agree,” “2=somewhat agree,” 
“3=somewhat disagree,” and “4= strongly disagree”) to answer the question. Responses 
were reverse coded and combined into the following three categories: 3=More stressed 
than in Japan (respondents who answered “strongly agree”), 2=somewhat more stressful 
than in Japan (respondent who answered “somewhat agree”), and 1=less stressed than in 
Japan (respondent who answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”). Mean value is 
2.02; standard deviation is 0.564. 
Personal Fulfillment (FUL) is assessed by a scale generated by component 
analysis of 16 items about one’s subjective evaluation about their own deployment 
experience. Eight items related to positive evaluation of one’s deployment experience 
were extracted as the primary component from the 16 items. These items were all related 
to one’s positive job experience during deployment. Using these 8 items, I created a scale 
called “personal fulfillment.” The scale consists of the degree of agreement with the 
following 8 statements, “ I felt that I can utilize my skills (in peacekeeping) more than 
(doing domestic missions) in Japan,” “ I could feel more job accomplishment than 
(domestic missions) in Japan,” “I feel (peacekeeping is) more challenging than (domestic 
missions) in Japan,“ “I feel (peacekeeping is) more interesting than (doing domestic 
missions) in Japan,” “ I feel that I am doing more important job (in peacekeeping) than in 
Japan ,” “I could feel more fulfillment in peacekeeping than in Japan,” “I felt more bored 
in the peacekeeping mission than in Japan,” “I enjoyed my job in the mission because I 
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had more autonomy.” The respondents answer those items using a four-point scale from 
“1= strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree. To avoid confusion regarding the direction 
of beta coefficient, I reverse coded the responses. The scores for the 8 items were added 
and divided by 8. The reliability coefficient, Cronbach’s alpha, for the 8 items is 0.82. 
Mean score is 3.167; standard deviation is 0.576. 
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Chapter 6: Formation of Contemporary Japanese Armed 
Forces  
  
In an organization, legitimization plays a key role in both its development and 
survival by providing the organization persistence and comprehensive meanings 
(Suchman 1995). The founding process of an organization is particularly important as an 
“imprinting” process in that social and institutional conditions significantly influence 
organizational structure at the founding of the organization and eventually become 
institutionalized (Stinchcombe 1965).   
In order to understand the institutional basis of organizational practices and 
professional identity of Japanese service members, I first examine how organizational 
legitimacy has developed/failed and the ways in which Japanese service members’ sense 
of self is contexualized within the institutional field. This chapter identifies what values, 
beliefs, and attitudes are institutionalized as the elements of the military in contemporary 
Japan, and describes organizational efforts to gain legitimacy by using various strategies. 
I start with the historic process of the establishment of the SDF, and then discuss how the 
US Occupation Force and the Government reinterpreted the military institution and the 
SDF.  
Constitutional Restriction on Possessing Military Power 
The SDF have severe burdens that cannot be found in other armed forces because 
of the Constitutional restrictions on military power (Emmerson and Humphreys 1973). 
World War II was finally over when the radio broadcasted the Imperial Rescript to 
declare unconditional surrender at noon on August 15 1945. That day was also the last 
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day of the Imperial Army and Navy, which built a modern Japanese military tradition 
with a unique mixture of a feudalistic military tradition. Two months later US Occupation 
Force, the so called GHQ,20 issued the Civil Liberties Directive, and the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) directed Deputy Prime Minister Konoye to 
start revising the Imperial Constitution. After a full-year drafting process, the new 
Constitution was promulgated in November 1946, and enacted in February 1947. The 
most notable characteristic of the Constitution is Article 9, which set forth the 
renunciation of war, no possession of war potential and denial of the right of belligerence 
of the state.  
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized…” (Article 9 of the Japan 
Constitution, enacted in 1947) 
 
In Article 9, General MacArthur expressed his intention of establishing the 
ultimately pacifist Constitution and making Japan the “Switzerland in the Orient” (Hata 
1976) although the initial reconstruction plan of Japan did not exclude the possibility of 
rearming Japan with a constabulary force. In addition to declaring renunciation of war, 
Article 9 in the Constitution also asserted that the Imperial Army, not the Imperial 
political regime, was responsible for the social institution that led Japanese society to 
supra nationalism and atrocities during WWII.  
As we interpret Article 9 at face value, the Constitution denies the possession of 
                                                 
20 In this dissertation, the term GHQ is applied to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
and its predecessor General Headquarters of the US Army Forces Pacific (GHQ/AFPAC) moved 
from Manila to Yokohama on August 24 in 1945. On October 2, General Headquarters of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) was established (National Diet Library 
2003).  
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any military power, which includes the right of self-defense upon an enemy invasion as 
well as aggressive wars. After the enactment of the uniquely pacifist Constitution, Japan’s 
national security issues seemed to move slowly to determine the future direction in 
preparation for possible domestic and external security threats, including maintenance of 
domestic security and rearmament of the nation. However, this idealized expectation for 
full-fledge autonomy and democracy was betrayed by the establishment of the National 
Police auxiliary soon after the Korean War broke out. This geopolitical event drastically 
changed the speed and process of re-institutionalizing the military in contemporary Japan.  
The domestic security situation also contributed to the emergence of the 
predecessor of the Self Defense Forces. Inflation, a deteriorating economic situation, a 
high unemployment rate, and the lack of food and goods invoked the rise of strikes, 
demonstrations, insurgency, and other violent incidents.21 To bring social order and 
improve domestic security, the police system needed to be enhanced as soon as possible. 
However, the existing police system had a serious impracticality to ease the unsettling 
domestic security situation: local government police forces (Jichitai Keisatsu) had strong 
jurisdictional independence from the National Regional Police Force (Kokka Chihou 
Keisatsu). The National Regional Police Force was not authorized to intervene without a 
request from the local government police force that had jurisdiction. To respond to the 
immediate needs to improve the domestic security situation, GHQ decided to establish a 
Japanese police force to support the US Occupation force (The Japan Defense Agency 
                                                 
21 Anti-government demonstrations, insurgency, and violent incidents against police 
officers and American troops (e.g., an assault against American troops in front of the 
Emperor’s palace), insurgency of non-Japanese residents against the government, and 
quasi-terrorist attacks targeting the public ( Matstukawa Jiken (incident), Mitaka Jiken, 
Taira Jiken, and Hiroshima Nikkou Jiken) became prevalent.  
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1961).  
 
The Korean War and the Emergence of the Japanese Armed Forces  
In the dawn of June 25 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Within two 
weeks, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions, which defined North Korea as 
an aggressor and mandated the United Nations Command (UNC) under the United States. 
The United States had the political legitimacy and military resources to command the 
operation to coercively expel North Korean forces from South Korea. The geographical 
proximity of US troops stationed in Japan was also a factor for the United States to 
command the UNC, and the US troops in Japan were immediately sent to the Korean 
Peninsula. On July 8, General MacArthur issued a MacArthur note on the enforcement of 
a police force. In the note, MacArthur directed Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to 
organize a 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR) and increase 8,000 members of 
the Coast Guard to fill the positions for internal security that had been manned by 
American soldiers.  
The US military needed to send the soldiers stationed in Japan to the Korean 
Peninsula. This was the beginning of the contradictory process of Japan’s rearmament 
against the “idealistic constitutional restriction,” which McArthur himself set forth in 
1947. To avoid public dispute over the establishment of a quasi-military organization, the 
NPR, the Occupation Force ordered the Japanese government to organize the NPR under 
the Potsdam legislation, which did not require the regular Japanese legislative procedure. 
The government authorized the National Police Reserve Regulation (Keisatsu Yobitai 
Rei) on August 9, and it took effect on the same day. Soon after, the General Headquarter 
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of the Occupation Force (GHQ) started organized the NPR as a police reserve 
organization with the capability of a quasi-military organization.  
As the first step in the process of establishing a police reserve organization, the 
GHQ and the Government had to distinguish the role of the NPR from the existing police 
forces. The NPR was defined as the police force directly working for the Prime Minister 
and completely independent from the National Regional Police and the Local 
Government Police. The primary mission of the NPR was to supplement “the strength of 
the National Regional Police and the Local Government Police that is necessary to 
maintain peace and order within the country” (The National Police Reserve Order 
1950).22 Article 3 of the NPR Order clearly limited the activity of the organization to the 
activities in which a police force would engage. The temporary formation of the NPR 
resembled a police force; however, the final organizational formation announced in 
December 1950 followed a conventional Army division system. This is a typical case of 
“decoupled organizations” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) whose structures became 
isomorphic with conventional military organizations, which would not fit to real activities 
of the Self Defense Forces that emphasizes community cooperation and domestic disaster 
relief. The SDF tried to fill this gap employing symbolic management strategies.  
In August 1950, the NPR started recruiting Non-Commissioned Officers at police 
department offices nation wide. The rank system adopted the rank system of the police so 
that recruits did not expect that American soldiers would give them training at 
                                                 
22 All the major documents during the occupation were drafted in both English and Japanese. The 
National Police Reserve Order was drafted in Japanese first, and translated in English. Sadao 
Anbu, who translated the order in English, chose the word “within,” not “in” in the phrase “to 
maintain peace and order within the country” to exclude any possible interpretation to allow the 
NPR for international deployment. His memoir is cited in “ Jieitai Junen Shi (The Ten-year 
History of the Self Defense Forces)” published by the Defense Agency in 1961.      
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Occupation Force camps. Once recruits were transferred to Occupation Force camps, 
they expressed strong resentment, and a few of them left the NPR (Defense Agency 
1961). Recruitment of officers was the most sensitive and difficult issue for GHQ. Major 
General Willoughby submitted his proposal for recruiting 400 former Imperial Army 
officers to the GHQ; however, the proposal was declined because former Imperial 
military officers were banned from the public sector. Instead, the NPR decided to recruit 
1,000 officers from those who had no prior professional military service experience. In 
March 1951, however, to compensate for the shortage of company officers, the NPR 
launched a special campaign to recruit the former professional military personnel who 
were removed from the list of the purged: Two hundreds and forty-five out of three 
thousand former Imperial military schools graduates, including the 58th class of Rikushi 
(Army Recruits), the 74th class of Kaihei (Navy Recruits), and other military school 
graduates in the 1945 graduation cohort, became officer candidates.  
In 1954, 406 former Imperial Army officers were re-commissioned to enhance the 
capability of commanding officers by recruiting former officers experienced and skilled 
in military matters, operations, and leadership. Following this recruiting mission, the 
NPR also re-commissioned 407 company officers who formerly served the Imperial 
Army and Navy. Recruiting former Imperial military personnel continued as a part of the 
regular recruitment (The Japan Defense Agency 1961). The Occupation Force purged 
former Imperial Army soldiers from the NPR, but eventually had to admit as many as 
10,000 former Imperial Navy officers and enlisted personnel to serve the Maritime Guard 
Unit in the Coast Guard to make up for the shortage of skilled sailors (Tanaka 1997). 
Letting former Imperial Navy personnel in the service meant that the democratic 
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Japanese armed forces failed to completely eliminate the former Imperial military from 
their organization.   
In August 1952, the government established the Safety Agency to centralize the 
operations of the NPR and the Maritime Guard Unit in the Coast Guard. Two months 
later, the NPR and the Maritime Guard Unit were renamed and enlarged as the 110,000-
man Safety Force and the approximately 10,500 Guard Force respectively. In Safety 
Agency Law, the phrase “supplementing the National Rural Police and Local 
Autonomous Police Force” was dropped and rephrased as “to maintain peace and order 
within the country and to protect people’s lives and properties” [translation provided by 
the author] (Article 4, Safety Agency Law 1952). The omission of the phrase was 
interpreted to mean the Safety Force and the Guard Force would be assigned to deal with 
situations that go beyond the capability of the police force. Thus, the Forces equipped and 
trained the members to meet their needs in these mission situations (The Defense Agency 
1961).  
In the Japan-US Security Treaty concluded in 1950, the United States encouraged 
Japan to gradually take responsibility for defense against direct and indirect territorial 
invasion. Corresponding to the requests of the United States referring to the Security 
Treaty, the government formed “the Committee for Investigation of Institutions (Seido 
Chosa Iinkai)” to conduct research to estimate the minimum level of defense force and 
economic resources needed for it. In May 1953, the Diet passed two defense laws to 
establish the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces (SDF). At the same time, the 
House of Councilors also passed a resolution banning overseas deployment of the SDF. 
Under the Defense Agency, the Security Force and the Guard Force were reformed as the 
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Self Defense Forces (SDF) in July 1954. The air force (the Air Self-Defense Force) was 
newly established as well. Under the authority of the Prime Minister, the organization of 
the SDF consisted of three branches, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) (Akaha 
1993). The force structure was also updated and more Americanized by adding ASDF, 
National Defense Council, and the Joint Staff Council. This Americanized organizational 
structure was viewed as the organization’s hidden desire for remilitarization.  
However, most military organizations all over the world have similar 
organizational structures aside from what functions and tasks are really needed for 
national security. Most militaries have three services, land, sea, and air forces, regardless 
of geographic location of the national territory that sometimes does not require all three 
branches for national defense (Avant 2000). In institutional organizations like the 
military, legitimized formal organizational structures reflect rationalized institutional 
rules, but those structures are not made to improve organizational efficiency or to purely 
manage tasks or functions that the organization is assigned to do. Aside from 
interoperability issue, the organizational structure of the military is supported by 
institutionalized myths and serves as the criteria for the membership in the profession.  
The GSDF started with 130,000-man strength in 6 regional divisions; the MSDF 
started with a quota of 15,808-man and 5 regional fleets and 1 defense fleet. The newly 
established ASDF started with only 6,287 and developed the aviation training system 
first. Parallel to the expansion of the organization, the quota of the Defense Agency 
increased from 152,115 in 1954 to 33,225 in 1959. The mission statement of the SDF 
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expanded the spectrum of the missions and emphasized territorial defense against direct 
and indirect invasion and maintenance of public order.  
Ceremonial Conformity  
In many cases, when an organization does not gain legitimacy from its external 
observers, the organization attempts to maximize legitimacy using substantive 
management strategies such as meeting the observers’ performance expectations to the 
organization and adopting organizational design that conforms to the values, norms, and 
expectations of the observers. For the SDF, however, it was nearly impossible to conform 
to constitutional restrictions against possession of any military power because it meant to 
deny the existence of the organization itself. For this reason, the SDF could not use 
substantive management strategies (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990) to gain legitimacy. Instead, 
the SDF have focused on normative and cultural aspects of legitimacy to defend 
organizational legitimacy, using symbolic management strategies without making 
substantial changes in the organization.  
First, the Japanese government tried to meet societal ideals of national security by 
defining the goals of the SDF. Although the existence of the SDF cannot gain regulative 
legitimacy because of Constitutional restrictions, the government has repeatedly 
announced reinterpretation of Article 9 in the way in which Japan can possess defensive 
military power. To justify their interpretation, the government had to provide convincing 
reasoning to the society that national defense using the military power of the SDF is “the 
right thing to do.” The judgments of rightness are free from practical usefulness. Rather, 
these judgments reflect beliefs about whether the activities of an organization are 
consistent with socially constructed value systems in the larger society in which the 
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organization is embedded (Suchman 1995).  
Japanese national defense policy follows the Basic Policy for National Defense 
that was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in 1957. 
The Basic Policy addresses protection of the nation and independence built upon 
democracy as the objective of national defense and the following four principles to 
achieve this objective.  
(1) To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international 
cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace. 
(2) To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, 
thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security. 
(3) To develop incrementally the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-
defense, with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic 
situation. 
(4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the 
future in deterring and repelling such aggression.  
(Basic Policy for National Defense 1957: Translation provided by the Japan 
Times, Ltd.) 
 
These four principles were drawn from the three fundamental pillars of Japanese 
National Security Policy: (a) The Constitution; (b) The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; (c) 
The Charter of the United Nations. Based on the Basic Policy for National Defense, 
Japan has set four additional policies on national defense as norms for a moderate defense 
build-up under the Peace Constitution. The principles include (a) maintenance of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy, (b) not becoming a military power that might pose a 
threat to other countries, (c) strict implementation of civilian control, and (d) observing 
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, together with maintaining firmly the Japan-U.S. 
security arrangements. Table 2 lists these four additional policies derived from the Basic 
Policy for National Defense. These 3 policies and 4 principles constituted the operational 
and institutional structure of the SDF as a constabulary force, while the formal structure 
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of the organization, designed by the US military and manned by some of former 
professional Imperial Army soldiers, was very much identical to that of a war-fighting 
force.  
Table 2: Four Additional Policies derived from the Basic Policy for National 
Defense. 
A.  Exclusively Defense-Oriented 
Policy 
The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that 
military force cannot be exercised until armed attack is 
initiated, and that the scope and level of use of defense 
forces are kept to the minimum required for the purpose 
of self-defense. Moreover, the defense capability to be 
possessed by Japan must be limited to the minimum 
necessary level. Thus, this policy refers to the posture of 
passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit 
of the Constitution. 
 
B.  Not Becoming a Military 
Power 
There is no clear definition of a "military power." For 
Japan, however, "not becoming a military power that 
might pose a threat to other countries" means that Japan 
will not possess military capability strong enough to 
pose a military threat to other countries, beyond the 
minimum necessary level of the defense capability for 
self-defense. 
 
C. Observing The Three Non-
Nuclear Principles 
 
The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refer to the principles 
of "not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them 
and not permitting their introduction in Japan." Japan 
adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as the 
fixed line of national policy. The Atomic Energy Law 
also prohibits Japan from manufacturing or possessing 
nuclear weapons. (Furthermore, Japan ratified the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976, and placed 
itself under obligation, as a non-nuclear weapons state, 
not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.) 
 
D.  Securing Civilian Control The defense operations of the SDF require approval of 
the Diet. Administrative works related to defense are 
fully subordinated to the administrative right of the 
Cabinet as part of general administrative works.  
 
Source: Defense of Japan 1998 (p.103-104: The Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times 
1998).  
 
 
Added to exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan highly values the United Nations’ 
policies in security issues. Japan became the 80th member nation of the United Nations in 
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1956, four and half years after the initial petition for membership. The Diet and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that there would be no contradiction between the 
Constitutional restriction against use of force and the obligations as a member of the UN. 
Japan declared that it would comply with the obligations as a member nation by 
all means at its disposal. This declaration made it clear that Japan would not fulfill 
obligatory demands that require means beyond its constitutional restrictions. Before 
joining the United Nations, the Diet passed a resolution against overseas deployment in 
1954. Shunsuke Tsurumi, who proposed this resolution, argued that there would remain 
the possibility of deploying troops to different countries far away from the homeland and 
repeat the WWII history if we do not limit the range of “self defense” only to territorial 
defense. The passage of this resolution lacked consideration about the demands on the 
JSDF for maintaining world peace or alliances (Tanaka 1997).  
As early as 1958, the United Nations approached Japan to send troops to the 
peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Japan could not comply with the request because of 
its domestic political dispute over the legality of the newly established JSDF. Japanese 
society left the inherent incongruence between the peacekeeping concept and the 
Constitutional restriction as it was and developed the idealistic “UN Centralism” as a key 
concept in her diplomatic and national security policies. At the same time, the US-Japan 
security treaty facilitated organizational isomorphism of the SDF in cooperation with the 
US military. The treaty increased the dependency of the SDF on the US military to 
supplement the limited capability for territorial defense. This organizational dependency 
led the SDF to adopt the US military’s manpower policies (e.g., downsizing after the end 
of the Cold War; the expansion of reserve components) although the SDF or the Defense 
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Agency had relatively weak justification to introduce those policies to Japan. There is 
little concern for organizational effectiveness; instead, adopting US organizational 
systems has been driven by belief and anxiety to keep up with the US military as a 
successful military organization. 
 
Redefining Means and Ends  
The SDF started as a constabulary force, which Janowitz (1960) identified as an 
emerging dominant type of military organization in the post total war age. In the process 
of organizing the Japanese armed forces, the constabulary force concept first appeared as 
a conceptual model for a new democratic Japan’s armed force in the correspondence 
between the GHQ and the Department of Army before the new Constitution was enacted. 
The US National Security Council was planning to build a force whose nature is between 
a police force and a military force such as light-armed task force for maintaining internal 
security (in an emergency, the force will act as regular military force), modeling on the 
constabulary force organized in Philippines under US occupation (Hata 1976). As 
Janowitz (1960) suggested, it is difficult for the existing military organization to adopt 
the constabulary force concept because of the drastic adaptation of the organization that 
may be required. For the new democratic Japan that had yet to overcome the 
psychological trauma of committing atrocities and being manipulated and exploited by its 
own military, it was an extremely difficult task to reconstruct the social definition of the 
military that distinguishes between a conventional military force and a constabulary force 
because the constabulary force concept was too subtle and abstract for ordinary Japanese 
people. As a result, the SDF has been viewed as a conventional military in society while 
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the organizational activities and goals have materialized based on the constabulary 
concept. 
In addition to the organizational concept, the SDF does not hold some 
fundamental characteristics of a military organization that are normally observed in 
almost any armed force. This diversion of the organizational structure is a strategy of 
maintaining the legitimacy of the organization. At the same time, the lack of fundamental 
characteristics leads the SDF to be separated from fellow military organizations in other 
nations. Organizational legitimacy had been constantly at risk since its inception due to 
the Constitutional restriction against the possession of military power: the absence of a 
court martial system and no compulsory terms of service (the prohibition of conscription). 
Kowalski called these two characteristics “two deficiencies” of the Japanese armed forces 
to maintain military discipline in the organization. 
According to Kowalski (undated), the National Safety Force (NSF) was “a 
military organization under the police laws,” operating “in a twilight zone of legality.” 
Since the National Police Reserve started as a police auxiliary, neither the NSF nor the 
SDF had a court-martial system to charge service members who violated the military 
codes. The absence of a court martial system and reliance on civilian criminal law placed 
the organization in a gray area between a legitimate military organization and a heavily 
equipped police reserve.  
In terms of compulsory service, the NSF started as an all-volunteer force without 
a compulsory term of service because its members are technically police officers. The 
Japanese Constitution prohibits conscription because it is involuntary servitude against 
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one’s own will, which is the violation of Articles 13 and 18 of the Constitution.23 Under 
the Japanese Constitution, involuntary imprisonment for criminals is the only involuntary 
servitude permissible. Taking into consideration the legal ground that makes conscription 
illegal, the “citizen solder” concept ― the core concept of American democracy― is 
missing in Japanese democracy, albeit Japanese society adopted democracy and the 
Constitution from the United States.  
The history of modern Japanese conscription strongly contributed to the absence 
of conscription in post-World War II Japan. Unlike the United States, Japanese 
conscription was initially launched not with a strong sense of patriotism nor support for 
the national sovereign. Under the ruling conservative oligarchs of Meiji Japan, 3-year 
conscription started in 1870, but exemption, including paying for a substitute, was 
common. Paying for a substitute was only allowed for the upper class. The conscription 
system was revised in 1873 and again in 1883. It was a sign of expansion of Meiji Japan 
and oppression of the non-ruling class, especially peasants and commoners. In post-
World War II Japan, the institutionalization of a conscription-based large standing army 
became impossible due to its unconstitutionality and very little external threat (Brendle 
1975). In any case, devaluing military service as a citizen obligation significantly reduces 
the institutional value and social status of military professionals in society. This is a 
critical political and societal factor for the organizational development of the military.  
The organization has maintained the organizational symbols of a non-traditional, 
                                                 
23 Article 13: All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the 
supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.  
Article 18. No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for crime, is prohibited (English translation provided by the Government Printing 
Bureau. The English translation of the Japanese Constitution is available on the National Diet 
Library website 2003 at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#3). 
  120 
 
constabulary force instead of taking a risk of losing organizational legitimacy by claiming 
the authenticity of the military force. These characteristics that are common to the police 
force furnished the SDF with the constabulary ethos, although the organizational format 
was transformed into a basic organizational model of modern armed forces, consisting of 
land, sea, and air in the early stage. The formal structure of the organization is the same 
as that of a conventional military force for warfighting, while the real activities of the 
Self Defense Forces have emphasized exclusively passive territorial defense, community 
cooperation, and domestic disaster relief.  
Results of government polls on national security issues show that these missions 
are recognized as the main missions of the SDF. The SDF could have not survived if its 
activities were purely training for combat. This is a case of “decoupled organizations” 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977) whose structures and activities are separated, and when the 
integration of the two domains can cause a serious operational issue, such separation 
serves as a buffer for an organization to survive. In the social environment in which 
regulative legitimacy is questioned, the SDF tried to gain legitimacy by manipulating 
their own structures and activities to the extent to which the organizational activities are 
congruent with value systems and meet societal needs. Gaining legitimacy through 
conformity to the environment is a safe and easy strategy when the ground of 
organizational legitimacy is as weak as the SDF because manipulating the organizational 
structure for conformity to the environment is a sign of loyalty to the existing cultural 
order, and causes little conflict with the existing institutional logic (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). Within individual organizations, conformity with the social environment can be 
gained easily by manipulating their own structures (Suchman 1995) without mobilizing 
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resources or making arrangements with the professional sector.  
Reinterpretation of the Military  
The Japanese government organized the SDF whose formal structures were built 
based on those of the US military. Regardless, the Government, the Defense Agency, and 
the SDF had to redefine the military institution in a way in which organizational 
legitimacy can be provided under the Constitutional restrictions. After the Constitution 
was enacted, the Japanese military institution was quickly diverted from that of the 
Prussian military model. The diversion of the Japanese armed forces, however, was not in 
the organizational structure, but in the meaning of the military institution in society. The 
meaning and the function of the SDF have been constantly debated and challenged, 
which substantially localized the meaning of the military within society. The meaning 
discussed here is cultural meaning, a certain meaning of a social entity that is constructed 
within a given culture. Cultural meaning characterizes the identities that constitute the 
goals that someone located in a particular position obtains and maintains through the 
mechanism of identity verification (Burke 2004). In this sense, political debates over the 
definitions of the SDF are the conjuncture between the social structure and identity of 
SDF personnel (jieikan).24 
Although the JSDF is treated as the Japanese military overseas, it has never been 
called “the military (guntai)” within Japanese society because Article 9 of the 
                                                 
24 In this dissertation, I will call SDF personnel Japanese service members, jieikan (self defense 
personnel) or jieitaiin (self defense members) to avoid imposing the Western cultural concept of 
“soldiers” and losing the subtle but critical distinction in the meanings implied in jieikan and 
jieitaiin. Despite the fact many researchers just call JSDF members “Japanese soldiers,” SDF 
personnel are officially not gunjin (military person) or heitai (soldier). Using the term “soldier” 
imposes the prescribed “soldier” identity based on a traditional warrior ethos and undermines the 
process of their identity formation and how JSDF members define who they are. 
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Constitution prohibits the nation from possessing any military power.25 The government 
announced the official interpretation of Article 9, claiming the rights of maintaining the 
minimum necessary level of armed strength to exercise territorial defense and the legality 
of the SDF as an armed organization for territorial defense. The Japanese government 
made a strict distinction between military power (senryoku) and defense force 
(boueiryoku) by defining defense force as strictly limited to the minimum level for 
territorial defense. The government applied the same logic that they used to separate 
senryoku and boeiryoku to legitimize the existence of the armed forces to compromise the 
Constitutional restriction. The government argued that the SDF is not a military because 
the SDF will not be engaged in an armed conflict exercising senryoku but will defend the 
country exercising boeiryoku, which complies with the Constitutional restrictions on 
engagement in warfighting. The definition has been consistent since the inception of the 
SDF. It is summarized well in the following statement by the Chief of the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau Yoshida. 
“Generally speaking, senryoku is literally force to fight. Speaking solely on this 
meaning, we can say that all the organizations with coercion have senryoku. 
However, senryoku, which is prohibited in Item 2 in Article 9 of the Constitution 
is the one that exceeds the necessary minimum level for defense…..” (Yoshida, 
November 13 1972 at the House of Councilors Budget Committee).   
 
However, the government has repeatedly defended the right of self-defense 
(jieiken) and military power to exercise the right. In the Diet, therefore, the difference 
between belligerence and jieiken and the definition of senryoku in relation with jieiken 
                                                 
25 Minister of Foreign Affairs Nakayama commented at a plenary session of the House of 
Representatives on October 8th 1990 that “Jieitai (the JSDF) is subject to the restriction under the 
Constitution, which prohibits the possession of more than the minimum and necessary level of 
force, so that it is different from the military that is commonly conceptualized. However, it is 
treated as the military under the International law, and the JSDF personnel is equivalent to the 
constituents of the military” (p.540: Asagumo Shinbun 2002). 
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were repeatedly discussed in various occasions over time. In 1959, Secretary General of 
the Defense Agency Seiichi Ohmura replied to a question by Budget Committee Member 
Atsushi Fukuda. Ohmura simply admitted that the Constitution does not deny the right of 
self-defense referring that a state should naturally possess the right of self-defense as an 
independent sovereign.   
“The Constitution renounced war, but not contention for self-defense (jieiken). 
First, war and the threat or use of force is renounced only ‘as means of settling 
international disputes’ Second, if we have armed attack from another nation, 
interrupting armed attack is exactly the same as exercising the right of self-
defense, thereafter, this is fundamentally different from settling international 
disputes” (Ohmura 1949: Budget Committee at the House of Representative, 
December 22).  
 
Ohmura then concluded that having the SDF is not illegal since the Constitution 
allows the nation to have troops with capability (jitsuryoku butai) to protect the right of 
self-defense that Japan should have as an independent sovereign. His statement was the 
official interpretation of the then Hatoyama Cabinet. Ohmura continued his statement on 
the legality of the SDF. 
 “Is the SDF a military? The SDF has a mission to protect [Japan] from the 
invasion of a foreign country. If you call this the military, the SDF can be 
called the military. However, possessing troops with this type of capability is 
not against the Constitution.”  
(Ohmura 1949: Budget Committee at the House of Representative, December 
22).                                                     
  
This definition is somewhat more relaxed than the one that former Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida gave in the Diet sessions in 1946. According to Yoshida, the NPR was 
not a military because it is to maintain public order; thus, organizing the NPR was not the 
rearmament of Japan.26  
Having a self-contradicting official definition of the organizational role has two 
very critical implications for the SDF and its organizational concept. The government 
                                                 
26 See the Records of Budget Committee sessions in the House of Representative on February 22 
and March 27 1946 in the 10th Diet Session.  
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abandoned the dominant definition of the military to justify the existence of the SDF 
under the Peace Constitution. However, formal organizational structure, expected 
activities, training, and equipment are undeniably military. It is normal that organizations 
change their organizational definition over time to adjust to environmental change. As a 
state-sponsored organization, most of the military does not have any legal issue to exist 
although there are many countries that specifically restrain the spectrum of the missions 
that they can carry out. In Japan’s case, organizational legitimacy could not be gained 
without self-denial as a military organization.  
The governmental definition of the SDF forced the SDF to deny its existence as a 
military organization to protect the country from enemy invasion, which is one of the 
primary missions for every single contemporary state-supported military organization. As 
a result, the SDF have to constantly live with a dual identity, which requires the 
organization to look as unmilitaristic as possible but be capable of dealing with armed 
confrontation in case of enemy invasion. This inconsistency of macro-level 
organizational concept has created numerous meso- and micro- level organizational 
controls to legitimize the organization. On the other hand, the organizational ambiguity 
enlarged the incompatibility to the conventional military in operations and organizational 
culture. It could significantly lower the credibility of the SDF as a military organization.  
As discussed above, rapid localization and lack of legitimacy of organizational 
existence in the first 10 years of organizational history isolated the SDF from its host 
society and fellow military organizations as well. The localization accelerated the 
separation between the organizational structure and actual activities, and the separation 
became a buffer against the lack of legitimacy by providing functions that are atypical of 
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a military organization. Such atypical activities were still too weak to change societal 
perception about the SDF, but became the lifeline for the organization. To keep this 
lifeline, the SDF have been using various strategies to localize its organizational activities.  
Since the SDF has a dubious legal ground to exist, the organization has attempted 
to legitimize itself by restricting organizational activities to passive territorial defense and 
domestic humanitarian assistance. In other words, the organization failed to legitimize 
itself so that the SDF tried to legitimize its existence by modifying the social definition of 
the military within society. The core concept of Japan’s national security is strictly 
limited to passive territorial defense, called senshu bouei27, which allows the SDF to 
exercise force only when another country initiates an armed attack on Japan. Most 
notably, military terminology was removed from the official organizational chart and 
materials while the organization adopted the US military organizational structure.  
Denial and Concealment: Euphemizing Military Terminology 
At the cognitive level of the organization, language plays a significant role in 
generating and maintaining organizations. Language defines the reality of the 
organization and is a key strategy of gaining legitimacy to help create organizational 
reality by “linguistic enactments of its members in the course of their everyday 
communications between each other” (p.126: Evered 1983). Language can epitomize and 
alleviate the understanding of experiences, and can create a system of meanings (Berger 
and Luckman 1966). Societal contexts―institutional and political conditions ― are 
essential components of vocabulary beyond a systematic sequence of letters (Mills 1972). 
Previous studies (Humphreys 1975; Hook 1996; Früstück and Ben-Ari 2002) have 
                                                 
27 Senshu-bouei means exclusively defense-oriented national defense. 
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argued that demilitarization of military terminology by US Occupation Force and the 
Japanese government was a “strategy to actively address its problematic existence” (p.1: 
Früstück and Ben-Ari 2002) and a way to “prevent any sense of linkage to the old 
imperial structures” (p.38: Humphreys 1975). In a study of organizational language in the 
US Navy by Evered (1983), the language used by its organizational members suggest a) 
its similarities to and differences from other organizations, b) its societal role, and c) 
shared view and realities among organizational members. The use of language in the SDF 
is used to emphasize the difference from the Imperial military and to keep the 
organizational image of the SDF as a non-military organization. From the organization 
charts to rank, equipment, and the manuals, most military terminologies were replaced by 
equivalent non-military terms. For example, US Army Colonel Frank Kowalski, who was 
in charge of organizing the NPR at the SCAP, cautioned Major Stevens, who had newly 
joined his staff regarding language use: 
“The Japanese Constitution prohibits having a military. So, you should not call 
enlisted personnel soldiers and officers by military ranks. You should call a 
soldier keisa (patrol men), and an officer keisatsushi (police officers) or 
keisatsusei (police official). If you see a tank, you should call it tokusha (special 
vehicle). By the way, a truck can be called a truck” (p.92: Kowalski 1969) 
[English translation was provided by the author of the present dissertation]. 
 
According to Kowalski (1969), American officers were reproached when they 
mistakenly called NPR personnel in commanding positions by military rank. The NPR 
adopted the name of ranks from the police force. He confessed that it was too obvious 
that what the US Occupation Force and Japanese government officials were creating was 
nothing but the army; however, they still had to deny the fact in public.  
The language used in an organizational context normally makes sense out of 
organizational phenomena in order for organizational members to share meaning and to 
  127 
 
collectively work to accomplish goals (Smircich 1983). Usually, it improves 
organizational efficiency because the organizational members can share meaning, which 
makes their choice of the best behavioral and attitudinal choice easier. On the other hand, 
shared meaning does not always lead organizational members to maximize their 
productivity, rather group conformity. Earlier research on Japanese national security 
suggested that SDF members successfully internalized this seemingly contradicting 
organizational reality through language use. Emmerson (1970) described uneasiness 
among SDF General and executive officers when they were called “General” and 
“Colonel” by US military officers in English because these ranks were for military 
officers, not for SDF officers. The language system in the SDF was designed to deprive 
SDF personnel of a conventional military ethos and remind them of the societal role of 
the organization as a constabulary force and as a military “fait accompli” with an 
ambiguous legal ground.  
The government refused to identify the SDF as a military organization to 
legitimize the existence of the organization while the Government partially admitted the 
nature of the organization as a military shown in the official interpretation by the 
Hatoyama Cabinet in 1948. Complex legal interpretation and lack of regulative 
legitimacy led the SDF to gain normative and cognitive-cultural legitimacy by fostering a 
constabulary ethos and exclusively defensive national security policies and persuading 
society through manipulation of language.  
Although these strategies for gaining legitimacy targeted the social environment, 
they affected internal legitimacy within the organization. In the shift from the NPR and 
the Security Force to the SDF, behavior of personnel has been regulated by non-coercive 
  128 
 
codes of conducts. These codes have power to penalize personal with pay cuts, demotions, 
and reprimands, but do not have legal force beyond the civilian criminal law because of 
the lack of a court martial system in the SDF. Accordingly, the code of conduct 
emphasizes ethics of the personnel’s behavior. In the NPR and the Security Force, the 
oaths stated the responsibility of the personnel to maintain peace and order of Japan. In 
the NPR, the oath included the phrase ‘to secure public well-being,” which was restated 
as “to protect people’s lives and properties” in the Security Force oath of service. In 1954, 
based on the Prime Minister’s Office Ordinance No.40 “Self Defense Forces 
Enforcement Regulations,” defense missions were newly assigned to the SDF. Reflecting 
the nature of the newly assigned duty, the SDF oath for general service (ippan no fukumu 
no sensei) identifies mission as territorial defense and behavioral and attitudinal standards 
for SDF personnel.  
“I am aware of the mission of the Self Defense Forces to protect the peace and 
independence of our country and comply with laws. With total cooperation, I 
maintain strict discipline, constantly cultivate virtue and faithfulness (tokusou), 
respect individual personality, train myself mentally and physically, improve my 
skills, refrain from being involved in political activities, and devote myself to 
missions with strong sense of responsibility. Regardless of my own safety facing a 
situation, I will try to accomplish my duty with all my heart and mind and 
strength. Thereby I take this oath to meet people’s commitment.” (The Prime 
Minister’s Office Ordinance No.40 “Self Defense Forces Enforcement 
Regulations,” 1954) 
 
Unlike the ones of the NPR and the Security Force, the SDF oath no longer had 
any description about maintaining public order within society as its primary mission. The 
organizational goal shifted to fight against external threats rather than internal threats. 
However, the oath still embraces the ambiguity of the organizational existence when we 
compare it with the US military oath of enlistment.  
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 "I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I 
will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of 
the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. So help me God." (Title 10, US Code 1978 1960, 
and 1962).28 
 
The American oath of enlistment specifies “against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic,” while there is no specificity in the Japanese oath of enlistment. In the Japanese 
oath, the phrase, “facing a situation (koto ni nozonde ha),” implies enemy invasion or 
national emergency but there is significant latitude left to interpret what the situation 
means.  
Systematic avoidance of clarity on the organizational orientation and denial of 
organizational identity as a military was heightened in the organizational language of the 
SDF. The absence of a new organizational concept for the SDF made it difficult for the 
general public to distinguish its function and purpose from those of the Imperial Army.  
To claim that the SDF is a constabulary force as the US government initially planned to 
design the armed forces for the new democratic Japan, it was necessary to at least 
temporarily admit that the SDF and its predecessors were fundamentally the military to 
become a constabulary force, which could have jeopardized organizational survival 
before developing an organizational foundation. Instead of taking the risk, the Defense 
Agency proposed an abstract and rosy picture of the organization. The new democratic 
government tried to promote the SDF as the “loveable” and “people’s” Self Defense 
Force, which showed a sharp contrast to the Imperial Army’s view of a solder as a “direct 
retainer of the emperor” (Inagaki 1975:p.3). In “Jieikan no kokorogamae” (mental 
                                                 
28 Act of 5 May 1960 replaced the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 
October 1962. 
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preparation of SDF personnel) issued on June 28 1961, it emphasizes the unity of SDF 
personnel with the Japanese people in describing the ideal mental states of SDF 
personnel: “Whether peacetime or wartime, SDF personnel should be proud of sacrificing 
themselves beyond their own interests, taking people’s hearts as their own hearts.” 
Interestingly enough, the kokorogamae much more clearly lists the mission of the SDF 
than the oath:“ 1) We will defend our people and nation, which has been abundantly 
developed and passed on to us by generations of worthy forefathers, against foreign 
invasion; 2) We will maintain public peace and order that built upon freedom and 
responsibility.” 
Although the Defense Agency and the SDF chose a cognitively complex approach 
rather than a straightforward but confrontational strategy to build the organizational 
identity, the strategic choice was not solely made by the organization. This is a 
consequence of the interactions between the organization (the SDF) and the environment 
(the society). The meanings associated with demilitarized military terminology are 
connected to the social structure and culture of contemporary Japan. Among 
environmental factors, “anti-militarism” (Berger 1998), one of the key cultural elements 
in contemporary Japanese society, seemed to play a significant role in the process in 
which the SDF found the ground of the organization. Anti-militarism influenced Japan’s 
national security policies and guided the SDF to the direction of today’s SDF. Once the 
environment let the organization survive in a particular form, the organization maintains 
and enhances the patterns of the operations to maximize the survivability in the 
environment. As a result, the SDF have enhanced their constabulary nature and diverged 
from the structure and activities of a conventional military as much as possible. At the 
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same time, anti-militarism has significantly lowered the general knowledge level of the 
Japanese public about national security issues, which interfered with interactions and 
understanding between the SDF and the larger society. A more problematic consequence 
is that the separation of the SDF from the larger society left the society unaware of the 
subtle but critical conceptual difference between the military force and the constabulary 
force.  
Legitimacy of the Military in the Early Post WWII Era 
Germany and Japan were both democratized by US occupation forces, but the 
Japanese armed forces were far more stigmatized in society than those in Germany. 
Berger (1998) listed three factors that distinguish American occupation in Japan from that 
in Germany: the actual social conditions when the two countries unconditionally 
surrendered; the way in which sense of war guilt and de-militarization were handled; and 
the process by which their new political institutions were created. Compared to 
Germany’s, Japan’s defeat was far less total: much greater degree of continuity was kept 
since the Japanese administration succeeded in preserving continuity in the government 
bureaucracy. Regardless of the painless shift into American occupation, this preserved 
continuity in the government system let the old political elites and bureaucrats maintain 
their political positions. Linguistic and cultural barriers also made it extremely difficult 
for the SCAP to completely purge and reform the local bureaucracy in Japan.  
Among the three factors that made the US occupation in Japan different from that 
of Germany, how sense of collective guilt and war crime were handled in the process of 
rebuilding new political institutions played a critical role in the process of 
reinstitutionalizing the military between Germany and Japan. In Germany, both civilian 
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and military Nazi party members were prosecuted and purged as war criminals. Purges in 
Japan exclusively targeted military elites. Very small numbers of businessmen and 
government officials were removed from political positions, while 117,000 former 
Imperial military officers and soldiers were barred from taking political positions in the 
new democratic government. Although such an inconsistent purge was necessary to 
preserve Emperor Hirohito and the imperial institution as a societal symbol in post war 
Japan, the disproportionate prosecution between civilian and military elites stigmatized 
the armed forces. There is another factor that stigmatized the armed forces in Japan. 
Berger (1998) suggested that the Japanese had sense of “dual victimization” by their own 
military leadership and by foreign countries’ occupation of Japan after the defeat. The 
former seems to be adequate: the Japanese felt that they had been victimized by Japan’s 
wartime military leadership and its expansionism. However, the latter seems to be less 
convincing. Instead of foreign countries’ occupation, I would like to emphasize the sense 
of victimization as the first nation whose people were victimized by nuclear weapons, 
taking into consideration that victimization by atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945 provided the momentum of anti-militaristic movements in post-WWII 
Japan. 
In contrast, Germany had new political leaders who conducted a fundamental 
reform of the political institution and confronted the atrocities of the Nazis. In the 
reconstruction process, Germany and Japan developed similar aversions to military 
power and fostered “antimilitarism,” (Berger 1998) which is different from “pacifism.” 
Antimilitarism is rooted in their strong aversions to military power reflecting people’s 
collective guilt associated with the militaristic regime before and during WWII. In Japan, 
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the military was degraded in every account. As the US occupation dismantled the 
Imperial military, the Japanese people cooperatively rebuffed militarism. For veterans, 
very little governmental or social support was provided (Humphreys 1975). 
In both Germany and Japan, the military was absent in the initial process of 
building the new political institutions. The relationship between the military and 
democracy was systematically estranged through the new social institutions. The 
Japanese Constitution and the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) that renounce war have 
served as the core of German and Japanese national security policies since then. 
In Japan, public hostility against militarism became radical after the renewal of 
the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960. The 1950 Japan-US Security Treaty and its 
renewal was one of the primary political concerns of the Japanese public from the 1950s 
to the early 1960s. The Japanese public felt that full independence from the US 
Occupation Force should be acquired by discontinuing the treaty. Despite the people’s 
hope, the Kishi Cabinet passed the bill of the renewed Security Treaty at midnight on 
May 20 1960. Rage against the anti-democratic legislation process mobilized 
approximately 300,000 people and heightened the student movement against the treaty 
and rearmament of Japan in universities and colleges all over Japan. The Kishi Cabinet 
resigned the next month.  
During this event, the Government requested the SDF to send troops to support 
the riot police to control mass protests, but the Director General of the Defense Agency 
rejected the request (Tanaka 1997). The National Police Agency firmly resisted the idea 
of requesting the SDF support the riot police to maintain public order against mass 
demonstrations to maintain its norm of restrictive non-violence strategy (Katzenstein 
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1996). This was a critical organizational decision for the National Police Agency because 
blurring the boundary between the police and the SDF would jeopardize the legitimacy of 
the police. Rejecting the deployment request from the government to suppress protesters 
symbolizes the conflicting organizational position of the SDF. For the SDF, sending 
troops to suppress protesters could decrease legitimacy and disband the organization by 
violating organizational policy to protect Japanese citizens. Since protesters were enraged, 
but ordinary Japanese citizens, using force to suppress them would evoke a historical 
negative image of the military as a violent oppressor to people. At the same time, the 
refusal of sending troops meant that the SDF admitted its unique role as a military against 
external threats, not a quasi-police force to resolve internal threats.  
The series of incidents in 1960 quickly developed an organizational myth among 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LPD) leaders: national security issues became political 
taboo in the early stage of democratic Japan (Tanaka 1997; Berger 1998). The LPD 
leaders dealt with defense issues in the Diet only if international political pressure 
required them to bring the issue to the table. For the Japanese public, renewal of the 
security treaty had a larger implication for democracy. Prime Minister Kishi’s move made 
the public deeply suspicious that the LDP and right wing politicians would remilitarize 
Japan and undermine democracy under the name of national security concerns (Berger 
1998). The strong linkage between anti-democracy and national security issues developed 
through the events of 1960 provided the SDF another layer of unfavorable image as a 
symbol of anti-democracy.  
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the founding process of the SDF and strategies of 
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defending the self-claimed regulative legitimacy that the US occupational force and the 
Government provided for the SDF and gaining normative legitimacy in society.  
Since the post war democratic Constitution prohibits the possession of any 
military power, the Self Defense Forces had an inherent legal and political constraint to 
gain organizational legitimacy. When the precursor of the SDF ―the National Police 
Reserve ― was established in 1951, Japanese society had not fully recovered physically 
or psychologically from the horrific memory of WWII ruled by the oppressive Imperial 
Army. Before the rearmament of Japan, there was no time for Japanese people to reflect 
on and develop a new identity learned from war crime that their own people committed 
or let happen during WWII. Haunted by the dark and gruesome image of the Imperial 
Army, the development of contemporary Japanese armed forces is characterized by the 
redefinition process of the military, not the development of a new military (Katzenstein 
1996). More precisely, it is the process by which the SDF has separated the organization 
from the unwanted predecessor and prove the difference to the larger society that is the 
weary captive audience in Japanese civil-military relations.    
For an organization, the meaning, legitimation, or higher-level of support from the 
wider social system is necessary to make the implementation of the organization’s goals 
possible. In response to such institutional support, the organization needs to shape its 
operations in a way in which they are congruent with the normative structure of society 
(Parsons 1956). However, for the SDF, there was no form of institutional support 
available except governmental support. This institutional environment forced the SDF to 
keep negotiating with the larger society in order to manage its legitimacy. Normally, 
organizations without cultural, normative, and legal supports are less likely to survive 
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than organizations with these supports because “legitimacy exerts an influence on 
organizational viability independent of its performance or other attributes or connections” 
(Scott 1995: p.158). At the same time, organizations are not entirely passive to 
institutional environments that constitute them; organizations can tactically react to the 
pressures from institutional environments and manage views of their legitimacy for 
survival and achieving goals. Although excessive protesting to gain legitimacy drives 
away support from audiences (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), in response to criticism from 
the public, the SDF kept protesting to secure its legitimacy. Such aggressive pursuit of 
legitimacy put the SDF into a “vicious circles” of legitimation (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), 
and marginalized the SDF in society. The next chapter will further discuss the strategies 
that the SDF introduced to defend legitimacy and the role of jieikan as active agents of 
the SDF in the management of failed legitimacy.  
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Chapter 7: Symbolic Management and Professional Identities  
 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, the failure to gain legitimacy in the founding 
process isolated the SDF from the larger society and caused distrust in the Japanese 
public on national security policies. As a result of not having acquired a sufficient level of 
legitimacy in the founding process, the SDF had to spend enormous time and resources to 
gain social acceptance in order to survive in a society whose dominant value system does 
not view the military as a legitimate social organization. Lack of legitimacy under the 
peace Constitution, however, necessitated the SDF to use symbolic management 
strategies instead of substantive management strategies to gain legitimacy.  Symbolic 
management strategies are closely related to the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects 
of institutions. The normative element of an institution emphasizes “internalization of and 
compliance with collective values and norms”; the cognitive element emphasizes 
consistency with cultural-cognitive schemas and models: legitimacy as recognizable, 
taken-for-granted structures and behavior” (p.218: Scott, et al. 2000).  
Although symbolic management targets external observers to support the 
organization, it also affects organizational members’ attitudes and behavior over time 
because institutions shape the basis of one’s identities (Wicks 2002). The previous studies 
have consistently found this initial failure and isolation of the military institution in 
democratic Japan (see Brendle 1973; Inagaki 1975; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; 
Tanaka 1997). Despite a considerable number of studies on civil-military relations in post 
war Japan, little attention has been given to service members’ professional identities or 
the impact of the undesirable civil-military relations on the SDF as a professional 
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organization.  
I hypothesize that symbolic management strategies that the SDF relied on to gain 
legitimacy shaped the organizational culture and created the unconventional behavioral 
and attitudinal standards (ideal type) for SDF personnel. Therefore, this chapter focuses 
on symbolic management strategies to defend legitimacy for organizational survival and 
how SDF personnel internalize their tainted professional identity. I examine how 
Japanese service members shape their professional identity, managing the morally and 
physically tainted image of the profession and negative feedback from the public. 
Furthermore, I discuss the significance of dirty work in society, and provide an 
explanation why the SDF is necessary to maintain the anti-military culture in 
contemporary Japanese society. 
 
Espousing Socially Acceptable Goals  
Socially acceptable To ease the concern about Japan’s rearmament, the Defense 
Agency set a self-imposed cap on defense expenditure. In the National Defense Council 
and Cabinet meeting on November 15 1976, the defense expenditure was set under 1 
percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). This budgetary limitation did not cause any 
financial difficulty to the Defense Agency and the SDF. Pressure from the Ministry of 
Finance made the Defense Agency set the budgetary limit, but the 1 percent limit was not 
really a restrictive limit, rather a reasonable one in because the defense expenditure in the 
past several years did not exceed 1 percentage (Harada 1991) (see Table 3). Regardless, 
the 1 percent of GNP cap (and later the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was adopted) 
became a significant indicator for the Japanese public and neighboring Asian nations to  
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Table 3: Japan's Defense Related Expenditure since 1955.  
Year GNP・GDP 
(million yen) 
Defense 
Expenditure 
(million yen) 
% of GNP・
GDP 
Growth from 
Previous Year 
1955 75,590 1,349 1.78 3.3 
1965 281,600 3,014 1.07 9.6 
1970 724,400 5,695 0.79 17.7 
1971 843,200 6,709 0.80 17.8 
1972 905,500 8,002 0.88 6.98 
1973 1,098,00 9,355 0.85 6.55 
1974 1,315,00 10,930 0.83 6.39 
1975 1,585,000 13,273 0.84 21.4 
 1985 3,146,000 31,371 0.99 6.9 
1990 4,172,000 41,593 0.99 6.1 
1991          4,596,000 43,860 0.95 5.45 
1992 4,837,000 45,518 0.94 3.8 
1993 4,953,000 46,406 0.94 1.95 
1994 4,885,000 46,835 0.96 0.9 
1995 4,928,000 47,236 0.96 0.86 
1996 4,960,000 48,455 0.98 2.58 
1997 5,158,000 49,414 0.96 1.98 
1998 5,197,000 49,290 0.95 0.3 
1999 4,963,000 49,201 0.99 0.2 
2000 4,989,000 49,218 0.99 0.0 
2001 5,186,000 49,388 0.95 0.3 
2002 4,962,000 49,395 0.99 0.0 
2003 4,986,000 49,265 0.99 0.3 
2004 5,006,000 48,764 0.97 1.0 
Source: Defense of Japan 1976 and 2004 (The Defense Agency 1976; 2004).  
 
evaluate the remilitarization of Japan. Table 4 illustrates the top 6 nations in defense 
expenditures in 2003. Japan constantly has spent over 43 trillion yen (approximately 40 
billion US dollar) and the fourth largest in the world, while the ratio of defense 
expenditure to the 1 percent of GDP is the lowest among the top 10 nations on defense 
expenditure. For example, Saudi Arabia spent 18.3 billion dollars for defense related 
expenditure, which is equivalent to 13.0 percent of the nation’s GDP.  
Based on an exclusively defensive security policy, the force used for territorial 
defense is limited to the minimum necessary level capability for self-defense. Under this  
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policy, the acquisition of offensive and potentially offensive equipment and weapon 
systems is also prohibited. However, these self-imposed limitations on financial and 
performance capacities in national defense were not enough to reduce institutional 
pressure from the public on the SDF. 
Table 4: The Nations Spending the Most Defense Expenditure  
Country Defense Expenditure 
(US billion dollar) 
Ratio of Defense 
Expenditure to GDP (%)
US 276 3.2 
China 55.9 4.3 
France  46.5 2.6 
United Kingdom 31.7 2.3 
Germany 38.8 1.4 
Japan 39.5 1.0 
Source: CIA 2003 World Factbook. (The Central Intelligence Agency 2003). 
 
Regardless of an exclusively defensive security policy, the unpopularity of the 
SDF continued to grow in the society. A few social changes that took place also made it 
more difficult for the SDF to integrate with the larger society. Rapid economic growth in 
the 1960s expanded job opportunities for the youth, which created a serious manpower 
shortage for the SDF, and resulted in a decline of the quality of recruits. The deterioration 
of the quality of the personnel added another negative organizational image in society. As 
the requirements for enlistment in the SDF shows, a high school diploma has not been 
and still is not officially required for applicants to join the enlisted corps except for 
aviation students (kouku gakusei).29  
                                                 
29 Criteria for enlistment are only age (between 18-26 years old) and Japanese citizenship. 
Applicants need to pass written and physical exams and an interview. The criteria remains still the 
same today although now it is increasingly competitive for those who without high school 
diploma to join the force because an overwhelming number of high school and college graduates 
apply for enlistment. In the GSDF, 10 percent of the recruits hold college degree (Yamaguchi 
2002). Kouku gakusei is a unique system to train future ASDF and MSDF pilots by providing a 2-
year training and education to high school graduates. Each service has a different school facility 
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A series of protests against the renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960, 
coupled with rapid economic growth, spoiled the reputation of the SDF as an employer 
among the eligible youth, and perpetuated the manpower shortage. As a result, the SDF 
could not reach its recruitment goals in the late 1980s: they were 30,000-40,000 men 
short every year (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993). Because of the manpower shortage, 
low standards of screening and selection and desperate recruiting campaigns enhanced 
the negative image of the SDF. Interviewees, who joined the force in the 1980s or earlier, 
confirmed that the recruiter was not a popular job among NCOs. It was not unusual that 
recruiters went to a shopping district and randomly tried to recruit young men who were 
hanging out at a pachinko (pinball) parlor or on the streets. Their struggle resembles to 
the recruitment crisis that the US military has experienced after the end of the Iraq War in 
2003, but unlike the United States there was no societal value or virtue in serving the 
country in Japanese society.  Chronic manpower shortage continued until the economic 
crisis in the early 1990s restructured the Japanese labor market and filled in the wage gap 
between civilian workers and government employees.   
One of the main concerns that Japanese national security watchers share is the 
remilitarization of Japan. Japanese society has carefully monitored any military activities 
that the SDF and its personnel conduct, which may go beyond exclusively defense-
oriented national security policy. Any proactive exercises including desk simulations to 
prepare for national emergencies are prohibited. The Mitsuya study (Mitsuya Kenkyu) 
was one of the national defense-related scandals that became a subject of public scrutiny 
during the Cold War period. The Mitsuya study was a simulation exercise conducted in 
                                                                                                                                                 
and different curriculum. During training kouku gakusei hold NCO ranks. After finishing the 
training program, kouku gakusei become officers.  
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the Defense Agency to study operations of SDF troops and other relevant issues based on 
a scenario in which a conflict breaks out in the Korean Peninsula and affects Japanese 
national security. The Mitsuya study was a classified study, but it became public in the 
Diet by Haruo Okada from the Socialist Party in February 1965. A focus of the dispute 
was that the simulation including the procedure for wartime emergency legislation (yuji 
housei). Wartime emergency legislation (yuji housei) evoked the haunted image of the 
Imperial Army’s wartime conscription. As Tanaka (1997) pointed out, this type of 
simulations, including the review of the existing legislation and their issues seems to be a 
common exercise for armed forces whose primary purpose is territorial defense. However, 
Prime Minister Eisaku Satoh drmorf the legitimacy of uniformed officers running any 
simulation to deal with any warlike national emergency (yuji). After this incident, 
studying legislative flaws in case of national emergency (yuji) became a taboo within the 
Defense Agency. This incident introduced an additional normative rule to the SDF to defy 
the very activity that should define the purpose of the military organization.  
Such a normative rule was able to be sustained because post-war Japan did not 
have any immediate threats, unlike Germany. Germany was constantly prepared for a 
potential threat from East Germany during the Cold War. Such a difference in the 
regional security situation between Japan and Germany made a significant difference in 
social understanding of the military and its role between the two nations. In Germany, on 
the other hand, the conscription system, supported by the concept “citizen in uniform,” 
helped avoid demonizing the military by the general population. Conscription served as 
an opportunity for German youths to learn what the military is all about in their daily 
lives (Berger 1998). In contrast, the Japanese Constitution prohibits conscription because 
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of its involuntary nature. Illegalizing conscription separated military service from 
Japanese democracy and increased the abstraction of national security issue in a stable 
regional security situation during the Cold War era. The SDF is an all-volunteer force, 
and its size is only 0.2 percent of the general population. There have been very scarce 
opportunities to promote social understanding of the SDF in society so that the SDF had 
to control the public image of the organization in various ways.  
 The more the organization valued the constabulary ethos, the more domestic 
missions (disaster relief, rescue missions, and civilian cooperation) became emphasized 
in the SDF. From 1970 to 1975, the SDF dispatched troops on 4,019 occasions including 
13 major disasters (e.g., typhoons, a fire on a ship, and recovery of the remains in an air 
crash). On the other hand, the number of territorial defense missions was much smaller 
(The Japan Defense Agency 1976). By producing adequate outcomes that meet societal 
ideals and the self-defined goals to serve the Japanese people, this number of disaster 
relief missions should have met the goal to show conformity of the organization to 
societal ideals. 
 
Social Significance of the dirtiness of the Military in Japan 
 For decades, the SDF has been working on public activities and rescue missions 
to improve the organizational image, to prove their higher loyalty to Japanese people, and 
to rise above their stigmatized professional status. However, ironically the problematic 
existence itself seems to be the most important function of the SDF for the contemporary 
Japanese society and its psyche.  
Following Berger’s (1998) model of the national security policy in post WWII 
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Japan, the above self-imposed organizational policies fundamentally do not work to 
provide the SDF legitimacy.  Norms derived from the “anti-militarism” culture with strict 
civilian control and strong preference in economic development undermined the role of 
the military in society. The skepticism of the public and the Peace Constitution play a 
gatekeeper role in this dynamic. However, Berger (1998) overlooked the dependency of 
Japan’s anti-militarism on the stigma of the SDF. This dependency makes anti-militarism 
culture a more effective cultural apparatus to maintain the collective identity of the 
Japanese. The dirty work theory provides an explanation for the mechanism of the 
dependency of Japan’s anti-militarism on the stigma of the SDF.  
              As Berger (1998) emphasized, the ideology of Germany and Japan have on 
national security is not merely pacifism to pursue peaceful resolutions for conflict 
situations, but “anti-militarism” that implies active aversion to the use of force. Berger’s 
argument on Japanese “dual victimization” sentiment suggested a noteworthy social 
psychological function of Japan’s anti-militarism culture:  
“On the one hand, the Japanese felt they had been victimized by the blind 
ambition of Japan’s wartime military leadership. On the other hand, they also felt 
victimized by the United States and other foreign nations which, in the Japanese 
view, had conducted a ruthless campaign of conquest in order to increase their 
own power” (Berger 1998:p.7).  
 
Anti-militarism culture in contemporary Japan is not merely a noble conversion to 
prevent rearmament of the nation. Rather, it is a defense mechanism to sustain the 
Japanese people’s collective identity. The early Japanese peace activism focused on 
grounding the idea of ordinary Japanese people as another group of war victims during 
WWII. The Japanese government is a strong supporter of anti-nuclear weapons activism 
and has remained a nuclear weapons free nation, supporting the three principles against 
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nuclear weapons (hikaku san gensoku). On the other hand, the government did not deal 
with war crime issues such as compensation and apologies to war victims in neighboring 
Asian countries, especially sex slaves for the Imperial military, so called comfort women, 
for more than four decades. It has been just ten years since the government started 
engaging in resolving these war crimes of the previous war.  Japanese society has been 
trying to dissociate itself from war crimes committed during WWII by characterizing 
those crimes as exclusively organized and conducted by the Imperial military. In this 
rhetoric, stigmatizing the military profession as “dirty work” plays a significant role in 
sustaining the collective identity of the Japanese.  
As a function of stigmatization, the individuals who stigmatize a particular group 
can benefit from doing so by inviting “functional value” for themselves, for the society, 
or for all of these (Croker, et al. 1998). As Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) suggest, dirty 
work is socially significant for the public to keep them clean. Societies make connections 
between cleanliness with goodness and dirtiness with badness. Such cognitive association 
has moral implications that makes physically and socially tainted occupations morally 
devalued and insist on removing the badness from the goodness to protect the cleanliness 
(Douglas 1966, cited in Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). Individuals who stigmatize others 
(‘the normal’ in Goffman’s term) can believe that they are good (a self-esteem 
enhancement function), that they are deserving and fair (serving as social control 
function), and that their world view is correct (serving an “anxiety-buffering” or “terror 
management” function (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 1991)) (Croker, et al. 
1998).  Among these stigma functions, the self-esteem enforcement function is especially 
noteworthy in the analysis of the relationship between the SDF and the larger society. The 
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stigmatization of the SDF has served as an enforcer of self-esteem of people in post War 
Japan by motivating positive intergroup comparison. The entire Japanese society could be 
stigmatized as a former ultramilitaristic nation that has engaged in inhumane conduct to 
enemy combatants and non-combatants and to their own people. By marginalizing the 
SDF as dirty work, the society avoided being stigmatized as a whole, at least within 
society.   
According to Dovidio, et al. (2000), when attribution is associated with groups 
(e.g., racial, ethnic, or national group), social identity and attributions are more important 
than when the attribution is associated with an individual. The motivation stimulated by 
distinguishing the self and intergroup members from outgroups leads intergroup members 
to look for their attributions that can be favorable over the outgroup. This can facilitate 
active discrimination against outgroups. “Enhancement of one’s own group relative to out 
groups, then, reflects positively on collective as well as personal self-esteem” (p8).  
Although the public was initially eager to tear down the military, it became a convenient 
and effective tool to keep the larger society innocent.  
Societies make every effort to separate cleanliness from dirtiness to keep the main 
body of the society clean (Ashforh and Kreiner 1999). By allocating dirtiness to those 
who engage in dirty jobs, societies can forget about dirty jobs that are necessary and 
avoidable in society and maintain their cleanliness and superiority (Hughes 1962; 
Ashforth and Humphrey 1995; Ashforth and Kreiner 1999).  As long as the society 
maintains their anti-militaristic sentiment and antagonism against the military institution 
including the SDF, civilians are deserving and peaceful people. As a side effect, the sense 
of social responsibility for war victims during WWII remained weak because ordinary 
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Japanese people are victims of the oppressing military regime. Technically speaking, 
victims do not have to take action on behalf of the aggressor.  
Benefiting from these functions of dirty work, “anti-militarism” culture has 
provided an effective and psychologically less damaging solution for the Japanese society 
to sustain a unified, collective identity as the Japanese. Also, until very recently, the SDF 
was not recognized as “necessary.” Although dirty work is often important and necessary 
in society, as morally tainted, the public do not find necessity in the military profession. 
So, the profession came to be viewed not as “necessary evil” but just “evil.”  For this 
reason, stigmatizing the SDF has been rationalized, and integrated into contemporary 
Japanese democracy as an institutional form of justifiable discrimination with legal 
support from the Peace Constitution.  
 
Denial and Concealment to Defend Legitimacy 
Institutions shape how individuals in the organization interpret the environment 
and how the interpretation process constructs taken-for-granted understanding of social 
reality. Thus, institutions shape the basis of one’s immediate social structure and create 
one’s identity that regulates one’s situational behavior (Wicks 2002). As social, historical, 
and legal factors continued to limit the opportunities of the SDF to integrate into society 
for decades, the Defense Agency and the SDF launched strategies to control the public 
image of the SDF in order to gain social acceptance.  
Public services for local festivals and athletic events have been one of the main 
activities that the SDF had conducted since the 1950s. One of the most widely known 
public assistance missions is to build snow sculptures for the annual Sapporo Snow 
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Festival every February. The SDF started assisting the festival in 1955. Since then it has 
been taken for granted that Ground Self Defense Force personnel carve many sculptures 
for the festival every winter. However, when the Defense Agency decided to deploy 
troops from the Northern Army (mostly the 11th Division) to Iraq in 2004, this unique 
civil assistance program caught the international media attention. The Washington Post 
and other North American and British media featured the long-lasting “sculpture 
mission” as a symbolic image of the SDF as a constabulary force. As a result of the 
deployment of troops from the Northern division, the city had to seek out volunteers and 
contractors to carve the snow sculptors first time in the half a century long history of the 
festival (see Faiola 2004). Despite the organizational efforts to integrate into the local 
community, the presence of the SDF has not always been welcomed. In Okinawa, a 
Ground Self Defense Force team participates in a traditional boat race held in May every 
year. However, the team is not allowed to reveal their affiliation with the SDF in the race. 
In the race, the team is introduced as “the people working for the land (riku no oshigoto 
wo suru hitotachi)” (Tatsumi, et al. 1998b). In April 1998, a professional baseball team 
invited a group of cadets from the Defense Academy for the opening game to 
demonstrate their drill. However, once it was found that firing rifles is involved, the 
sequence of the demonstration was modified because firing guns is inappropriate in the 
opening game where lots of families with children are present (Asahi Shimbun 1998).  
Other than public assistance missions, cognitive strategies that the SDF have used 
include authority cuteness and gender integration in the SDF.  Authority cuteness is  
McVeigh’s (2000) concept referring to a strategy used by Japanese authorities to soften 
the power relations and make it easier to control and influence people by displaying 
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weakness by authority figures. Although these strategies are targeting those who are 
outside the SDF, they also influence individuals in the organization as well by 
internalizing a certain image of the organization that is prevalent in the larger society. 
 
Authority Cuteness and the Social Status of the SDF 
 “While I was waiting for Captain K in the public relations office at the Air Self 
Defense Force Officer Candidate School in Nara, a young civilian employee 
handed me a pile of sheets of stickers. She and the head of the public relations 
office told me that they had too many of these stickers and would be happy if I 
could take some. On a glittering sheet, there were a lot of small stickers with the 
two animated characters wearing different types of SDF uniforms. A boy and a 
girl with huge round eyes, called Paseri-chan and Pikurusu-kun, were on a tank, 
helicopter, and other heavy armed vehicles. I expressed my gratitude to her, yet 
could not take my eyes off from the cute stickers. I saw these characters while 
living in Japan, but never paid close attention to them. After spending several 
years in the United States, I got used to tall, broad-shouldered American soldiers 
walking on the street near the Pentagon and the hyper-masculine image of 
American soldiers in recruitment commercials on TV. Now, these cute animated 
characters gave me uncomfortable feelings.  These characters, Paseri-chan and 
Pikurusu-kun, were THE mascots of the SDF. They were not just for kids. They 
are everywhere in the [public relations] magazines. A tour for civilians is even 
named after one of the characters’ name.” (Author’s field note on May 9 2003) 
 
One of the most noticeable unmilitaristic images of the SDF is the two animated 
characters: a cute boy and a girl wearing the uniform used in public relations materials.  
Referring to McVeigh’s (2000) concept, Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) have pointed out 
“authority cuteness” represented in these animation characters and the image of women 
used in public relations materials of the SDF.  Applying Goffman’s dramaturgical theory, 
Brian McVeigh (2000) analyzed school uniforms, dress codes, and cute objects to 
examine the relationship between micro-level self-presentation and the state in 
contemporary Japanese society. According to McVeigh, authority cuteness is a strategy 
that Japanese authorities use to make their tasks of controlling and persuading the general 
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public easier by softening the authoritarian image through the display of friendly, weak 
images. Japanese authorities (state agencies, educators, large corporations, etc.) display 
weakness through innocent animated characters such as babies, children, animals, and 
creatures smiling and painted with cute colors. For example, the National Police Agency 
uses cute male and female creatures (Pipo-kun and Pico-chan) in public relations 
materials. By being surrounded by these soft and vulnerable images, the general public 
feels the authorities more approachable and conforms to their warnings and persuasion 
easily. In other words, authority cuteness is a performance of the authority for smooth 
communication. The general public accepts the soft self presentation of the authority 
figure, and cooperates with the performance of authorities as the receptive audience.  
Figure 4 shows the two characters used by Defense Agency: Pikurusu-chan and 
Paseri-chan (Mr. Pickles and Miss Parsley). These short, big-headed, round-eyed, 
childish figures are characterized as a prince and a princess in neighboring countries of 
Japan, symbolizing the ideal image of the Defense Agency:  “cheerful (akarui)” and 
“friendly (shitasimiyasui). They are more than mascots that symbolically represent the 
organizational image; rather, they are active agents to disseminate the ideal organizational 
image of the Defense Agency through simplified narratives. The basic story of these two 
characters is as follows: Pikurusu-kun is a prince of a small and peaceful country, the 
Paprika Kingdom. He initially had a doubt about why his country had a defense force, but 
he realized the usefulness of the defense force when a neighboring country, the Sesami 
Kingdom, invaded his country. His girl friend, Pikurusu-chan, is a daughter of a tribal 
chief in another neighboring country, the Broccoli Kingdom. When she was once 
captured by the Sesami Kingdom, Pickles-kun rescued her after his defense force 
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defeated the Sesami Kingdom troops that invaded the Paprika Kingdom. After that, 
Pickles-kun came to Japan to serve in the SDF to learn how to improve his country’s 
defense force. Compared to the characters used in other Japanese government agencies,  
 
Figure 4.  Japan Self Defense Force Mascot Characters, Pikurusu-kun and Paseri-
chan on A Sheet of Stickers distributed in a Public Relations Office for Civilian 
Visitors.  
 
  
                          (Front)                                                          (Back) 
Reprinted with permission of the Japan Defense Agency.  
 
Pikurusu-kun and Paseri-chan have much richer background information and their own 
stories. Pikurusu-kun was initially very skeptical about his country’s defense force, but 
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his mindset changed through the experience of enemy invasion.  
Although the status of Pikurusu-kun in the story is a prince, this is a metaphor of 
the young generation Japanese who have power to determine the future of the country 
like a prince. Pickles-kun has no obligation to serve in the military, but he did so because 
it is important to maintain peace in his country. On the one hand, Paseri-chan and 
Pikurusu-kun are the idealized images of the Japanese youth. On the other hand, these 
characters are an indirect form of challenging the stigmatized attributes of SDF personnel 
by claiming its loyalty to a higher cause (Sykes and Matza 1957): protecting the country 
and their noble status as a prince and a tribal chief’s daughter, who do not have to serve 
in the force but do so for a higher cause.  
Authority cuteness is an alternative way of gaining and assuring a normative 
power relation through commercialization and commodification of cute things. Cute 
objects embedded in everyday life create an objectified sentiment to cuteness, which 
reinforces symbolic associations between cuteness and abstract values (McVeigh 2000). 
Cuteness represents the power holder and the subordinate in society such as authority 
structure and male-female relations. Those who are in power show cuteness to their 
subordinates as a deceiving self-presentation strategy to gain control over them. On the 
other hand, displaying cuteness toward the power holder is a strategy to receive attention 
and favorable treatment (McVeigh 2000). For the former reason, authority cuteness is 
used as a common strategy in other government agencies in Japan (McVeigh 2000) such 
as the National Police Agency and the National Personnel Authority. Früstück and Ben-
Ari (2002) viewed that the SDF controls and disguises its association with violence using 
the authority cuteness strategy. However, unlike other state agencies and big corporations, 
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the SDF have very weak authority and legitimacy. The SDF is not fully supported by 
legal bodies nor supported by the majority of society; therefore, authority cuteness is not 
only for softening the image of the organization to exercise the authority smoothly. In this 
case, the overrepresentation of the un-militaristic features of the public relations materials 
more resemble the latter case, displaying cuteness to the power holder. The authority 
cuteness strategy is to gain legitimacy at the micro-social level, rather than the means of 
disguising Japan’s desire to be a major military power.  
 Wakamori’s (1996) observation of the Emperor system and its paradoxical way 
of maintaining power shows a resemblance to the SDF’s use of cute objects. He argued 
that the contemporary Japanese Emperor system uses its own vulnerability and the 
necessity of others’ presence in contemporary Japanese society. For Wakamori, the 
vulnerability of the Emperor has the power to eliminate those who deny his existence in 
the same logic of cuteness. His vulnerability appeals to people’s emotions, and people 
cannot help but protect the Emperor as a cultural icon. It is a human instinct of a mature 
adult to protect a vulnerable child. Thus, the absence of logic and emptiness are the 
power of the Emperor system. The vulnerability is a synonym to cuteness. Cuteness 
makes people uneasy to leave a vulnerable, obedient object behind. This is an effective 
strategy in society in which “interdependent view of the self” is dominant as Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) suggested about Asian cultures. In such a society, “both expression and 
the experience of emotions and motives may be significantly shaped and governed by a 
consideration of the reactions of others” (Markus and Kitayama 1991: p.225).  
Cuteness numbs the ability to think critically and logically and evokes one’s 
other-serving emotions and motivations; it eventually builds an interdependent 
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relationship that is habitually sought between authority and individuals. In a society 
equipped with interdependent self, a social actor or organization who uses a cuteness 
strategy can communicate with others smoothly and gain power in a very subtle way 
while those who receive a symbol or gesture of cuteness can stabilize the ground of their 
identity by meeting normative goals of connecting to others. The receiver of cuteness 
gestures or symbols can either actively or less actively accept requests of interdependence 
from others. If simply surviving in a situation, organization, or society is the goal of the 
sender of the cuteness message, passive acceptance― indifferently letting them exist― is 
just enough to go through a situation because cuteness is situational, not permanent. 
Situational understanding is important, but deep understanding or acceptance is not 
required.   
Through adopting the softening strategies, the SDF become diverted from 
conventional military forces regarding their organizational practices. Moreover, the low 
social status of the organization added a different meaning to authority cuteness. It is a 
fact that the SDF has military capabilities, but such physical power does not hold 
equivalent status power in society. Thus, by admitting their lower status in the status 
hierarchy and showing their obedience to the general public, the SDF admits its 
helplessness as an organization and tries to gain sympathetic, emotional response from 
general public. 
                                                 
Women’s Role in the SDF 
  In recruiting campaign posters, women as well as Pikurusu-kun and Paseri-chan 
are also used very heavily despite the low percentage of women in the force (4.2 percent 
  155 
 
as of 2002). Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) claimed that women’s images are used in the 
same way as the animation characters to soften the image of the SDF and disguise 
violence. According to them, women’s presence implies that the SDF is a safe and peace-
oriented organization so that women can be active members; if the organization is 
engaged in dangerous, aggressive missions, women are not allowed to be a part of it. It is 
true that women’s presence is used to promote the peaceful image of the organization; 
however, there have been more structural and practical factors contributing to gender 
integration in the SDF: long-term and short-term recruitment issues and international 
pressure of gender equality in Japanese work places.  
It is a general pattern among armed forces that the military starts recruiting 
women in the military service when facing a shortage of men to serve (Segal 1995). 
Before the low fertility became a serious issue in the Japanese labor force, the SDF had 
already started having a shortage of applicants for other reasons. The negative public 
opinion toward the SDF and the nation's economic growth accelerated the shortage of 
applicants for the SDF as early as the late 1950s (Bouei Kenkyukai 1988). Unpopularity 
of the organization and better employment opportunities in private sector discouraged 
young men from joining the SDF. Yet, until 1967 the SDF did not recruit or train women 
in the active duty component except for medical specialties.30  The GSDF started 
recruiting women officers in 1967, and women enlisted personnel in the following year. 
After the GSDF, the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self Defense 
Force (ASDF) started recruiting women officers and enlisted personnel in 1974.  In 2003, 
the percentage of women in the total active duty in the SDF reached to 4.4 percent 
                                                 
30 Right after the establishment of the National Police Reserve (NPR) in 1952, the Ground Self-
Defense Force (GSDF) recruited 57 nurses (Defense Guide 1997). In 1958, the training of nurses 
began in the GSDF as the organization established hospital units and increasing number of nurses. 
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(10,614 out of 239,806) (The Japan Defense Agency 2003a).  
There is also a serious demographic factor that necessitates gender integration in 
the SDF. In 2004, the population growth rate in Japan is 0.2 percent; the birth rate in 
Japan also fell to 1.43. If the birth rate continues to drop, the population will not sustain. 
According to the 1997 annual population estimation by the Japan National Social 
Security and Population Institute, the current population of 1,260 millions (1996) will fall 
to 1,000 million in 2050. According to the Defense white paper (Defense Agency 1997), 
the number of young men age 18-26, who are qualified to enlist as private (GSDF), 
seaman apprentice (MSDF), and airman 3 rd class (ASDF) levels, is estimated to drop 
from approximately 9 million in the peak year 1994 to approximately 5.7 million by 
around the year 2,013. The continuous decline of the youth population would be a severe 
problem in the medium- and long-term recruitment plans of the SDF.  
Recruitment is not the only reason for extensive gender integration in the SDF. 
International political pressures, especially from the United Nations, promoted gender 
integration in the SDF. One of the most influential factors to improve gender integration 
in the SDF was the United Nation’s worldwide Women's Decade campaign to enlighten 
women's awareness to their equal rights and opportunities from 1975 through 1985. The 
campaign supported women's movements in Japan and placed political pressure on the 
Japanese government to improve women's equal rights. Women’s groups specifically 
asked for eliminating gender-discriminating recruitment system in the SDF. The top 
officials in the government were willing to promote women’s equal rights in the labor 
market to gain an international reputation as a progressive and modern society (Wiegand 
1982).  
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 In 1993, the Manpower Policy Committee decided to open all the job areas to 
women members except the following jobs: infantry, tanker, chemical protection, 
reconnaissance, anti-tank helicopter squad in the GSDF; escort flotillas, mine 
countermeasures vessel, submarine, missile vessel, and pilots for P3C patrol aircraft in 
the MSDF; fighter pilot in the SDF. In terms of the reason why the SDF still has 
restrictions on women's jobs, the Defense Agency commented that they consider it for 
"protection of motherhood." Corresponding to this new expansion of women’s job areas, 
the National Defense Academy started accepting female candidates in 1992; The JMSDF 
and the JASDF started educating female pilots in 1993.  
   Japan is known for its surprisingly low scores on the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM) that the United Nations use as an indicator of women’s involvement and 
power in society, Japan is only in the top 40. The GEM score includes the number and 
percentage of women in the legislative authorities and managerial positions; the poor 
score of Japan’s GEM shows that gender equality in work places is still far from the 
satisfactory level for an industrial society. In this labor market condition for women, 
despite the glass ceiling issues, the SDF have provided women members the highest level 
of equal opportunities and benefits compared to the private sector in Japan. The salary 
rate of women is the same as that of men. Comparing the average starting monthly 
payment in 1996, civilian women workers with college degrees earned 183,600 yen 
(approximately 1,412 dollars), officer candidates (with college degree) earned 214,000 
yen: (approximately 1,500 dollars), which is at least 14 percent higher than that of 
civilian women workers (this payment does not include housing benefit and special 
allowances). In addition, the difference between SDF personnel and civilian working 
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women increases over time because private companies have a long tradition of double-
standard salary scales based on a gender-segregated seniority system, albeit this tradition 
has been disappearing. In the SDF, however, the same salary scale is applied for both men 
and women as they are promoted. The glass ceiling is a major issue for women in the 
SDF to pursue their career. Skewed concentration of women in administrative and 
logistics specialties is also a significant obstacle to promotion for women. The priority of 
promotion to General rank tend to be given to those who are in combat operation jobs 
(e.g. aviation, navigation, infantry, tank, submarine, etc.). 
In addition to the manpower shortage in the SDF, severe gender discrimination in 
the civilian labor force made enlistment in the SDF more attractive for eligible women 
who hoped to enjoy equity in their career. In the late 1990s, some of the ground combat 
jobs (e.g., infantry operations and recoilless gunners), which have not yet to be opened to 
women in the US military, were opened to women in the Ground Self Defense Force. A 
NCO in the GSDF said to the author without any hesitation, “women can operate 
recoilless guns…It is not that heavy. So, it is fine if women are assigned to infantry 
(futsu-ka) to do these jobs. They can handle that!” 
Gender integration in the SDF seems to be progressive compared to many 
workplaces in the private sector. On the other hand, the oddly progressive gender 
integration is likely to be a reflection of the low status of the SDF in the occupational 
hierarchy in the Japanese labor force. Despite the prescribed equal treatment policies, 
women in the SDF have to face gender discrimination within the organization. In a 
Defense Agency survey of 1,400 women in the SDF, approximately 26 percent of women 
are frustrated with the organization and superiors’ lack of gender consciousness. Outside 
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the organization, women in the SDF are quietly but harshly criticized by Japanese 
feminist researchers for their participation in the armed forces despite the fact that the 
remaining gender inequality in Japanese workplaces limits women’s aspiration and 
achievement in their careers (see The Ministry of Welfare and Labor 2001). The SDF is 
not an exception. For example, the basic training unit for women GSDF recruits has a 
motto: “Strong, Cheerful, and Lovely” (tsuyoku, akaruku, uruwashiku). The third 
adjective uruwashiku implies girlish cuteness. This is a sharp contrast to the equity-
conscious manpower policy of the US military (Tatsumi, et al. 1998a). Gender 
discrimination within the SDF is expressed in a subtle manner, and the organizational 
discourse of women in the organization is consistent with gender norms in the larger 
society.  
Table 5. Gender Integration in the Self-Defense Forces 
 
1952 The National Safety Force started recruiting nurses. 
1958 The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force started recruiting nurses. 
1967     The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force started recruiting female officers (14). 
1974 The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force started recruiting female officers and NCOs. 
             The Japan Air Self-Defense Force started recruiting female officers and NCOs. 
1978    The Defense Agency started recruiting accredited women medical doctors and dentists.  
1985 The Defense Medical Academy started recruiting women students. 
1986 Defense Reformation Committee decided open more job areas to women and gain the 
number of women members up to 5,000.  
1990 The 5,000 women force policy completed. The Defense Agency decided to continue 
recruiting more women in the Japan Self-Defense Force.  
1992     39 female candidates enrolled the Defense Academy. 
1993 The Air Defense Force and the Maritime Defense Force started recruiting women flight 
students. 
1997   The first women P3-C pilot was designated in the Maritime Self Defense Force. 
2001     The first women promoted to rank of General (Admiral in the Maritime Self Defense 
Force: Director of Rehabilitation Department at the SDF Central Hospital) 
Data Source: Securitarian May 1997; November 2003. 
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Life in a Hyper Constabulary Military 
In Chapter 3 I described the Japan Self Defense Forces as a hyper constabulary 
military with exclusively defensive national security policy. One of the most unique 
elements in the life of SDF personnel is that they are not (or should not) expect to fight 
unless an external threat attacks Japanese territory. Their policy on engagement in combat 
bears a close resemblance to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UN peacekeepers. 
Training and exercises in the SDF are often belittled as “training for training” (kunren no 
tameno kunren) because when SDF personnel utilize the skills and abilities gained 
through training and exercises will be the time the nation is attacked by an external threat 
and cannot sustain the exclusively defensive security policy. During the Cold War period, 
there was virtually no external threat that would threat on Japanese territory. This is a 
sharp difference between the SDF and conventional military organizations such as the US 
military and the British Military.  In Ohi’s (1999) study, a peacekeeper described the 
nature of the SDF’s missions as follows: “What the SDF do is all training. Because of 
that, I think, there are so many aspects that we do on a live-and-let-live basis. Frankly 
speaking, it does not matter whether it goes well or not…” (p.64). Although I did not gain 
much information about the details of SDF personnel’s daily lives back home through the 
interviews, peacekeepers expressed the increased autonomy during peacekeeping and 
their frustration about highly bureaucratic organizational structure and operations. A 
GSDF NCO looked back his deployment experience and expressed the difference in 
autonomy during deployment and after he returned to his unit. He described the days 
during deployment as busy but challenging because he was given more authority to make 
decisions than in Japan: 
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“After I came back, I have to ask my boss, and he will ask his boss to deal with 
annual expenditure...[In the Golan Heights] the commander, officers, and I, three 
of us, discussed and decided those things…. I feel that I do not have to take 
responsibilities here….I do not have to do things in a hurry. Now I am free from 
the tension in my job, but have a little trouble figuring out what to do because the 
gap is tremendous…. To some extent, we had more meaningful, deeper exchanges 
[with others] during deployment…” (interview  #10)     
 
            Although Japanese peacekeepers have more autonomy and authority in the field, 
peacekeepers in the JDA survey that the lack of autonomy was an issue during their 
deployment. Compared to the contingents from other countries, Japanese peacekeepers 
felt that they were not able to act on their own decisions, and consequentially could make 
an appropriate decision making in a situation. Although the jobs that SDF personnel do 
are diverse and some require long working hours, their daily life is highly routinized and 
bureaucratized, and very little flexibility is given to individual service members.  
 
Professional Identity of Jieikan 
Work is one of the most important sources of people’s personal and social identity 
(Hughes, 1958; 1965; Ashforth and Kreiner 1999).  In organizations, identity is “the basis 
of manipulation achieved through negotiated transactions between organizational 
strategies of control and individual strategies for securing identity” (p.339: Thompson 
and McHugh 2002). In these transactions, the identity constructed through interactions 
does not always bring a positive result to the organization, especially when the job is 
considered as “dirty work” in society. Society stigmatizes groups of people who do 
distasteful tasks for society, and disassociates itself from those groups (Hughes 1958; 
Hughes 1962). In this process, those who are engaged in dirty work personify their job 
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and tasks and become ‘dirty workers’ (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999).  
We can see ample examples of degrading the professional military and 
stigmatization of SDF members as ‘dirty workers’ in the popular and academic literature 
on Japanese national security. For example, the phrase “tax thief” used to be a common 
critical remark for SDF personnel (see Emerson 1971; Ohi 1999), reflecting the 
controversy over the legality of the SDF under the Constitution. SDF personnel are still 
highly self-conscious about self-presentation off base.  
“Compared to the past, well, drastically, I think, our circumstances have 
improved. From Japanese people’s point of view, [the SDF] look much better. In 
the past, I was once called “tax thief” while I was riding a train. Compared to 
those days, I think this is far better…..Civilian people’s view of the uniform is 
changing dramatically.” (p.45: Ohi 1999[Translation provided by the author of the 
present dissertation]) 
 
Who is stigmatized and how much unfavorable image is attached to a specific 
attribute differ across time and place (organizations, agencies, regions, culture, and 
society) (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999; Crocker, Major, and Steel 1998; Stangor and 
Crandall 2000). In contemporary Japanese society, being military professionals has been 
viewed as a stigmatized profession. Regarding uniforms, SDF personnel are very self-
conscious about their presence in public. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) noted that most 
SDF personnel working at the Defense Agency Headquarters in downtown Tokyo whom 
they met for interviews appeared in civilian clothes even just across the street from the 
Headquarters. In metropolitan areas in Japan, it is still not recommended for SDF 
personnel to go off base in uniform. Prohibiting the uniform outside military installations 
lowers the visibility of the organization and avoids the possible tension that may be 
caused by the uniform in public space. At the same time, the myth of uniform is a subtle 
technique to have service members accept the stigma attached to the military profession, 
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although the ultimate purpose of the strict dress code is to gain cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy by appealing the limitation of time and space that SDF personnel play their 
roles as military professionals. Although SDF personnel maintain the classic total 
institution-type life style, they try to assimilate to their civilian counterparts as much as 
possible.   
In terms of uncontrollability, stigmatizing conditions provide a useful insight. 
Although Goffman’s (1961) original concept of stigma focused on the type of devalued 
identity that an individual possesses, stigmatizing conditions and functions are also 
important in the case of the SDF. Jones and his colleagues (1984) identified six aspects of 
stigmatizing conditions: (a) visibility-whether a stigmatizing condition can be hidden 
from others; (b) course-the way the condition changes over time, and its ultimate 
outcome; (c) disruptiveness- how much the condition hampers social interactions; (d) 
aesthetic qualities- how much the attribute makes the individual ugly, repellent, or 
upsetting to others; (e) origin-how the stigmatizing condition was acquired, and who was 
responsible; and (f) peril- the kind and degree of danger that the stigmatizing condition 
poses to others. Visibility and Cotrollability are key dimensions. Occupation is not a 
visible stigma unlike race, gender, body type, or physical disfigurement. Those who have 
non-visible but “discreditable” stigma, in Goffman’s (1963) term, can conceal their 
stigmatizing identity by monitoring their speech and behavior very carefully (Crocker, et 
al. 1998). Although they are fully aware of their discreditable stigma and worry about the 
exposure of their spoiled identity, people with discreditable stigma are more resourceful 
to manage interpersonal situations than people with visible discredited stigma. In terms of 
controllability, Brickman (1982) pointed out that there are two responsibilities for (a) the 
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onset of a stigmatizing condition and (b) elimination of it. However, it is a common case 
that an individual might be responsible for the onset of a stigmatizing condition but have 
no control over eliminating it, or vise versa.   
As Berger (1998) emphasized the difference between pacifism and Japanese anti-
militarism, the latter implies a high degree of rejection of the military institution. The 
systematic antagonism against the military in Japan is strong enough to consider choosing 
the military as one’s own occupation as deviant behavior. In fact, enlistment to the SDF is 
an individual choice because the SDF is an all-volunteer force, although there are 
structural factors contributing to enlistment, such as family background, education and 
employment opportunities, and labor markets in specific regions. The impression of 
volunteer choice is also enhanced by the absence of an obligatory service contract in the 
SDF.  If a SDF member leaves the service, service history with the SDF will follow 
former service members (called motoji or moto jieikan) at least for a long time as a 
deviant attribute of a person. Although the occupation may not be one’s grand master 
status such as gender and race in some societies, the occupation plays a significant role as 
a master status in a racially and ethnically homogenous society like Japan. Controllability 
is also important in occupational discrimination when choice of a certain occupation is 
considered to be one’s lifestyle choice. This is because individuals with controllable 
stigmas, at least believed to be so, are more disliked, rejected, and harshly treated than 
people whose stigmas are perceived as uncontrollable (Crooker, et al. 1998). In this sense, 
career choice to join an all-volunteer force has little immunity from the extra harsh 
treatment against people with controllable stigmas.  
Components of social identity constituting the basis of social evaluation may have 
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an impact on one’s self-evaluation; social identity functions as the standard for self-
judgment because of their association with role criteria (Rosenberg [1981] 1990). The 
stigmatized image of the SDF had had strong influence on the JSDF personnel’s identity 
structure. According to Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002), the macro socio-political position 
of the SDF is manifested in individual SDF members’ attitudes and behavior. To manage 
the problematic existence of the SDF in an anti-militarist society, the organization 
implemented various strategies such as eliminating military terminology, the no-uniform 
rules, and discouraging excessive masculinity. In Japan, the military has been viewed as 
the source of militarism during WWII, not a social institution that plays a necessary role 
in society. As some researchers have noted (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002), Jieikan 
perceive the weak social status of the SDF and internalize it as the general status of their 
profession, compared to the higher social status of the professional military in other 
societies.  
The deeply rooted negative social perception toward the SDF is still obvious to 
jieikan and shapes their behavior, especially in public places, and isolation from the 
larger society. In many aspects of micro-interactions, SDF personnel are required to use 
normalization techniques such as passing, covering, and insulating.  
In my interviews, I encountered hesitation of jieikan to talk about the SDF to me 
if somebody was within hearing distance. While I interviewed a senior NCO at a 
Japanese restaurant in lunchtime, he looked around and lowered his voice when our 
conversation started shifting to military operations and weapons, to make sure that 
nobody including servers could hear our conversation. An ASDF officer’s reaction was 
more distinctive. Once a middle age couple sat at the table next to us, he visibly became 
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nervous and nearly stopped answering questions. After the couple left the restaurant, the 
Captain explained to me: “I absolutely could not talk about jieitai with you while other 
costumers were next to us. I was pretty sure that they listened to us!!” (Officer S, ASDF). 
Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) pointed out a similar self-consciousness among SDF 
personnel that they interviewed. Jieikan whom they interviewed have tried to assimilate 
their appearance to civilian office workers. Jieikan, especially those who are assigned to 
the SDF installations in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, have to follow informal base 
regulations not to wear uniforms off base.31 A myth that has been passed among jieikan 
supports an organizational norm to justify this civilianization of their appearance off base. 
It was that a jieikan in uniform got on a metro train during rush hour one morning, and a 
badge of rank on his uniform touched and scarred a young woman’s face when the train 
became crowded with people. There are two types of functions of stories: symbol and 
script. As a symbol, the meaning crystallized behind the story. On the other hand, a script 
is used to teach people how to behave and react (Wilkins 1983). As a script, this story 
legitimizes jieikan hiding their profession from the public by not wearing the uniform, 
and enhances the organizational norms about dress code off base; as a symbol, the story 
symbolized the meaning of the SDF uniform as an unwelcomed object that may harm 
people.  
As Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) pointed out, SDF personnel do not have 
noticeably different body types or hairstyles from civilian workers, and those distinctive 
physical appearances are not encouraged in the organization except in a limited number 
of job specialties (e.g., rangers). In my interviews, service members’ orientations to their 
                                                 
31 However, the “no uniform” rule is loosened or diminishes in areas where there are many 
military installations even though the area is located in a metropolitan area such as Yokosuka. 
Yokosuka has a US Naval base, SDF bases, and the Defense Academy.  
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civilian counterparts greatly varied from one extreme (patriotic) to the other extreme 
(civilianized). Some service members explicitly addressed their satisfaction with serving 
their people and country, but they were all addressed in a humble, professional manner. 
They were very careful about how they described themselves.  
A GSDF officer who had extensive oversea experience called SDF personnel 
“heitai” (soldiers) in the interview. He brushed and immediately corrected himself by 
calling SDF members “jieikan” (SDF personnel). Jieikan are very careful not to define 
themselves as “soldiers” in society.    
A corporal who I met in Dili, the capital of East Timor, yelled at me once because 
I made a distinction between the civilian (minkanjin) and the military. I was accompanied 
by him and two other NCOs. At a very modest Chinese restaurant in a hotel, we were 
talking about the SDF and peacekeeping missions, and I referred to the general public as 
“civilians” (minkanjin). The young cheerful corporal stared at me and went off.  
“Stop using the word minkanjin, please? I really mean it. We are of no 
difference from them….Hey, you just used the word again!!”  
            
His buddies did not agree or disagree with him. They continued eating. I was 
perplexed but apologized. He accepted my apology, mumbling, and started eating his 
meal again as if nothing had ever happened. He was actually not the only Japanese 
service member who did not like the term minkanjin. After this conversation, I used this 
term intentionally to find out reactions of other SDF members. One officer pointed out 
that my word choice is too Americanized. I was told to remember how we called the 
civilians when we served in the Air Force. In fact, several interviewees used the word 
minkan-no hito (person of civil or ordinary people) in their interviews, instead of 
minkanjin. Minkan-no hito sounded much less militaristic. The word minkanjin implies a 
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sharp distinction between the military and the larger society. This incident and other 
subtle signs that the interviewees displayed during interviews indicate that many SDF 
personnel refused to identify their difference from others in society. Goffman (1963) 
observed the self-identified difference among those who are in stigmatized occupations. 
Later in a study of a stigmatized occupation, Thompson and his associates (Thompson 
and Harred 1992; Thompson, Harred, and Burks 2003) have supported Goffman’s 
observation that dividing the social world by membership of the occupation (“we versus 
them”) can foster group cohesion. A senior NCO commented that he was comfortable 
with talking to me because I used to serve in the SDF. However, his subsequent comment 
had a twist (“This is nice. It is fantastic to be able to a civilian person, not a jieikan, about 
peacekeeping”).  The NCO identified me as a civilian even though I served in the SDF 
before. He could have not felt comfortable if I was a complete civilian, but he found a joy 
in our conversation because it was with a civilian person (the author). 
On the other hand, in a survey of former peacekeepers conducted by the Japan 
Defense Academy in 1998 (N=618), 84 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement that SDF personnel are the same as civilian workers. The 
majority of peacekeepers viewed being SDF member as a uniquely different job 
compared to civilian workers. It is apparent that SDF personnel know the special quality 
of their profession, but they try to identify themselves as civilian counterparts to protect 
their identity, and secondly, to conform to the constabulary ethos.   
One of the jargons that SDF members frequently use represents their marginalized 
identity as career military personnel. In my interviews and informal conversations with 
SDF officers, especially among Air Self Defense Force officers, it was common that SDF 
  169 
 
personnel referred to the SDF as “waga sha (our company or our firm)” as if they were 
civilian corporate workers. Since the Japanese armed forces started as a police auxiliary, 
not a regular military force, we cannot simply conclude that this is a sign of the SDF’s 
shift to the “occupational” orientation, referring to Moskos’s (1988)  I/O (Institutional 
and Occupational) theory of professional military. Rather, we should pay attention to the 
strategic meaning of using this jargon. On the one hand, calling the SDF wagasha has a 
sarcastic, self-deprecating meaning. On the other hand, this jargon suggests an extreme 
degree of localization of military professionals in the relationship with their clients. In his 
study of teacher-student relationships, Howard Becker (1970) analyzed cultural conflicts 
between teachers and students as a relationship between professionals and clients. 
Professionals have an ideal type of their clients. The more an actual client diverges from 
an ideal type, the more problems professionals experience in carrying out their business. 
While Becker (1970) focused on explaining school subcultures through cultural conflict 
between teachers and students, Reynolds (1976) looked at the mechanism of how 
teachers can manage their teaching activities without conflicts with students. He found 
that localization of teachers’ behavior makes it easier for them to interact with students. 
As teachers do not enforce rules so strictly, students are less frequently engaged in 
problematic behavior. Takeuchi (1996) named this behavioral choice of teachers to avoid 
conflict with students “localization” of professionals. The localization of teachers can 
minimize conflicts, and help teachers keep the organization going. A “truce” between 
teachers and students develops over time; teachers and students compromise with each 
other to survive in school. Going back to SDF personnel, usage of the jargon wagasha 
symbolizes the localization of the SDF to its client, in this case the larger society, to 
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survive. The only difference between the teacher-student relationship and the SDF 
personnel-Japanese people relationship is that SDF personnel and Japanese people very 
rarely share time and space to realize their mutual needs to survive. As a captive audience 
which does not have normative or practical commitments to the SDF, Japanese people do 
not find any need to receive service from the SDF. As a result, the SDF have localized 
their organization as much as they could; some SDF personnel anchor their 
organizational identity to the more civilian side although there is no visible audience or 
client in front of them.  
For SDF personnel, their professional identities are indirectly but significantly impacted 
by the multiple institutional forces imposed by the organizational environment that 
marginalize their profession. Based on Oyserman and Markus’s (1993) model of the 
sociocultural self, I illustrate the structural dimensions in which the self of SDF personnel 
are embedded (see Figure 5). Oyserman and Markus (1993) claimed that one’s identity is 
enmeshed in the multiple layers of social structure. Institutional environments include 
cultural belief system, normative frameworks, and regulative systems that provide 
meaning and continuity to the organization (Scott 1995; Scott, et al. 2000). Within the 
organization, individual members act as active agents within the constraint imposes by 
the institutional environments. This diagram represents how organizational and social 
factors in macro-micro social structures, from international organization to national 
culture, nation-state, socio-demographic environments, organization, community, and 
family affect SDF personnel’s professional identity.  
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Figure 5. The Socially Embeddedness of the Japan Self Defense Forces and Service 
Members.  
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Summary 
For an institution whose audience does not find the service provided by the 
institution necessary to survive, there should be a partial transformation of the meaning of 
the given institution by coercive control or localization (Etzioni 1961). To comply with 
social expectations and values, the SDF aggressively localizes its activities to meet anti-
militaristic sentiment in society. These strategic responses to the environment fostered a 
constabulary ethos in the SDF. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), when 
organizational uncertainty is significantly high, organizations will be increasingly 
isomorphic when resource dependency of an organization on another organization is high. 
Isomorphism of organizations provides legitimacy and resources by making an 
organization similar to an existing successful organization in the field without necessarily 
making the organization more efficient. However, the findings in this chapter suggest that 
variation in strategic responses to a particular environment can create an organization 
rather unique than isomorphic to other organizations (Zucker 1991). The SDF was 
increasingly localized and became a constabulary military organization as it conformed to 
the general societal norms in Japanese society. The organization remotely resembled to 
traditional military forces. The organization is not allowed to engage in conventional 
activities of military forces other than defense or in certain types of strategic simulations 
(e.g., simulations including emergency defense legislation). Any activities related to 
offensive military action and proactive defense measures and remarks of the government, 
policy makers, government officials, and SDF officers suggesting these potentials have 
been subject to a punitive social sanction in society.  
Although Japan’s national security depends on the U.S. military presence as a part 
of the unilateral alliance with the U.S., the martial orientation of the U.S. military was not 
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adopted by the SDF.  Instead, “social fitness,” a social format considered to be legitimate 
in a given institutional environment, (Scott 1995:p.153) in the immediate environment 
plays a key role in organizational survival of the SDF in contemporary Japan. For this 
reason, the SDF displayed increasing conformity to social expectations and values while 
organizational legitimacy was still lacking. The SDF have used and still use authority 
cuteness, gender integration, and other symbolic management strategies including 
civilianized military jargon, assisting community events, and minimizing militaristic 
features of their appearance. However, the harder the SDF pursued legitimacy, the more 
skeptical the society became about the legitimacy of the SDF and continued treating the 
SDF as a “nervous actor” that attempts to “compensate for illegitimacy in one area by 
rigidly legitimate behavior in another” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.189). The less 
legitimate organization seeks out legitimacy more aggressively than legitimate 
organizations. It leads the organization to a “vicious cycle of legitimation,” which 
eventually decreases legitimacy by too much protesting (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).   
While the organization aggressively attempts to defend organizational legitimacy, 
these localizations and symbolic management strategies affected the professional identity 
of service members. They expressed mixed feelings about their profession, particularly 
rejecting to the division of the social world between the military and the larger society. 
Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) suggest that SDF personnel desire to be a normal (futsu) or 
real (honmono) military and idealize the US military, referring to their view of the 
organization as being a “half-baked” (chuto hanpa) military organization. From their 
point of view, SDF personnel are using the strategy of “condemning the condemners” 
(Sykes and Matza 1957) to neutralize their profession. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) 
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claim that SDF personnel believe that the military should be like the US military, a 
masculine, warfighting force, and challenge the moral superiority of the majority of 
civilians who question the value of the military profession and the motives of service 
members to serve in the force. However, findings in the present dissertation did not fully 
support their observations. In my interviews with SDF personnel, a few of them admired 
the US military, but the focus was not militaristic capacity. Rather, SDF personnel admire 
US military and other armed forces because of their higher social status and respect from 
their people, compared to the socially constrained and disadvantaged organizational 
status of the SDF. This micro-focused admiration is more problematic in identity 
formation and maintenance in organizational change because their admiration is 
systematically separate from the general purpose of the organization. This may increase 
symbolic conformity to the warfighting oriented military without any substantial 
organizational changes or practical necessity.    
A more problematic aspect of professional identity among Japanese service 
members is the way they claim the normality of their profession. Japanese service 
members used to be directed not to display visible signs of their professional identity 
such as uniforms and masculine bodies. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) found non-
masculine bodies of SDF personnel as a reflection of a socially ideal body type and an 
assimilation effort. They also pointed out the different symbolic meaning that SDF 
uniforms have compared to school uniforms in Japan: unlike the youthful and clean 
images of school uniform, SDF uniforms have a strong association with violence and war. 
However, a certain type of male school uniform (tsume-eri: a jacket with a stand-up 
collar) is also considered as militaristic in Japanese society.  SDF members are trying to 
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assimilate to their civilian counterparts by emphasizing harmlessness and commonality of 
their job with the jobs of their civilian counterparts. They deny the dirtiness of their 
profession and claim normality. Claim of normality is another strategy of neutralization 
(see Sykes and Matza 1957; Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2003). As individuals in dirty 
work, some SDF personnel try to neutralize attribution of their profession by claiming 
that their job is normal because the job they do is the same as that everyone else does 
while accepting the fact that their job lacks legitimacy in society. However, as we saw in 
public assistance activities and community integration efforts, and the no-uniform rule, 
SDF personnel are often forced to use passing techniques. Thus, SDF personnel have to 
introduce the technique of appealing to higher loyalties. 
Nonetheless, the period of antagonism and indifference did not last too long after 
the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Japanese society had to face the gap between 
international and domestic norms and definitions related to the military institution. In this 
transition, the SDF was required to change organizational practices, and the micro-
institutional effects impact on individual service members’ behavior and identities.  
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Chapter 8: Peacekeeping Participation and Its Effect on the 
SDF  
 
Peacekeeping and Normative Rules of Japan’s National Security  
During the Cold War era, support from the government and a number of symbolic 
management strategies the SDF launched did not help the SDF defend or enhance its 
legitimacy in society. The harder the SDF tried to defend its legitimacy, the more 
skepticism they received from the general public. The organization could not get away 
from a “vicious circle” of legitimacy for almost 35 years. However, social isolation and 
the tainted image of the organization started changing once the SDF became actively 
involved in peacekeeping operations and increased its visibility in domestic disaster relief 
activities in the 1990s (Katahara 2001; Lipari and Kurashina 2002). 
It was the Gulf War that started changing the seemingly unattainable legitimacy 
of the SDF and its dirty work status by revealing serious inconsistencies in Japan’s 
national security policy. As noted in Chapter 6, the UN has maintained a special position 
in national security policy as a core principle of national security in post WWII Japan, so 
called UN-Centrism (kokuren chushin shugi).  As well as the bilateral military alliance 
with the United States, the UN and its policies in military affairs have been highly valued 
as congruent with Japan’s pacifist posture. Despite its wide acceptance in society, UN-
Centralism has a serious flaw in that it built unrealistic expectations in Japanese society 
that the UN would guide Japan’s national security policy in a satisfying way (Drifte 
2000). During the Cold War era, a stable regional security situation, which was 
maintained through US military presence under the bilateral security treaty, allowed 
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Japanese society to successfully adopt an idealized image of the UN and its policies in 
military affairs. Once the UN sanctioned use of force by a group of coalition forces to 
enforce an embargo against Iraq in 1990, Japan faced the realty that UN policies on 
military affairs were not always compatible with Japanese highly idealistic anti-
militarism although the UN-centered policy was the core of post-War Japan’s national 
security policy. 
During the Gulf War, the United States requested Japan’s active contribution to 
the collective war effort, but Japan could not respond to the request in a timely manner 
because use of force to settle international conflicts and sending troops overseas were 
legally prohibited in Japan and could not gain societal support for peacekeeping 
participation in a short period of time. In 1990, the original UN peace cooperation Bill 
did not pass the Diet because the majority of lawmakers believed that sending SDF troops 
overseas was a violation of the Constitution. As a result, the Japanese government made a 
significant monetary contribution (approximately 13 billion dollars in total); however, the 
absence of a military contribution drew criticism from the United States and other 
Western democracies, specifically in their press (Keddell 1993). After the end of the war, 
Japan finally sent minesweepers as a part of the peacekeeping operation in the Persian 
Gulf although it was too late to restore Japan’s credibility in global politics. The war left 
Japan without appreciation of the enormous economic contribution. A former Japanese 
diplomat recalled the days saying that they were treated like “dirt” (Finn and Tolbert 
2001).  
After the Gulf War, the existing normative and cognitive legitimacies surrounding 
the Japanese military institution started changing very quickly. The international criticism 
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from North American and European media against Japan’s refusal to make a military 
contribution was a punishment for Japan’s violation of the normative codes in the 
international community. To stop Iraq’s further invasion of Kuwait, the coalition force 
gained a full-range of legitimacy from the international community for a war against a 
nation that was acknowledged as a “perpetrator” in a UN resolution. However, Japan as 
well as Germany did not recognize the emerging norms that require UN member nations 
to engage in military affairs regardless of their political and historical situations within 
society. Japan’s legitimacy for claiming immunity from any military actions outside their 
territory failed in this military sanction fully supported by the international community. 
This incident shed light on the gap in social construction of the military institution 
between Japan and other major actors among the UN member nations. Japanese society 
realized that it is impossible for Japan to meet the standard of the international society 
without “manpower” contributions. The society had to deal with the long-standing 
ambivalence and confusion loaded in the post-WWII Japanese national security policy 
that no one was willing to get involved in before (Tadokoro 2001).   
The bitter criticism against Japan’s hesitant cooperation prompted the enactment 
of the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and 
Other Operations (International Peace Cooperation Law: IPCL) in June 1992 (Katahara 
2001). When the Bill passed the Diet, the 1954 ban on overseas deployment, the first 
Japanese government’s self-imposed defense policy, was amended. It took nearly two 
years and three Diet sessions to pass the Bill (Keddele 1992). The IPCL introduced a new 
mission to the SDF and considerably expanded the role of the SDF (Katahara 2001) and 
its visibility in society. Since the IPCL was enacted, Japan has participating in UN 
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peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Zaire, Timor-
Lesta (formally known as East Timor), and other places. The SDF has constantly sent 
troops to peacekeeping missions although the size of the troops and the activities in 
which they are involved are limited compared to other nations (See Appendix B). SDF 
troops relied on the contingents of other nations to provide them security in Cambodia, 
Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. From the deployment to Timor-Lesta, SDF troops 
started carrying small firearms for protection; however, Japanese troops still depend on 
the security provided by contingents from other nations when risk is great in the 
operation site.32   
Sending SDF troops to international peacekeeping missions that started in 1992 
was a defining moment for civil-military relations and the shared meanings of the 
military institution in Japanese society. Regulative legitimacy for peacekeeping 
participation was quickly established after the Gulf War, while the legitimacy of the SDF 
under the peace Constitution was still hanging in the air. Giving regulative legitimacy to 
an activity that is carried out by an organization whose legitimacy is still questionable 
surely contributed complexity and ambiguity to Japanese peacekeeping. The 
peacekeeping legislation shows a part of such complexity and ambiguity. The newly 
established IPCL provides the criteria for provision of manpower and material supplies to 
support United Nations’ peace making efforts. Japanese peacekeeping missions include 
UN peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief operations, and 
international election monitoring activities. The IPCL restricts the JSDF’s contribution to 
the range of activities fulfilling the five principles as follows:  
                                                 
32 For example, the Dutch contingent provide security to the Japanese contingent deployed to Iraq 
although a commander of the Dutch contingent made it clear that the Japanese contingent should 
provide security, for itself.  
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(1) Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties 
to armed conflicts.  
(2) Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well 
as Japan's participation in such operations has been obtained from the 
host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts. 
(3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favoring any of 
the parties to armed conflicts. 
(4) Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guideline 
cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw SDF 
units.  
(5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to 
protect the personnel's lives, etc (The International Peace Cooperation 
Headquarters 2001). 
 
Although these five principles were applied when Japan sent troops to 
international peacekeeping missions, oversea deployment under the IPCL was a drastic 
step for the SDF to become more martial. These principles made it difficult for the SDF 
to send troops to traditional peacekeeping missions. The SDF was a self-contained 
“hyper” constabulary military that existed only for territorial defense, and now its 
domestic orientation is forced to be modified. Yet, Japan’s cognitive-cultural norms on 
military activities were not completely abolished. The forth and fifth principles made 
Japan’s manpower contribution to peacekeeping very different from that of other nations 
by setting very stringent ROE and guidelines for mission environments in which Japanese 
troops can deploy. IPCL also suspended33 certain activities conducted by the SDF units 
for peacekeeping operations such as monitoring of disarmament, stationing and patrol in 
buffer zones, and collection and disposal of abandoned weapons, because decision 
making to conduct these activities was premature at that point (Tadokoro 2001).   
Due to the legislative restriction, the Japanese contingents were engaged only in 
transportation, infrastructure, and humanitarian assignments until the suspension of 
                                                 
33 In Japanese, this suspension of engaging in the primary activities in peacekeeping is metaphorically 
described as “frozen” (touketsu). 
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engagement in the primary activities was lifted in December 2001 when IPCL was 
revised. Under the new IPCL, Japanese peacekeepers can engage in monitoring of 
disarmament, stationing and patrol in buffer zones, and collection and disposal of 
abandoned weapons. At the same time, the restriction on ROE was also relaxed: Japanese 
peacekeepers are allowed to use force to protect peacekeepers from other nations, UN 
employees, and NGO workers; Defense Force Law Article 95 (use of force to protect 
weapons) is now also applied to situations in peacekeeping missions. However, security 
missions to protect high-ranking UN officials and VIPs and use of force against those 
who interfere with the execution of a mission are still banned since use of force in these 
occasions can be excessive self-defense (Asagumo Shinbun 2001).  
In March 2002, Japan sent approximately 680 GSDF troops to Timor Lesta for the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) to assist reconstruction 
processes after a regional conflict and independence of East Timor from Indonesia. 
Although the contingent only carried ten 7.62-millimeter machine guns and 670 hand 
guns and small rifles to protect 680 troops, it became national news in the Japanese 
media.34 In a visit to the camp site in East Timor, a GSDF liason officer told the author 
how nervous troops were to carry loaded weapons with them all the time. Regarding 
weapons, an ASDF officer with the 1st Airlift Wing commented on the politics over 
allowing airlifting crews to carry one handgun and the cumbersome paperwork to carry 
equipment overseas.  
“It was so much hassle to obtain permission for the crew to carry one handgun for 
an airlift mission for self-defense. We passed our honest opinion to a higher 
command that we do not need it if it were such big trouble. Then, we were told 
                                                 
34 Prior to deployment to East Timor, one machine gun was allowed in the humanitarian mission 
to Rwanda in 1999. For the deployment to East Timor, there was no opposition in the Diet for 
SDF troops to deploy with machine guns  (Handa 2001).  
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that we ought to bring it…..When we recently deployed to Jordan for an airlift 
mission, everything we bring overseas becomes an export item….. For instance, 
when a mechanical failure occurs with one of the transportation aircrafts, we had 
to resubmit all the paperwork to the custom agency again. Last time the 
paperwork became that thick [with a gesture as if he held a two-inch thick local 
phone directory]. It was nonsense. We should do something to make this process 
easier.” (Officer Y, ASDF) 
  
The SDF have to fill out import item declaration forms for more than 500 items 
including fuel, foods, repair parts, and 9 mm pistols for self defense. They are all 
categorized as export items (Yomiuri Shinbun, July 09 2003).  
The GSDF have sent more than three deployment rotations to Timor Lesta, and 
there have been no incidents reported in which Japanese troops used force. The Japanese 
contingent has been very careful and fortunate so far, but at the same time this extremely 
unrealistic and naïve practice represents a deep and unbeatable cultural norms against use 
of force. Japan has no hesitation to sacrifice peacekeepers from other nations and risk its 
troops’ lives in order to protect their ideology of anti-militarism.  It is the fact that special 
arrangements about the security of Japanese contingents endanger other nations’ 
contingents by putting them in a position to protect unarmed Japanese peacekeepers with 
arms. For example, the Japanese contingent was unarmed, and depended on the 
Australian infantry unit for protection in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). Drifte (2000) 
called this a manifestation of Japan’s exceptionalism as a non-nuclear power and a war-
renouncing country. For peacekeepers from other nations in which the military is an 
established social institution, Japan’s inability of full engagement in peacekeeping 
missions is a burden for the limited human resources in the field. Their frustration is 
accumulating as the outsourcing of peace operations becomes more prevalent (Brooks 
2003).  
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  Japan has been subject to external pressure for more active participation in UN 
peacekeeping regardless of the Constitutional restriction against exercising force, but the 
external pressure was not the only factor prompting Japan’s participation in peacekeeping 
operations. A political goal of post-war Japan, to gain a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council, plays an important role in this process of adapting the SDF to 
peacekeeping missions (Drifte 2000; George 1993). To achieve this goal, participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations and contribution of troops are central issues to fulfill all the 
preconditions although the full range of participation seems not be required for 
permanent Security Council members. As Drifte (2000) pointed out, no articles in the UN 
Charter require the Permanent Security Council members to make full-fledged 
contributions to peacekeeping operations; however, Permanent Security Council 
members are obliged to serve on the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to make strategic 
direction under Article 47 of the UN Charter despite the absence of opportunities for the 
MSC to fully function so far. However, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in the 
debate over the ICL bill in 1992, the expansion of Japan’s role in peacekeeping has been 
discussed as a necessary condition for decades to enhance the political legitimacy of 
candidacy for the position of Permanent Security Council members (George 1993). 
Proponents of Japan’s candidacy for permanent membership argue that refusal of full-
scale involvement in peacekeeping will result in a considerable financial burden on Japan 
while the country will need to suffer its second-class status in world politics as a 
disadvantaged nation in terms of fair burden sharing in military affairs. To make amends 
for the weakness of Japan’s multilateral diplomacy, the government has focused on the 
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aspect of conflict prevention and assistance for economic/political reconstruction process 
in Japan’s peacekeeping operations (Drifte 2000).   
 
The Most Recent Situation of Japanese Peacekeeping  
“….In the past 10 years, Japan has dispatched 66,000 personnel to support 
international peace…..These men and women carry out cease fire monitoring, 
infrastructure construction and reconstruction, humanitarian mission…  Most 
recently the largest ever unit was dispatched to Timor Lesta…… Working 
together with local people to consolidation of peace and nation building. 
Responsibility of PKO. Japan’s contribution continues.” (10 years of PKO: The 
Government of Japan 2003) 
 
In March 2003, the dawn of the Iraq War, the Japanese Government aired a one-
minute long TV commercial on its peacekeeping activities on a few Cable News 
Channels (e.g., C-SPAN and FOX NEWS) exclusively in the United States.  According 
to an official at the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, it was just a 
coincidence that March 2003 was the ten-year anniversary of Japanese peacekeeping 
participation. The commercial was created to promote the popular understanding of 
Japanese peacekeeping activities in the United States, but no other countries. The 
commercial was never on the air in Japan, either. Aside from the miraculous timing of the 
airing, there is a conscious effort of the Japanese government to promote the awareness 
of Japanese contribution to international peacekeeping missions in the United States as a 
reflection of the lessons learned from the previous Iraq War in 1991.      
The situation facing Japan after the September 11 attacks showed striking 
similarity to the Gulf War, and this was a chance for Japanese political leaders to remove 
the unwanted label of “checkbook diplomacy.” On October 29 2001, the Japanese 
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government proactively advocated and gained passage of the Anti-terrorism Special 
Measures Law (the Anti-Terrorism Law) to support the US campaign in Afghanistan 
against terrorism. Two months before this revision, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
Law was enacted corresponding to the start of Operation Enduring Freedom against 
Osama Bin Ladin and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Anti-Terrorism Law 
allows the JSDF to deploy overseas, virtually anywhere to “support the US military and 
other armed forces, which are contributing to achieving the object of the Charter of the 
UN by removing the threat brought by terrorist attacks.” The SDF personnel deployed for 
the mission can use firearms to protect “those who are under their control” (Asahi 
Shinbun 2001).  
Under the Anti-Terrorism Law, SDF personnel have been actively engaged in 
refugee assistance and support activities. Since December 2001, the Maritime Self 
Defense Force has sent escort ships and supply ships to the North Indian Sea in order to 
provide fuel for British and US military vessels. The Air Self Defense Force has 
completed 15 overseas transportation missions by C-130s (The Japan Defense Agency 
2003a). Then, on December 7th of 2001, the revision of the International Peace 
Cooperation Law (IPLC) Bill also passed the Diet, and the suspended engagement in 
primary peacekeeping force activities was lifted. This series of prompt legislative actions 
was surely driven by the harsh criticism that Japan received during the Gulf War.  
The new IPLC allows Japanese peacekeepers to participate in the primary 
activities of peacekeeping forces that were suspended under the previous law, such as 
monitoring of disarmament, stationing and patrol in buffer zones, and disabling and 
removing abandoned landmines and other weapons. The new law also loosened the 
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restriction against using firearms to protect peacekeepers of other nations and the UN 
staff as well as fellow Japanese peacekeepers. In addition to self-defense, Japanese 
peacekeepers are now allowed to use firearms to guard weapons, ammunition, and 
vehicles (Asagumo Shinbun 2001). These two peacekeeping-related laws were advocated 
to meet the international standards of cooperating in peacekeeping operations. For Japan, 
these two laws embrace critical changes in the existing national security policies. First, 
these laws include critical political decisions related to the long-standing dispute over the 
restraint about oversea deployment in Article 9 of the Constitution. Second, these 
changes will affect social perceptions of the JSDF and its function and position as a 
social institution. Lastly, those constitutive shifts will lead to changes in the nature of the 
missions and may affect the identity set of the SDF members and their professionalism as 
well.    
Sending troops to East Timor (now known as Timor-Lesta) for the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was the first mission after revision 
of the relevant laws in 2001 and the largest deployment in the decade-long history of 
Japanese peacekeeping participation. Japan’s contribution to East Timor started in 
November of 1999 by sending JSDF personnel to airlifting assistance for the United 
Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) in West Timor, although Japan could 
not send ground troops due to the restriction of peacekeeping participation when the 
internal disturbance in East Timor intensified. In March 2002, the Japanese government 
dispatched a Ground Self-Defense Force Engineer Group of 680 members to East Timor 
for a 6-month deployment.35 UNTAET was taken over by the United Nations Mission of 
                                                 
35 As of March 2002, approximately 8.8% of the uniformed personnel in UNTAET were JSDF 
personnel. The total number of Japanese personnel in the ongoing UN peacekeeping operations is 
  187 
 
Support in East Timor (UNMISET) upon independence in May 2002, and the GSDF 
deployed troops to UNMISET until early 2004 (total three tours to Timor Lesta).  
Within a month after US President Bush declared the official end of combat in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom early in May 2003, the Iraq-SDF law to send Japanese troops to 
Iraq under the current Constitutional restriction has passed the Diet. Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi played a central role in this legislative process, as a big supporter of 
US policies on Iraq issues. Accepting a request from the World Food Plan (WFP), the 
Japanese government dispatched 98 Air Self Defense Force troops and 2 C-130s to 
Jordan for a month-long airlift assistance mission to support post-conflict reconstruction 
in Iraq in early July. Soon after the completion of this short mission, on August 19th, a 
truck bomb struck UN Headquarters in Baghdad, and killed at least 20 UN officials, 
including the UN special representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. Corresponding to this 
incident, Japanese government and policy makers postponed the deployment of JGSDF 
troops to Iraq. The pressure from the US government to support its reconstruction efforts 
in Iraq coupled with Japan’s needs for US support to resolve North Korean issues, 
nuclear threats and mass kidnapping of Japanese nationals, will necessitate the 
deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
has insisted that Japan make military contributions in Iraq, not walk away. Armitage also 
warned that JSDF troops would sit back to back with danger and risks, not like attending 
a “tea party,” in the process of supporting the reconstruction in Iraq (The Japan Times 
2003).  
                                                                                                                                                 
733, which is 17th out of 85 nations contributing military troops to peacekeeping operations (The 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002).  
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Japan is facing a major institutional change in national security policy, which had 
not dramatically changed since the 1950s. Neighboring nations have not opposed Japan’s 
dispatch of SDF troops because the missions are non-combat, humanitarian missions 
(Midford 2003). Sending troops near a combat zone may risk the positive reputation of 
Japan’s military contribution to UN peacekeeping in Asia; however, selective 
deployment for burden sharing in the international community somewhat reduced the 
assertive image of sending SDF troops to international peacekeeping missions. Although 
Japan lost two civilian peacekeepers in Cambodia in 1993, there have been no casualties 
among military peacekeepers yet. Dispatch of troops to a near conflict zone in Iraq may 
provoke domestic and international opposition, especially in neighboring Asian nations. 
If the SDF dispatch troops to Iraq, it is possible that the first fatal casualty among 
Japanese military peacekeepers will cause a similar effect on Japanese society as the two 
US service members killed and dragged on the street in Mogadishu in 1993 had in 
America. However, facing the capture of three Japanese civilians by an Iraqi militant 
group in March 2004, the Japanese government did not give in the militants group’s 
demand for withdrawing SDF troops in Samawa. Although the Japanese hostages 
returned safely, foreign contractors, NGO workers, and journalists have been killed by 
Iraqi militants daily.  
 
Changes in Dirty Work Status  
National Security Situation and Legitimacy of the SDF 
The military profession has been considered as a dirty job in Japan, and as 
examined in Chapter 7, the organizational culture of the SDF conforms to the stigmatized 
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view of the profession, and many service members are exposed to the negative attitudes 
of the public toward their profession.  
In addition to sending troops to peacekeeping operations overseas, the changes in 
national security situation changed the social construction of the military institution and 
the degree of stigma attached to the SDF.  As a part of Japan’s strict civilian control, SDF 
personnel have been separated from domestic politics. As domestic disaster relief 
missions increase their magnitudes, the lack of trust of local governments in the SDF 
surfaced as an operational problem in disaster relief efforts. The distance between the 
state and the military was one of the issues in domestic disaster relief operations. The 
1961 Ethical Principle for Self-Defense Forces Personnel clearly prohibits SDF personnel 
from engaging in any political activities. Although there are no official statistics, the 
percentage of SDF veterans among the members of the Diet is extremely low. Japanese 
society strongly opposes former SDF veterans joining the Diet based on the Japanese 
civilian control principle. As a result, the distance between the state and the armed forces 
is carefully kept in Japanese society, while the organizational effectiveness of the SDF 
has been suffering from highly bureaucratic procedures of mission authorization. For 
example, the significant delay of the dispatch of the Ground Self-Defense Force troops to 
rescue and assist victims in the Hanshin Earthquake on January 17 1995 created a 
national dispute about impracticality and complexity of the authorization procedure to 
send SDF troops for disaster relief.36 Japanese media questioned the role of the SDF in 
disaster relief and criticized the idea of giving more authority to the SDF in terms of 
                                                 
36 The SDF law prohibited the SDF to send rescue units for disaster relief operations until they 
receive the governmental order. This authorization process was simplified to send SDF troops to 
assist emergency situations as soon as possible.  
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dispatching troops in disaster situations. For example, Tetuso Maeda (1996), a prominent 
Japanese journalist who opposes the presence of the SDF, proposed the establishment of 
a separate organization for assistance in disaster relief. The media denies the concept of a 
constabulary military and attempts to impose a conventional military force model on the 
SDF, and refuses to provide legitimacy to the SDF.   
The sources of the increasing instability of Japan’s national security are not only 
external threats, but also internal threats. The Sarin gas attack by a cult group that took 
place in the Tokyo Metropolitan subway in March of 1995 signaled the emergence of 
sub-national threats in Japan. Eight lives were lost, and approximately 500 victims 
suffered nerve damage and psychological trauma. The cult group, Aum shinrikyo, used a 
highly sophisticated technology to synthesize the Sarin gas in a private lab. To deal with 
another mass terrorist attack, the government gave the SDF greater flexibility to intervene 
in domestic emergency situations caused by terrorism as well as large-scale natural 
disasters.   
Although there have been no armed confrontations since the end of WWII, Japan 
is increasingly dealing with sub-national threats that can be defined as military affairs. In 
2002, North Korea’s admission of it long-term, state sponsored abduction of Japanese 
nationals and nuclear stand-off also reminded the Japanese society that the communist 
threat has not disappeared yet in the Far East. Japan become more willing to set proactive 
measures against North Korea’s provocative messages than ever before. Corresponding 
to changes in the regional security situation, Japanese society is relatively less reactive to 
policy makers’ radical comments on national security issues.  
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Figure 6. What Do You think about the Possibility that Japan will Get Involved in 
War?  
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            Data Source: The Prime Minister’s Office (2000 2003).  
 
Regardless, the changing national security situation increased the perceived needs 
of military presence for territorial defense.  Figure 6 shows a result of series of opinion 
polls on national security issues conducted by the Japanese government.37  Since 1994, 
those who think that Japan’s involuntary involvement in war is possible have increased 
steadily. The percentage of those who believe in Japan’s possible involvement in war 
increased from 30.5 percent in 2001 to 43.2 percent in 2003. The percentage of those who  
                                                 
37 The Prime Minister's office has conducted the opinion poll every three years since 1969 (available 
from http:// www.jda.go.jp/library /yoron/ 2000). Each year survey has sampled approximately 3,000 
adults who are over 20 years old. 
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believe that Japan will not be involved in war declined more than 10 percent from 2001 
to 2003. Since the mid 1990s, fewer and fewer Japanese people believe that the security 
situation surrounding Japan is completely safe; the percentage of those who think that 
Japan’s involvement in war is possible surpassed that of those who deny the possibility in 
2001. This result shows a recent shift of Japanese people’s perception of security.  
According to Katahara (2001), regardless of the limited range of missions, 
deploying overseas is a significant stretch of the SDF’s roles and missions as well as the 
interpretation of the Constitution, and helped improve the public image of the SDF 
personnel and discard the stigmatized image as “social outcasts.” The Gulf War led the 
SDF and the Defense Agency to higher status in society. Results of a series of the 
governmental opinion polls on national security at least partially supported Katahara's 
observation. In Figure 7, the poll results show a sharp contrast to the strong opposition 
against Japanese participation in peacekeeping prior to the Gulf War. Comparing the 
results between 1991 and 2000, respondents who agreed with Japanese participation in 
peacekeeping operations dramatically increased from 20.6 percent to 40.5 percent (See 
Figure7-1). Parallel to this change, favorable attitudes toward the SDF increased since the 
early 1990s: the 2000 poll indicated that 31.5 percent of respondents had positive 
impressions of the SDF compared to 20.3 percent in 1991 (see Figure7-2). The poll 
results also suggest how positively the increasing public exposure of the SDF impact on 
the degree of understanding of general public about the SDF. Favorable responses on 
both general impression of the SDF and peacekeeping declined in the 2003 poll. 
Although the reason is unclear, we may need to pay attention to the data collection period 
of the 2003 poll. The data was collected in January 2003, when the United States was 
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preparing to attack Iraq. Japanese people were nervous about a possibility of sending 
troops to Iraq. It is likely that time effects affected the 2003 poll result.  
Regarding the public understanding of the SDF, in 1991, 50 percent of the 
respondents pointed out the obscurity of the SDF and their missions (“I do not know what 
the SDF do”). The percentage decreased to 38.2 percent in the 2000 poll and remained 
almost unchanged in 2003 (39.1 percent) (see Figure7-3). 
Figure 7-1: General Impression of the Japan Self Defense Forces
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Data Source: The Prime Minister’s Office (2000, 2003).  
  194 
 
Figure7-2:Attitude toward Peacekeeping Operations
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Figure 7-3: General Impression of the SDF
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At least, the visibility of the SDF has increased dramatically in the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s. In other words, Japanese people have more opportunity to 
know about or interact with the SDF and service members in their daily lives. On the 
one hand, this is certainly a reflection of the current security situation in the Far East, 
which is more unpredictable than a decade ago as we saw in North Korea’s nuclear 
standoff in 2003 and open admission of kidnapping Japanese nationals for espionage 
purposes. On the other hand, this seems to be a sign of the emergence of more 
integrative civil-military relations in Japan. The SDF successfully embedded itself in 
other social institutions in Japanese society to gain moral legitimacy.  
Through the Hanshin Earthquake and the Sarin Subway attack, SDF 
responded to societal needs and built a positive reputation. After 9-11, pragmatic 
needs for the SDF and their capabilities in disaster relief situations and domestic 
terrorism have kept increasing. Sending SDF troops to peacekeeping missions for 
burden sharing in the international community also raises pragmatic needs for the 
SDF in Japanese society. Corresponding to pragmatic needs for domestic security, the 
SDF started gaining legitimacy, yet pragmatic legitimacy was not enough to 
compromise the morally tainted image of the organization. On the other hand, since 
the SDF kept its profile as low as possible throughout the post World War period, 
organizational adaptation to peacekeeping became a major organizational challenge 
in the 40-year long history of the organization. Facing this change, SDF personnel 
had to question themselves about their role as military professionals such as who they 
are and what they should do to fulfill their role. 
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Relationship with Other Actors in the Field 
Our realities are constructed through our daily interactions. Once subjective 
experience is shared with others, it appears as objective reality. In a face-to-face situation, 
the other appears fully real. The more distant we keep from the other, the greater 
anonymity appear between the two (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In Japan, SDF 
personnel have limited opportunities to interact with civilian counterparts unless they are 
dispatched to domestic disaster relief and rescue missions. In the peacekeeping site, 
Japanese peacekeepers have more chances to interact with others: UN officials, military 
peacekeepers from other nations, NGO workers, and the local people. These interactions 
are identified as favorable experiences that motivate them in the field. More than 70 
percent of the respondents in the Defense Academy survey said that appreciation and 
expectations from the local people encouraged them in the field. Also, 86.7 percent of the 
respondents thought meeting with people from different countries and experience in 
foreign environment encouraged them to perform tasks in the field. Almost every 
peacekeeper shared their unique intercultural communication episode with the author. 
The stories were mostly about positive and negative experiences related to their language 
barrier and about cultural differences in behavior and attitudes of UN officials, the local 
people, and peacekeepers from other nations.  
Communication in English is always an issue for Japanese people. Twenty-one 
percent of the Defense Academy survey identified communication with non-Japanese as 
a source of stress during deployment. In my interviews, the majority of peacekeepers 
reported initial trouble communicating with non-Japanese people in the field, but at the 
end, they said that their communication problem diminished. Japanese peacekeepers 
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understand their communication issues in a positive way and solved the problems in 
creative ways including using a digital camera to supplement their lack of language skills. 
In the Golan Heights, a GSDF in a supply unit always showed picture of the parts and 
facilities that needed repair to Canadian soldiers who were in charge of maintenance.  
“Basically, language is not an issue. If I do not understand what somebody said to 
me, I simply ask the person to repeat many times. Yes, everyone comes from non-
English speaking countries such as Portugal and Pakistan, it is not expected to 
speak good English. Once a personal relationship is established, we can 
communicate with each other.”(Officer Y2, GSDF) 
 
However, it should be noted that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers have the 
minimum level of English communication skills in the pre-deployment training.  As a 
result, a very few fluent English-speaking peacekeepers have to act as translators for unit 
members. Their burden seemed to be severe because fellow peacekeepers constantly ask 
them to perform interpreter jobs even off-duty.  
Peacekeepers seem to have positive feedback and warm welcomes from the local 
people in Cambodia and Timor-Lesta. In the Golan Heights, there seems to be very 
limited contact with the local people. In Mozambique, the situation is unknown. An 
officer deployed to Timor-Lesta was surprised with the level of knowledge of average 
Indonesians about Japan’s developmental assistance and culture. In Timor Lesta, 
Japanese peacekeepers were more willing to interact with the Timorese. Some 
peacekeepers visited villages in the island during their vacation, and met an old villager 
who sang a Japanese song learned during WWII. Although Timor-Lesta was occupied by 
Japan during WWII, the Timorese seem to be friendly or indifferent to the presence of 
Japanese troops.  
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Peacekeeping missions brought a very rare cross-cultural communication 
opportunity for SDF personnel in both positive and negative ways. In Oe Kushi, an 
isolated area in Timor Island, the Korean Battalion and the Japanese 2nd Engineering 
Company worked and did community activities such as Tae Kwon Do and Karaoke 
together. Korean and Japanese peacekeepers held a volleyball tournament, and the Korea-
Japan mixed team lost a game against the local team. This level of personal interactions 
between South Korean soldiers and SDF personnel would not happen unless they were 
deployed to international peacekeeping missions. South Korea and Japan are both 
American allies, but the alliances are bilateral and there has been no direct cooperation 
between the South Korean military and the SDF until very recently. 
In contrast to these positive interactions, there was some tension between the 
Japanese contingent and Japanese NGO workers and activists in Timor-Lesta. A mid-
career Japanese development consultant in Dili, East Timor, described a Japanese-led 
demonstration of East Timorese against deployment of Japanese peacekeepers to East 
Timor at the arrival of the Japanese advance troops.  
“ When the Japanese advance troops arrived, there was a demonstration by the 
local people at the airport. I was there at that time…. They shouted like “NO 
NEED JAPANESE MILITARY,” but I saw Mr. H from a Japanese NGO standing 
behind the demonstrators. It was an event that Japanese activists incited the local 
people to do so. I was disgusted by that.  History education in local schools does 
not teach that [Japanese invasion during WWII]. For local people, their parents 
may remember [Japanese invasion] or that level of knowledge.  People in East 
Timor do not have such [antagonistic] feelings [about Japan] any more. They 
would like to work together in a friendly atmosphere. So, it was as if Japanese 
NGO workers used local people for achieving their own political goals by coming 
over here to incite local people to organize a demonstration against Japanese 
peacekeeping. In my opinion, it is not right.” (A Japanese civilian Consultant) 
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He also pointed out the conflicting nature of Japanese peacekeeping assignments 
with development business. The consultant expressed his frustration that Japanese 
civilian companies could do the same job with much lower costs than sending SDF 
troops. The government appropriated approximately 6.2 billion dollars for peacekeeping 
deployment in Timor-Lesta. Not only in the political sphere, has Japanese peacekeeping 
become competition for the Japanese construction industry and development business. 
Those domestic political conditions surrounding deployment of SDF personnel overseas 
made the SDF very nervous about SDF troops’ contact with NGO workers and journalists 
in the field.  
Organizational sensitivity affected Japanese peacekeepers’ behavior in the field. 
However, their behavior and attitudes greatly vary depending on rank and job specialties. 
NCOs were told not to contact any NGO workers and journalists at all in any occasions. 
One evening, I happened to have a dinner with 2 Japanese medical NGO workers, 1 
journalist, 2 GSDF officers, and 3 GSDF NCOs.38 At the table, the NCOs were visibly 
nervous and would not talk to the Japanese medical NGO workers. There were long 
silences on the table. The three NCOs were normally very communicative and lively.  
However, they were oddly quiet that night. Later one of the NCOs told the author that 
they were strictly directed not to talk to NGO workers and journalists.   
In contrast, one of the officers, a military medical doctor, talked to the NGO 
workers very freely. He carried on conversations cheerfully next to those intimidated, 
quiet NCOs. According to the military doctor, he regularly met those Japanese NGO 
workers and exchanged information with them to be familiar with local medical 
                                                 
38 In the SDF, there is no fraternization rule among officers and NCOs. Although there are 
potential problems, officer and NCOs can be openly friends with each other. Status discrimination 
such as fraternization rule will be culturally disapproved in Japanese society.  
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conditions. It was obvious that his medical doctor identity dictated his behavior over 
being a SDF officer. His behavior indicates the choice of social identification of 
prestigious professionals in an organization with low occupational prestige. His authority, 
professional status, and rank in the organization allowed him to break the normative rule 
in the Japanese contingent, while lower level peacekeepers conform to the normative rule 
and lost opportunities to interact with civilians in the field. This extremely defensive 
attitude of the Japanese contingent reflects fear of providing any information that can 
lead to negative media coverage. Approximately 60 percent of the Defense Academy 
survey respondents said that the media attention was discouraging. In the open-ended 
responses in the survey, peacekeepers expressed their frustration with too much media 
attention. Prohibiting contact with Japanese NGOs and journalists is a strategy of 
protecting accomplishments by monitoring operations in order to maintain legitimacy 
(Suchman 1995). The strategy seems to be working to minimize negative media 
coverage. On the other hand, a study showed that the power of personal interactions 
provided a basis of reality construction to foster a more cooperative environment among 
military peacekeepers and other actors in the field (Miller 1997). From this point of view, 
it is likely that the avoidance of the contacts has reduced chances to fill the gap between 
the SDF and other Japanese actors in the peacekeeping.  
 
Economic Recession and the Labor Force Structure 
The economic recession that began in 1991 has slowly but steadily has changed 
traditional Japanese management systems including the seniority system, life-time 
employment, and long-term career development (e.g., in-house training and education). 
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In the traditional Japanese management system, secondary socialization in the 
organization culture becomes a never-ending process, in which every single event within 
the organization has a long-term effect in one’s career development (Whitehill 1991). 
Given the recent change in the employment system in Japanese civilian workplaces, the 
SDF increases its uniqueness as an employer. As economic recession has continued, the 
Japanese traditional life-term employment system has been disappearing in civilian work 
places. On the other hand, the SDF has been, is, and will be a lifetime employer. The 
lifetime employment system will continue to provide the basis of SDF members’ 
organizational commitment and attract more young Japanese men and women as a secure 
employer (Yamaguchi 2002). Gaining popularity as a stable employer is unintended, but 
attracts the Japanese labor market. In the government poll, 12 percent would support their 
family member deciding to join the SDF in 1994; the percentage increased to 18 percent 
in 2000. On the other hand, the percentage of those who support family member’s 
enlistment because the SDF is a good profession declined from 35 percent to 28 percent.  
These changes in occupational status help the SDF gain legitimacy, but societal 
perception of dirtiness about the SDF may not be removed completely.   
 
Transforming the Contact: Micro-Focus Evaluation of Performance 
Japanese service members admire the US military as a model military (Frühstück 
and Ben-Ari 2002). Across job specialties, Japanese peacekeepers tend to focus on the 
excellence of the immediate job skills that peacekeepers from other nations have, but not 
what those skills are needed for. An ASDF loadmaster who participated in a joint 
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exercise with the U.S. and other Air Force in Alaska was impressed by the way American 
Air Force crews prioritized the tasks in the exercise.  
“ A country that is fighting wars does business differently as I thought. 
…….Efficiency was just really amazing. We spend 30 minutes to load a cargo 
very carefully, but they [American Air Force crews] finish up within 10 minutes. 
They choose to do the bare minimum.” (NCO M, ASDF) 
 
A C-130 pilot of the First Airlift Wing considered peacekeeping missions as their 
secondary mission because peacekeeping missions do not fully utilize the tactical 
capability of the C-130.  
“… those missions [peacekeeping missions] are to deliver cargoes to safe places, 
which is not for this airplane’s real mission…that’s what I think. ….. I guess that 
unlike commercial jets it is not a main mission for tactical airlifters to fly high 
altitudes and just get to the destination like ‘here we are.’” (Officer H, ASDF) 
 
Both the loadmaster and the C-130 pilot openly expressed their desire and 
admiration of war oriented armed forces because of their technical advancement, but not 
their war fighting skills. In the interviews, when Japanese service members expressed 
favorable comments on performance of soldiers from warfighting oriented armed forces, 
they tended to isolate technical aspects from the contexts. For Japanese service members, 
American soldiers are highly evaluated because of high level of professionalism and 
efficiency, but war-fighting elements are largely removed from the context.  
Nonetheless, the C-130 pilot’s view strongly reflects the “normal” military ideal 
and organizational myth that is prevalent in the SDF. However, the organizational 
structure and activities in the SDF are separate to a much greater degree compared to 
other armed forces. Chances of assault landing in territorial defense missions in Japanese 
territory are as little as or less than those in peacekeeping operations. However, the C-130 
pilot still devalued peacekeeping missions because they do not utilize the tactical 
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capability of C-130. She openly desired that doing her job like “normal” military is the 
way it should be, but she could not come up with any particular situation in which assault 
landing is required in SDF missions when I asked her to specify a mission situation 
requiring the technique. Her view narrowly focused on her job specialty and was 
somewhat technology driven. In addition, her view was close to American soldiers’ sense 
of underutilization in peacekeeping missions, but the reality of the SDF and Japanese 
security situation is that ASDF pilots will hardly ever have a chance to demonstrate their 
assault landing technique during their entire career. Before the research visit, the 1st 
Airlift Wing had just come back from a joint exercise with US Air Force and other air 
forces in Alaska. Exposure to those counterparts in other armed forces might impact 
Japanese crews’ perception about their job.  
Their focus on technical details in their job shows a striking similarity with 
emotion management in other occupations (Smith and Kleinman 1989; Arluke 1994). In 
a study of socialization in medical school, Smith and Kleinman (1989) reported that 
medical students try to focus on body parts or scientific aspect of medical practice when 
they have to deal with intimate parts of the human body. In another study on occupational 
socialization, Arluke (1994) reported that animal shelter workers focused on how to 
inject properly to put down animals peacefully, suppressing the disturbing feelings they 
experience. SDF personnel’s focus on technical excellence of service members from 
other nations suggests that they cope with their marginalized identity as military 
professionals by transforming and redefining the contact with military professionals from 
other nations.  By redefining the contact as exposure to technical excellence, SDF 
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personnel do not have to deal with the controversial nature of their profession within 
society.  
As Avant (2001) suggested, meeting organizational standards is a part of 
membership for military organizations. SDF personnel seem to maintain their connection 
with other armed forces in the quality of technical excellence and operational efficiency, 
separated them from the conventional purpose of the military profession: warfighting.  
The technical focus among SDF personnel was expressed very uniquely in the NDA 
survey results. A question in the survey asked how they evaluate the SDF compared to 
other military organizations in the field. According to the survey results, only 4.7 percent 
of the respondents answered that other forces are better than the SDF. In a following 
open-ended question, the respondents were asked about the reason why respondents 
chose their answers. Many of them pointed out “technological superiority” and 
“discipline” as a primary reason for their evaluation. This technological orientation can 
be viewed as an extension of techno-nationalism that has been known as another 
hallmark of post-WWII Japanese culture besides anti-militarism.  
In terms of discipline, a captain who coordinated air traffic control in the island of 
Timor happily told me that he was moved when he saw a C-130 land on time: “I was 
moved when I saw a C-130 approach to the airfield. It was amazing that an airplane could 
land a place like this, the middle of nothing, on time!” Maintaining their professional 
standards in difficult conditions seemed to provide a great deal of confidence to Japanese 
peacekeepers. For Japanese peacekeepers, peacekeepers from other nations sometimes 
lack discipline and professionalism. The Japanese contingent in UNTAET took over the 
engineering projects from the Bangladesh contingent. However, Japanese peacekeepers 
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expressed their dissatisfaction about the way Bangladesh troops built the road. 
Bangladesh troops rebuilt some parts of the road, but Japanese peacekeepers complained 
that Bangladesh troops did not do a good job so that they had to redo the project. Many 
respondents in the survey expressed their pride at being more disciplined than 
peacekeepers from other nations. Discipline seems to be highly valued in the 
organization. At the same time, maintaining discipline sometimes paralyzes daily 
operations: “Too much paper work”; “Peacekeepers from other countries separate work 
and private very well” (No.537). 
 
Professional Identity and Peacekeeping Experience 
As Kawano’s study (2001; 2002) showed, the majority of Japanese peacekeepers 
were satisfied with the deployment. My interviews confirm his survey results. The 
following comment from an officer who deployed to a mission in Timor described his 
deployment as a life altering experience. 
“I changed a lot by participating in peacekeeping deployment. I felt that I could 
do something helpful. We played a role in diplomacy, and the SDF is needed in 
Japan. If I were in Japan, there had been no way to knowing that. The 
peacekeeping mission let me be aware of how much Japan needs the SDF in 
reality.” (Officer K, ASDF)  
 
His very positive comment also implies “helplessness” and “unworthiness” that 
he felt about the SDF and his job before deployment. Other peacekeepers reported that 
they experienced job satisfaction that they could never gain through a domestic mission.  
“I changed, indeed. Before deployment, I had a typical public servant mentality 
(koumuin konjo) I felt that I did not have to work my butt off…..Unlike in Japan, 
there were a very small number of us there. Before saying what is my job and 
what is not….I was the only person who could do the job there. I could do my job 
with a sense of responsibility…I felt pressure, too. …..I am still adjusting myself 
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to get back to normal……. After being released from pressure and 
responsibilities, I still do not know what to do here…the gap is too big.” (GSDF 
NCO Y) 
 
 “Because of the experience in the Golan Heights, I am more confident and enjoy 
doing things at work and in private. What I gained though this precious 
experience is just priceless.” (GSDF NCO #4 deployed to the Golan Heights)         
 
There is a very important contrast between peacekeepers who were assigned to 
airlift missions and those who were in a longer-term ground assignment. Peacekeepers 
who were assigned to ground positions react to their field experience differently from Air 
Self Defense Force personnel assigned to airlifting missions. They expressed their 
uneasiness with the fact that peacekeeping is sometimes treated as if it is a more 
important mission than territorial defense. They described their peacekeeping experience 
as “the same as domestic missions,” “like a trip overseas,” and “not a primary mission of 
the SDF.” They tried to convince the author and themselves that what they do is a 
“secondary task” that they should do when they can have enough resources for territorial 
defense. The sharp difference in deployment experience between GSDF personnel and 
ASDF personnel is deeply related to the nature of their assignments. Through a longer, 
ground assignment that is physically and psychologically challenging, deployment 
experience gains a special meaning to GSDF personnel.   
For those who were assigned to the field, their sense of accomplishment was a 
personal and life altering experience. On the other hand, those who were assigned to the 
field assignments stayed in the region for at least 2 months or normally for 6 months 
unlike ASDF airlift crews. Airlift crews had fewer chances to interact with others while 
those who were in field assignments had more social interactions through the deployment 
and experienced changes in themselves. Social interactions play a key role in determining 
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the meaning of the deployment. At the same time, probably more importantly, 
peacekeepers in ground assignments reevaluated the role of the SDF and had a chance to 
gain personal confidence in their professional life. 
            The comment from a NCO deployed to the Golan Heights cited above reflects the 
stigma that was attributed to the SDF for decades and his personal experience that 
allowed him to neutralize the stigmatized image of the SDF by showing why the SDF 
should not be labeled as deviant and exchanging the existing identity as an unwanted 
organization for an identity as a wanted and useful organization in society. Neutralization 
strategy is to accept the attribution of deviance (in this case, the military) given to a rule-
breaking act (violation of the Constitution) but provide reinterpretation about why the 
individuals should not be labeled as deviant for playing the role (because the SDF fulfill 
the burden sharing for Japanese people). Through a self-enhancing experience in 
peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers legitimize their own profession as one for people in 
Japan. On the other hand, some peacekeepers were very bitter about Japanese 
peacekeeping by describing peacekeeping as a “tool for the Japanese government to be 
on the UN Security Council” (#339) and showed their frustration with the bureaucracy in 
the organization and the government.  
 
Constabulary Ethos, Rule of Engagement, and Institutional Vulnerability 
The constabulary ethos worked well for civil affairs in local community relations. 
In Cambodia, local people tried to pick up plastic water bottles that UN peacekeepers 
threw away in dumpsters at camps to use them as containers. French soldiers fired 
warning shots to drive those local people away from their camp, while Japanese 
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peacekeepers washed the empty bottles and kept them separate from other garbage to 
make it easier for local people to reuse the bottles.  
“I thought, ‘Why did you do that [to the local people] over garbage…If they can 
reuse them [empty plastic bottles], just let them do so.’ So, when Japanese 
contingent left Cambodia, local people gathered and sent off Japanese 
peacekeepers with tears. Japanese value emotional ties and that kind of thing.” 
(Interview #1)     
 
This is likely to be a reflection of how SDF members were socialized 
occupationally. Their alert level is not so high. In both the survey and interviews, some 
Japanese peacekeepers expressed their frustration about fellow Japanese peacekeepers 
who did not properly respond to gun fire and other signs of potential danger.  
At the same time, the constabulary ethos and expectations from the larger society 
impose unrealistic and dangerous behavioral norms on peacekeepers. As discussed 
earlier, the Japanese contingent cannot provide security to its own troops and camp sites 
due to the strict restrictions about use of force. The restrictions reflect strong domestic 
opposition to military action conducted by the SDF.  Peacekeepers expressed their 
security concerns in the field because of the restrictions on use of force. A peacekeeper 
deployed to Cambodia wished that Japanese people would understand the difference in 
security situation between Japan and countries that have been in conflict for a long time. 
“If we keep sending troops as we did before, the lives of jieikan will be at risk. It 
will not bring an appreciative result. I think that it is unrealistic to expect the 
government to deal with this issue logically and systematically….We need to put 
everything in order and take account of national interests first. Then, we should 
do so [expand our mission].”(#350)  
 
Despite the quiet frustration and fear among peacekeepers, the strict restrictions 
on rule of engagement based on the constabulary ethos in society have been 
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institutionalized in the SDF as the behavioral norms of peacekeepers representing a peace 
loving nation.  
On the other hand, it should be noted that Japanese peacekeepers expressed their 
concerns about the lack of sense of danger and of experience in the field, language 
difficulty, bureaucracy, and the gap as a military professional between soldiers of other 
armed forces and jieikan.  
 
“As a military organization, we are a bunch of lay persons (shirouto)” (# 165). 
 
“Inside Japan, we are not viewed as soldiers (gunjin) and we are not given an 
appropriate social status. For these reasons, it seems to me that we have a very 
weak idea about combat and too soft personality wise” (# 17).   
 
“Legal ambiguity that jieikan is not a soldier (gunjin) and that the SDF (jieitai) is 
not a military. The lack of political support” (# 330). 
 
It is noteworthy that, as expressed in the responses of respondents No.17 and 
No.330, the lack of organizational legitimacy is perceived as “inferiority” of the 
organization compared to other armed forces. However, Japanese peacekeepers do not 
merely view a conventional, martial military as an ideal type. Rather, as expressed in the 
following comment, Japanese peacekeepers were frustrated with their ambiguous status 
because they lacked behavioral and technical skills to survive in life-threatening 
situations unlike peacekeepers from other nations.   
“When we heard a gun fire close to our camp at night, one of our guys was 
standing and looking at the direction of the gun fire in underwear like a bystander. 
Although in trainings we are trained to get down and wear a camouflage when 
hearing a gun fire, we cannot do so at all in an actual situation.” (#27) 
 
              Not many, but a few Japanese peacekeepers said that they were happy about the 
constabulary orientation of the SDF. A peacekeeper was proud that Japan is a “model 
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developed nation” that does not possess a military. Although rules of engagement and 
weapons that troops carry are discussed as an issue related to the Japanese anti-
militaristic ideology, the safety of peacekeepers has been not been raised as a concern. 
Safety of peacekeepers became a part of the discourse to dismiss the legitimacy of 
Japan’s military contribution to international peacekeeping missions. When and in which 
mission the SDF will have the first fatal casualty in peacekeeping deployment is the focus 
of the popular security discourse in Japan, while the practical need of self protection for 
SDF members deployed to peacekeeping missions has never been discussed.  The 
baseline argument is that “the SDF should not send troops to peacekeeping missions 
overseas if they have to be armed for self protection.” Ideological consistency as a 
constabulary force and a military-free nation outweighs the appropriate security measures 
to protect peacekeepers. In fact, for peacekeepers, the idea of losing their established 
identity as territorial defenders who only engage in combat when the nation is under 
enemy attack, is causing tremendous uneasiness although they are increasingly 
vulnerable in the field. As a frustrated peacekeeping expert (Brooks 2003) pointed out, 
the Japanese contingent relies on security to the troops from other nations (e.g., In 
Cambodia, Canadian troops provided security; Recently, the Dutch troops and the Polish 
troops have been providing security to the Japanese contingent deployed to the Southern 
Iraq). As Wicks (2002) demonstrated in the impact on Canadian coal miners’ masculine 
identity of a tragic accident, the institutional element of professional identity and 
behavioral standard imposed by the larger society increases the vulnerability of Japanese 
peacekeepers.  
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Although Japanese peacekeepers express their concerns about security, they 
cannot ignore institutional influences of the general public on them. Organizational 
practice based on the anti-militaristic ideology shape the constabulary ethos of Japanese 
service members. In operations, the institutional element of their professional identity 
increases their vulnerability.  Luckily, Japanese peacekeepers have not had a fatal 
casualty in international peacekeeping missions yet. However, the data analyzed in the 
present dissertation suggest that Japanese service members internalize the fear and 
hesitation to use force in a persistent and strong manner. The institutionalization of a 
constabulary professional identity should be appreciated from the ideological view point. 
On the other hand, such micro-level institutionalization may compromise the meaning of 
use of force in purely ideological terms and facilitate a preventable tragedy by fostering 
inability to take appropriate action for self defense among Japanese peacekeepers. 
 
Summary  
There are two important findings from the interview data with former 
peacekeepers. First, contrary to the concerns of many researchers on Japanese national 
security about the possibility of Japan’s ambition to be a major military power, SDF 
members’ professional identity seems to be deeply rooted in constabulary ethics. SDF 
personnel view peacekeeping missions as a good opportunity for their professional 
development to improve their skills for the existing domestic missions. However, such 
exclusively job focused attitudes show that the SDF as a military organization has been 
developed with an organizational myth, modeling American armed forces as a “normal” 
military. We should pay close attention to the gap between the expressed sense of 
inferiority in the interviews or being a “half-boiled (chutohanpa)” military and survey 
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results showing that most peacekeepers felt that the SDF is superior to other armed 
forces. We can interpret that this confidence in organizational capability is a reflection of 
SDF members’ understanding of the difference in organizational orientation between the 
SDF and other armed forces. They are capable of being more aggressive, but choose not 
to do so because the organizational goal is national defense.  
At this moment, many SDF personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions gained 
more self-esteem and job satisfaction that they never felt before. In this sense, 
peacekeeping participation has a very positive influence on SDF personnel. However, 
there are several issues that the organization has to deal with such as post-deployment 
adjustment support and the expansion in the range of missions.  Japanese peacekeeping 
focuses on engineering, medical, transportation and relevant support functions, which 
limits job specialties of SDF personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions. UN 
allowance brings peacekeepers a decent amount of temporary income. Some of them 
purchase a new car or something expensive that other personnel cannot afford to with 
their salary; A long-term leave upon return from deployment sometimes causes tension 
between peacekeepers and their fellow service members back home. Although 
peacekeeping participation is not considered to be a factor for promotion, some of SDF 
personnel without peacekeeping deployment experience treat those who have deployment 
experience differently with envy and frustration because their absence burdened the job 
assignment in the unit. Unexpectedly high job satisfaction during peacekeeping 
deployment seems to be a little troublesome for some of former peacekeepers to readjust 
themselves to their jobs in their home stations.  
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Peacekeeping participation, combined with gaining popularity as a stable job 
among Japanese youths in the prolonged recession, is changing the cultural value 
associated with being SDF personnel in Japanese society.  Turner’s (1989) self relevancy 
theory suggests that this upward change in organizational status in society may change 
SDF members’ value orientation for setting their practical goals in the future, and it can 
change their possible self, the future-oriented components of the self-schema (Markus 
and Nurius 1986) as SDF personnel, which will affect their professional identity as 
military professionals. Positive experience that Japanese peacekeepers gained from their 
peacekeeping experience is getting out of the stigmatized stereotypes as self-conception 
is changing over time as a set of changing available self-knowledge. 
Most of the former peacekeepers interviewed in the present dissertation reported 
that they were satisfied overall with their deployment experience, which supported 
Kawano’s (2002) findings. However, it does not mean that there is no organizational 
issue associated with peacekeeping participation.  The next chapter will focus on the 
relationship between peacekeepers’ deployment experiences and deployment motivation 
and the perception about the relative capability of the organization and mission 
satisfaction. These are most important individual outcomes that would significantly 
impact on organizational adaptability to peacekeeping and overall organizational 
effectiveness.  
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Chapter 9: What do Japanese Peacekeepers Gain from 
Peacekeeping?   
 
In Chapter 7 and 8, I presented various aspects of SDF members’ identity and 
attitudes toward peacekeeping missions using qualitative data. Social and personal 
identities are implicated in the motivation that determines our role behavior in daily 
situations (Hewitt, 2003). Here I use survey data to examine the relative impact of the 
identity-related and deployment factors on peacekeepers’ mission satisfaction and their 
perception about the relative superiority of the SDF. The first section presents a statistical 
portrait of the sample by reviewing enlistment motivation, deployment motivation, a few 
aspects of deployment experience, and background characteristics. The second section 
presents correlation analysis to determine if these variables are significantly related to 
organizational perception and mission satisfaction. Findings from descriptive statistics 
and correlation analysis should provide preliminary evidence on what aspects of 
peacekeeping experience are related to redeployment intention and mission satisfaction. 
The last section of the chapter examines the relative impact of independent variables on 
organizational pride and mission satisfaction using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression. 
Statistical Portrayal of Japanese Peacekeepers 
In the present dissertation, I use the data from a retrospective attitudinal survey of 
Japanese peacekeepers collected in 1999 by Hitoshi Kawano at the Japan Defense 
Academy (JDS survey). Using the data, Kawano (2001; 2002) conducted bivariate data 
analysis of the questions related to peacekeepers’ attitudes and their subjective 
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evaluations of deployment very thoroughly. Therefore, the present dissertation will not 
repeat those bivariate data analyses. Instead, I will focus on questions about motivation 
and deployment experiences in the survey. Almost 20 percent of the respondents are 
officers; the other respondents are NCOs and enlisted. More than half of the respondents 
are married (56.2 percent). Regarding the highest education received, 14 percent of the 
respondents have college degrees, and the majority of the respondents (60 percent) have 
high school diplomas. A little more than 12 percent of the respondents have only finished 
junior high school. Not all of these junior high school graduates (equivalent to 9th grade) 
are high school dropouts. This is partially because the Japanese school system requires 
only junior high school level education as compulsory education, and partially because 
those who attended one of the three high schools run by the SDF (jieitai seito) are 
considered as SDF personnel once they enter high school. They hold high school 
diplomas. The proportion of high school dropouts and non-dropouts in this category is 
unknown.  
Peacekeepers who responded to the JDA survey were age 19 to 51 when they 
deployed to the missions. The majority of the respondents (93 percent) are Ground Self 
Defense Force personnel.  The average years in the service are 17 years. This relatively 
long average year of service reflects the lifetime employment system in the SDF. The 
majority of the respondents joined the SDF before the end of the Cold War (88 percent of 
the respondents); most of the respondents (96 percent) were already in the service when 
the SDF started sending troops to international peacekeeping missions in 1992. 
Approximately 38 percent are 20-29 years old; 42.5 percent are 30-39 years old; 19.8 
percent are 40-51 years old. This age distribution of peacekeepers suggests that many 
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respondents were exposed to antagonistic or indifferent attitudes of the public before or 
after they joined the force.  
 
Motivations and Professional Identity 
Enlistment Motivations   
A US study suggests that self selection is a major factor shaping and maintaining 
the organizational culture of the military rather than secondary socialization taking place 
after joining service (Segal, et al, 2001). Table 6 shows the distribution of reasons why 
peacekeepers joined the SDF. The data is drawn from the 1999 Defense Academy survey. 
In this survey, respondents were allowed to choose up to two enlistment motivations from 
the list of the options.  Approximately 18 percent of the respondents identified one reason 
for enlistment. More than 40 percent of the respondents answered training opportunities 
or job security as one of their primary enlistment motivations.  
Table 6:  Two Primary Motivations for Enlistment (N=612) 
Motivation N Percentage 
Encouraged by family 195 31.9 
National defense is important 148 24.2 
No other job was available  160 26.1 
Training and Credential that could be obtained 267 43.6 
Job Security 264 43.1 
Other 85 13.9 
Total 1,119 182.8 
Note: Respondents were asked to choose up to two motivations without specifying the rank order. For 
this reason, total percentage exceeds 100.  
  
Table 7 shows the top 5 combinations of the two primary reasons for enlistment. 
Approximately 10.3 percent of Japanese peacekeepers decided to join the SDF because 
the SDF is a stable government job and because the SDF would provide training 
opportunities to gain job skills and special licenses (e.g., driver’s license for trucks and 
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other large-size commercial vehicles and radio technician). The combinations in the 
second most chosen (job security and Family’s suggestion: 9.0 percent) and third most 
chosen (training opportunity and family’s suggestion: 8.7 percent) also listed similar 
reasons. Unlike the United States, patriotic reason first appeared in the 5th from the top 
(7.2 percent).  
Table 7: Distribution of the Top 5 Combinations of Enlistment Reasons among 
Peacekeepers. 
 Combination of Enlistment Reasons N Percentage 1 
1 Job Security & Training Opportunities 63 10.3 
2 Job Security & Family’s Suggestion  55 9.0 
3 Training Opportunity & Family’s Suggestion 53 8.7 
4 Training Opportunity & No Other Job Available 51 8.3 
5 Job Security & Belief in the Significance of National 
Defense 44 7.2 
1: Percentage of valid responses (N=612).  
Table 6 and 7 demonstrate that the significance of national defense (patriotic 
motivation) was not the primary motivations for many peacekeepers. Is this a consistent 
tendency across generations? Table 8 shows the distribution of patriotic motivation by 
age groups. The Pearson’s chi-square value is 11.17, which suggests that there is a 
significant relationship between enlistment motivations and age at the 1 percent 
significance level (p <0.01).  Between the 19-29 years old group and the 30-39 years old 
group, there is no difference in distribution of enlistment reasons. On the other hand, 35.5 
percent of the 40 years old and older peacekeepers answered that they enlisted because 
national defense is important. On the other hand, in younger groups of peacekeepers, 
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patriotic motivation had much lower percentages (19-29 years old: 20.9 percent; 30-39 
years old: 21.2 percent).39  
Table 8: Enlistment Motivation by Age groups (N=610) 
Age Group 
Non-patriotic 
Motivations 
Patriotic 
Motivation Total 
19 – 29 y.o. 182 48 230 
 (79.1) (20.9) (100.0) 
30-39 y.o. 204 55 259 
 (78.8) (21.2) (100.0) 
40 y.o. and older 78 43 121 
 (64.5) (35.5) (100.0) 
Total 464 146 610 
 (76.1) (23.9) (100.0) 
Note  1. ( ) is percentage within each age group. 
          2. Chi-square value =11.17 (p<. 01) 
 
This generational gap in enlistment motivation suggests generational difference in 
occupational socialization corresponding to the change in social status of the organization 
in society. At the same time, this can be a retrospective effect that older generation of 
peacekeepers might modify their enlistment motivations to protect one’s professional 
identity in a socially marginalized profession over time. As discussed earlier, while the 
Japanese economy was in a high-growth period, the SDF experienced chronic recruitment 
issues. Taking these social and economic situations into consideration, high patriotic 
motivation in the older age group may be (a) a product of the emotion management of 
SDF personnel to cope with their socially marginalized profession or (b) a conscious 
                                                 
39 Adjusted standardized residuals between expected and observed values supported thi  provide 
us the information about the distinctiveness of the cells: the cell has a distinctive response pattern 
if the absolute value is higher than 2. Adjusted standardized residuals indicate that peacekeepers 
age 40 and older tend to have patriotic motivation for enlistment. The value of adjusted 
standardized residual for patriotic motivation of the 40 years old and older group is 3.3, for non-
patriotic motivation of the group is -3.3. The value of adjusted standardized residuals for the other 
cells did not indicate the distinctive distribution pattern (the values are less than 2). 
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decision to choose a socially marginalized profession for personal belief in higher cause 
(national security).    
The lower percentage of patriotic motivation in the younger generations is 
noteworthy in the relationship with increasing interest in peacekeeping deployment 
among recent officer candidates and recruits. According to the officers in the ASDF 
Officer Candidate School (ASDFOCS), compared to several years ago, peacekeeping 
deployment became increasingly a popular motivation for joining the force as well as 
training and educational opportunities in the service. An executive officer in the 
ASDFOCS described the job preference among recent applicants.  
“ [Among applicants for aviation specialty] not only fighter pilot positions but 
also transportation and rescue pilot positions are becoming more popular because 
[applicants] want to participate in peacekeeping and disaster relief missions…[In 
the interviews with applicants] they knew that they should choose transportation 
if they wanted to deploy for peacekeeping operations. I did not know such a detail 
about the SDF when I was an officer candidate since it was in the period of five 
major specialties40….” (#14: Officer, ASDF) 
 
“Yes, transportation! I want to be assigned to transportation specialty so badly. 
….I thought that I should apply for operational specialties, but it is great to do 
something to support [missions] such as peacekeeping and disaster relief.” (#16: 
Trainee, ASDF)  
 
However, in a focus group session, officer candidates expressed their desire to 
study abroad paid by the SDF, but not to deploy to peacekeeping operations. For many 
ASDF officer candidates, peacekeeping operations are very limited opportunities in the 
ASDF unless they become aviators. Candidates generally expressed their positive 
impression about peacekeeping operations, but their comments were superficial reflecting 
                                                 
40 In the ASDF, officer candidates used to be assigned to five major job specialties such as 
aviation, air defense (Patriot missile operation), tactical air traffic control, air traffic control, and 
maintenance. 
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that peacekeeping missions are not in their realities in their newly started professional 
socialization in the ASDF. Combined with the very tight job market for new college 
graduates, media exposure of the SDF has been changing the pool of officers and recruits. 
Their career goals in the ASDF were diverse, ranging from aviation to aerospace 
engineering, post-doctoral education, and peacekeeping. Putting aside the fact that officer 
candidates are in the process of indoctrination, their career perspective and attitudes 
toward the military profession are distinctively different from experienced personnel. 
These attitudinal differences suggest that the younger generations of ASDF personnel 
may take a considerably longer time to adopt the same narratives or emotional 
management strategies. Or, the younger generations may not have a chance to reaffirm 
the dirty work approach unless they face situations that necessitate the existing emotional 
management strategies. Although it is not completely identical, those who are in certain 
occupations that deal with emotionally uncomfortable tasks (e.g., animal shelter workers 
who euthanasize animals routinely) ultimately rely on the strategies used by experienced 
fellow workers and reproduce the institution (e.g., Smith and Kleinman 1989; Arluke 
1994). In the case of the ASDF, it seems that the younger generations bring new 
meanings of the military profession, which are not consistent with the existing 
institutional norms and coping mechanism. For example, the educational opportunity 
motivation was not well accepted in the organization. The trainers whom I interviewed 
had a very critical view of the candidates’ mindset and career motivation.  
“Candidates in the recent cohorts are focusing on the flowery side of the job 
like studying abroad programs…. For example, they want to be a pilot 
because they can get training in the US. That is like putting the cart before 
the horse. We gotta straighten them out sometime. They joined the force for 
very personal reasons like studying overseas or going to graduate school 
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[paid by the ASDF], not for doing something for the country.” (#14: Officer, 
ASDF)  
 
The two trainers were both young Captains in their early 30s, and went through 
the same training seven or eight years ago, not too long time ago. However, they felt the 
change of mindset among candidates and showed their frustration with candidates’ 
instrumental attitudes toward the profession. My focus group interview confirmed their 
observation. Candidates were more focused on personal educational opportunities that 
very few of them could get in the future rather than more operation-related overseas 
opportunities such as peacekeeping deployment. Most trainees were almost abruptly 
indifferent to peacekeeping operations. In contrast, they became very enthusiastic and 
engaged in conversations when we switched the subject to educational opportunities to 
attend master’s programs overseas and aviation training in the U.S.  This is an example of 
a technique called ‘infusing.’  According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), infusing is to 
reframe the meaning attached to an occupation. For young officer candidates, study 
abroad programs in the SDF refocus their attention from stigmatized features of the 
profession (e.g., field exercises, danger in missions, and antagonism from the general 
public) to a nonstigmatized feature (e.g., study abroad programs and opportunities for 
post-graduate level education). People in a stigmatized occupation attempt to minimize 
the impact of the occupational stigma by considering their involvement and investment in 
the occupation as an instrument for achieving long-term goals (Ashforth and Kreiner, 
1999).  
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However, it is still not common among ASDF personnel to refocus the mission of 
the SDF based on peacekeeping participation. One trainee was not articulate but clearly 
uncomfortable with participating in peacekeeping missions:  
“Peacekeeping is politics, not military affairs. So, well…how should I say 
this…diplomacy? I’d rather be supporting [military affairs] by developing new 
airplanes behind the scene.” (#16: A trainee, ASDF OCS) 
 
This oversimplified view made a very important point in the basic ideal type of 
professional military and their expected self in the future. According to Turner (1989), 
people in a specific position in the social structure have constraints on how much their 
value can be applied to their practical goal setting. Turner calls this conflict between 
cultural value and personal goal “self relevancy.” As Trainee A expressed, some officer 
candidates have trouble understanding peacekeeping operations as a military mission 
because their reference group and the values that they applied is a military organization 
with a more martial orientation. Among candidates who expressed their interest in 
peacekeeping missions all focused on the development of personal skills and professional 
experience through deployment, but not the macro-level purpose of peacekeeping.  
It is likely that the recent job market for college graduates in Japan also 
contributes this individualistic attitude of officer candidates and young generation of 
peacekeepers toward their military service. In the early 1990s, the unemployment rate in 
Japan was around 2- 2.5 percent; now the rate is double (4.7 percent in 2004) (Ministry of 
Health, Labor, and Welfare, 2004). Scarce job opportunities under the recession of the 
Japanese economy pushed the popularity of joining the SDF and made it a very 
competitive job. The rates of competition to enlist the SDF as fixed term personnel are 
3.2 for men and 9.1 for women on average, among the three services in fiscal year of 
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1996 (Defense of Japan, 1997).  There is another category for enlistment, NCO 
candidates, who will be promoted to NCO within 6 years. The ratio of enlistment for E 
(U) candidates is 1: 12 for men and 1: 29.3 for women. For female applicants, the chance 
of enlistment is far smaller than men. General and technical officer candidate positions 
for college graduates are more competitive, an acceptance rate, lower than 3 percent. This 
popularity of enlistment was never expected in the 1980s when the SDF could not meet 
manpower needs due to recruitment problems. The recent long-term recession 
contributed to reducing the distance of the SDF from the larger society by presenting the 
organization as a stable employer to the youth generation. In addition, the 
competitiveness of enlistment to the SDF helps improve the quality of the recruits and is 
gradually reducing the stigmatized image of the SDF attached to the organizational 
history.   
Deployment Motivations 
Ohi (1999) found differences in perceived value among peacekeepers from 
different recruitment categories, suggesting different initial professional socialization 
processes in the service. Officers valued territorial defense more than constabulary 
missions such as disaster relief and peacekeeping, compared to Non-Commissioned 
officers (NCOs). Among officers, National Defense Academy graduates valued territorial 
defense related missions more than did civilian university graduates. This result might 
reflect the socialization process of National Defense Academy graduates as military 
professionals which started their career much earlier than officers who graduated from 
civilian universities. Reference groups in the socialization process of National Defense 
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Academy graduates might be traditional military officers such as American military 
officers. 
Despite the increasing popularity of the SDF among the youth, what motivated 
peacekeepers to deploy overseas? To better understand deployment motivations, I 
categorized the respondents into the following four groups based on their deployment 
motivation using the two motivation scales (organization-oriented motivation scale and 
personal-oriented motivation scale) listed in the methods section. 
Organization-Oriented Motivation (ORGMTV) is a dummy variable for those 
who score higher than the mean on the organization-oriented motivations scale, but not 
scoring higher than the mean on the individual-oriented motivations scale.  
Personal Motivation (PERMTV) is a dummy variable for those who score 
higher than the mean on the individual-oriented motivations scale, but not scoring higher 
than the mean on the organization-oriented motivations scale.  
Balanced Motivation (BALANCE) is a dummy variable for those who score 
higher than the mean scores on both individual and organization-oriented motivations. 
Those who have balanced motivation=1; otherwise, coded as 0. 
No Motivation (NOMOTIV) is a dummy variable for those who show no 
interest in peacekeeping deployment in an item asking about a respondent’s eagerness for 
peacekeeping deployment. The question is “how interested were you in participating in 
peacekeeping deployment before you were assigned to the mission?” Respondents used a 
four-point scale with don’t know option: 1= “I was very much interested”; 2= “I was 
somewhat interested”; 3= “I am not particularly interested”; 4= “I did not want to 
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participate if possible.” Those who answered 3 and 4 were coded as no deployment 
motivation=1; otherwise, coded as 0. 
Table 9 Cross-Tabulation of Patriotic Enlistment Motivation and Deployment 
Motivation 
  Enlistment Motivation *  
 
Non-patriotic 
Reasons Patriotic Reason Total 
Organizational motivation 95 (20.2) 50(33.8) 145 (23.5) 
Personal Motivation 54 (11.5) 6 (4.1) 60 (9.7) 
High in both motivations 88 (18.7) 31 (20.9) 119 (19.3) 
Moderately motivated 122 (26.0) 33 (22.3) 155 (25.1) 
No motivation 111 (23.6) 28 (18.9) 139 (22.5) 
D
ep
lo
ym
en
t 
M
i
i
Total 470 (100.0) 148 (100.0) 618 (100.0) 
. 
Table 9 provides the cross-tabulation of deployment motivations and Enlistment 
motivation (non-patriotic reasons and patriotic reason). Nearly a quarter of respondents 
showed high level of organizational motivation, while only 9.7 percent were high in only 
personal motivation. For 19.3 percent of respondents, organizational motivation and 
personal motivations are equally high.  Almost a quarter of the respondents were not 
highly but moderately motivated. A relatively high percentage of respondents (22.5 
percent) did not have an interest in peacekeeping deployment or did not want to 
participate in overseas deployment. There was a significant difference in deployment 
motivations between those who enlisted with patriotic reason and those who enlisted 
other than patriotic reasons as their primary motives (Chi-square value= 17.24; p<.01). 
Respondents who joined the SDF with patriotic reasons show a higher percentage of an 
organizational motivation and very low percentage of personal motivation.  
Since SDF personnel who have opportunities for deployment tend to be 
concentrated in certain job areas, personal reasons, specifically for promotion and 
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advancement, seem to be looked down upon by their peers. The following comment from 
an ASDF officer seems to represent one aspect of an organizational norm against using 
peacekeeping missions as a career opportunity.  
“Those who think this [peacekeeping] is a step-up for their career should not go. 
It is wrong. It is ok if they learn something in the process of deployment, but 
participating in peacekeeping for career advancement is just wrong” (#30: Officer 
with no deployment experience, ASDF). 
 
On the other hand, a NCO deployed to UNDOF in the Golan Heights expressed his failed 
expectation for promotion after deployment.  
“….one disappointing thing is promotion and special advancement (tokushou: 
tokubetsu shokyu). Every deployed service member should think about this once, I 
believe. I am very disappointed that I could not be promoted nor chosen for 
special advancement in July. I am ashamed to say that I have been Sergeant 3rd 
class for 10 years… Promotion was very important for me. My wife knew about 
it. I was very shocked to hear my wife saying to me, “you deploy for what?” I 
expected my promotion and advancement because senior NCO members [were 
promoted and received advancement]. I participated in a peacekeeping operation 
and did my best. Peacekeeping deployment does not count on promotion and 
advancement evaluation in my unit. After going there and coming back, ‘thank 
you’ is the only thing I get? ” (#10: GSDF NCO deployed to UNDOF). 
 
Ohi (1999) reported similar problems that peacekeepers experienced after they 
returned from deployment. Peacekeepers expected promotion and favorable treatment in 
terms of transfer and special advancement, but these expectations were often betrayed. 
There is a structural reason for not using peacekeeping experience for performance 
evaluation for promotion because the limited assignment of Japanese troops also restricts 
job specialties of service members who deploy (e.g., engineering, transportation) 
although service members in other specialties have opportunities to volunteer for 
peacekeeping assignments. Devaluing career enhancement and economic motivations is a 
unique contrast with North American and European peacekeepers. For American 
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peacekeepers deployed to the Sinai, perceived benefits for professional development was 
a factor in successful adjustment (Segal and Meeker 1985). American reservists who 
deployed to peacekeeping assignments were motivated by the financial benefit from their 
deployment (Lakhani and Abod 1997). On the contrary, among Italian professional 
soldiers who deployed to Albania and Somalia, those who were motivated for a financial 
gain were not satisfied with the missions because their civilian counterparts earn more 
money without hardship in the field (Battistelli 1997). This may be a difference in the 
allocation of morality regarding financial issues in different cultures. In Japanese culture, 
talking about money is often refrained from because it is considered as a sign of greed in 
Buddhism and Confucianism.   
 
Correlation Analysis of the Variables 
In the present dissertation, peacekeepers’ perceptions about organizational 
capacity (perceived organizational ability) and satisfaction are used as dependent 
variables. These variables play a significant role in Japanese service members’ attitudes 
and identity in the process of adaptation to peacekeeping.  
Perceived organizational ability was introduced as a result of the findings from 
interview data. As discussed in Chapter 8, Japanese peacekeepers display ambivalent 
feelings about their professional status and the current state of the organization. Some 
peacekeepers express frustration about their inability to react in a potentially life 
threatening situation. On the other hand, some say that they are proud that SDF personnel 
are more disciplined and efficient, compared to peacekeepers from other nations. 
However, it is still not clear that how other aspects of deployment experience, other than 
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these narrowly focused qualities, affect peacekeepers’ perception about organizational 
ability. 
In terms of satisfaction, previous studies have found that the majority of Japanese 
peacekeepers are satisfied with their peacekeeping deployment (Kawano 2001; 2002). 
Regarding the internal construct of mission satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers, 
Satoh (2001) used Kawano’s survey data and analyzed satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
factors in perceived mission experience. Satoh (2001) tested Herzberg’s (1966) model of 
the relationship between perceived job environments and satisfaction and motivation. 
Herzberg (1966) identified satisfaction factors and dissatisfaction factors in perceived 
mission environments, and suggested that perceived mission environments are strongly 
associated with job satisfaction, while dissatisfaction factors would not improve job 
satisfaction when they were reduced. In Satoh’s (2001) research, it is worthwhile noting 
that satisfaction factors showed strong correlations with both personal and organization-
oriented motivations for deployment. A problem with Satoh’s research is that he did not 
test his hypotheses in a single integrative model: he separated segments of the processes 
of attitudes formation into three parts and examined them respectively. He examined the 
correlation between pre-deployment motivation and perceived satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction factors, perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors and overall 
mission satisfaction, and perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors and 
redeployment intention.  Examining the relative explanatory power of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction scales leaves us puzzled about what aspects of the mission experience are 
associated with satisfaction. To clarify the relationship between deployment experience 
and mission satisfaction, the present dissertation introduces positive experience as the 
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‘personal fulfillment’ score, and analyzes the relationship between various aspects of 
deployment experience and mission satisfaction.  
For the analysis, first I performed correlation analysis to see how groups of 
independent variables relate to other independent variables and two dependent variables 
(Table 9). Using Pearson’s correlation coefficients, all the individual-level background 
characteristics except education level are significantly related to organizational pride; 
with mission satisfaction, only the mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) was significantly 
correlated. Young (younger generation of peacekeepers age under 30) is negatively 
related to organizational pride (r=-.158; p<.01) but not mission satisfaction.  
Education was not related to either perceived organizational ability or mission 
satisfaction. Dummy variables for two missions (UNTAC and ONUMOZ) were both 
related to organizational pride (UNTAC: r=-.105, p <.01; ONUMOZ: r=.114, p <.01), but 
only UNTAC was related to missions satisfaction (r=-.152, p <.01). Patriotic motivation 
for enlistment was also introduced as a background variable to provide the basis of 
peacekeepers’ initial intention of joining the organization. Patriotic motivation is 
significantly related to perceived organizational ability (r = .153, p <. 01), but not mission 
satisfaction. Although education levels are uniquely distributed across rank and age due 
to the enlistment system in the SDF and shift in the recruiting trend in the past decade, it 
is not likely that difference in education caused differences in organizational pride and 
mission satisfaction.  
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In terms of deployment motivation, balanced motivation, which is high in both 
organization-oriented and personal oriented motivation for deployment, is moderately 
related to organization pride, but not mission satisfaction. The three other categories of 
deployment motivation are moderately related to mission satisfaction, but not 
organizational pride. Interestingly, personal motivation (high in personal motivation for 
deployment) as well as no motivation (no motivation for deployment) is negatively 
associated with mission satisfaction. In contrast, personal motivation is positively 
associated with mission satisfaction. In the next section, therefore, I will examine the 
effect of different motivations on mission satisfaction relative to other factors.  
Compared to deployment motivations, experiences during deployment are more 
strongly related to the perceived organizational ability and mission satisfaction. 
Interpersonal conflict with unit members is negatively related to mission satisfaction (r =-
.163, p<.01), but not to organizational pride. On the other hand, conflict with superiors is 
negatively related to organizational pride (r=-.118, p<.01) and mission satisfaction (r=-
.187, p<.01). Unit cohesion was positively related to organizational pride (r=.103,p<.05) 
and to mission satisfaction (r=.124, p<.01). Mission difficulty was not related to 
organizational pride or mission satisfaction. 
 With regard to peacekeepers’ perception about peacekeeping missions, 
organizational suitability to peacekeeping is moderately related to both the perceived 
organizational ability and mission satisfaction. Perception of benefit of peacekeeping for 
domestic “defense act (Bouei Shutsudo)” is positively related to mission satisfaction 
(.145, p< .01), but not to perceived organizational ability. Relative stress level compared 
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to domestic missions in Japan is strongly and negatively associated with mission 
satisfaction (r=-.117, p< .01). Personal fulfillment shows moderately positive correlation 
with the perceived organizational ability (r= .106, p<.05), and highly positive correlation 
with mission satisfaction (r=.331, p<.01). Since the domain of personal fulfillment is 
personal experience, it is likely to be related to the individual’s mission satisfaction rather 
than the subjective evaluation of the organization, albeit one’s evaluation of the 
organization that she or he belongs to is likely to reflect their self-evaluation. 
In sum, many variables show significant correlations with either or both of the 
two dependent variables. No combination of the independent variables showed 
multicollinerality problems. To see the effects of the variables when controlling for other 
variables, the next section will present the OLS regression analysis.  
 
Impact of Peacekeeping Participation on Individual Peacekeepers 
The findings in the previous section provided preliminary evidence that 
peacekeeping participation is related to organizational perception and that the other 
model variables are also significantly related to mission satisfaction.  This section will 
examine the relative impact of independent variables on organizational pride and mission 
satisfaction using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression.  
Perceived Organizational Capability 
 Table 11 shows the four models that examine the impact of independent variables 
on perceived organizational capability. In Model 1, I regressed four dummy variables for 
deployment motivations on perceived organizational capability. The four groups of  
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Table 11. OLS Regression of Perceived Organizational Capability on Deployment 
Motivation, Deployment Experience, and Psychological States.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b Beta B Beta b Beta B Beta 
Deployment Motivation         
Organization-oriented  
Motivation a 
.161 
(.108) 
.079 .140 
(.109) 
.068  .125 
(.109) 
.061  .009 
(.109) 
.046
Personal Motivation a  .265 (.139) 
.091 .271 
(.140) 
.093 .295* 
(.139) 
.101  .270 
(.138) 
.093
Balanced Motivation a  .351** (.112) 
.159 .336** 
(.112) 
.152 .328** 
(.112) 
.149 .309** 
(.111) 
.140
No Motivation a .007 (.112) 
.033 .007 
(.113) 
.037  .008 
(.112) 
.037  .005 
(.112) 
.028
Deployment Experience       
Interpersonal Conflict   
-.001 
(.063) 
-.013  -.001 
(.063) 
-.011  -.002 
(.063) 
-.020
Conflict with Superior   
-.135 
(.070) 
-.088 -.137* 
(.069) 
-.089  -.123 
(.069) 
-.080
Unit Cohesion   
-.005 
(.044) 
.058  .004 
(.044) 
.047  .004 
(.043) 
.042
Mission Difficulty   
.001 
(.069) 
.009  .001 
(.069) 
.001  -.006 
(.073) 
-.042
Perception about Peacekeeping         
Suitability to peacekeeping    
 .201** 
(.067) 
.127 .181** 
(.067) 
.114
Defense Act    
-.001 
(.034) 
-.021  -.002 
(.034) 
-.031
Psychological States        
Relative stress level Stress    
   .139 
(.072) 
.089
Personal Fulfillment    
  .176** 
(.068) 
.114
Control        
Young b -.291***(.078) 
-.160 -.278*** 
(.078) 
-.153 -.272*** 
(.078) 
-.150 -.283*** 
(.078) 
-.156
Education .004 (.073) 
.025  -.004 
(.074) 
.025  .002 
(.073) 
.017  .004 
(.074) 
.026
UNTAC c -.007 (.084) 
-.042  -.006 
(.085) 
-.035  -.005 
(.085) 
-.034  -.004 
(.084) 
-.024
ONUMOZ c .224 (.125) 
.084 .216* 
(.127) 
.081  .247 
(.127) 
.093 .299* 
(.128) 
.112
Patriotic Enlistment Motivation  .258** 
(.090) 
.124 .261** 
(.090) 
.125 .263** 
(.089) 
.126 .249** 
(.089) 
.119
Constant    2.503  2.530  2.182  1.584  
R2      .078  .091  .107  .121  
Adjusted R2      .062  .069  .081  .093  
Note: N = 545; Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Compared to those who are moderately motivated; b Compared to those who are age 30 
and above; c Compared to respondents who deployed to Golan Heights (UNDOF). 
b = Unstandardized Coefficients, Beta = Standardized Coefficients. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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deployment motivations were included in the model, taking the “moderately motivated” 
group as control group. In the next model (Model 2), I added four deployment 
experiences including interpersonal conflict with fellow peacekeepers and superiors 
respectively, unit cohesion, and mission difficulty. In the third model (Model 3), two 
variables for peacekeepers’ perception about peacekeeping as a mission for the SDF were 
introduced. Lastly, in Model 4, I controlled for relative stress level and the level of 
personal fulfillment. 
Model 1 tested the relationship between deployment motivations and perceived 
organizational capability, holding constant young generation, education, missions, and 
patriotic enlistment motivation. The positive, significant “balanced motivation” 
coefficient indicates that peacekeepers who report higher scores on both organization-
oriented motivation and personal motivation tend to have a more favorable view about 
the potential of the SDF. The negative, significant coefficient for peacekeepers under 30 
years old shows that peacekeepers in the younger generation do not evaluate the 
capability of the SDF so highly compared to other armed forces. Among the control 
variables, enlistment motivation also shows a positive, significant effect on favorable 
perception about the SDF’s potential. Next, in Model 2, the positive, significant 
coefficient for balanced motivation decreased but not much (from .351 to .336 or by 4 
percent). The negative, significant coefficient for peacekeepers under 30 years old also 
slightly decreased from -.291 to -.278, but this change was trivial. None of the 
deployment experience variables were significant. 
In Model 3, I focus on peacekeepers’ perception about peacekeeping as a SDF 
mission. Suitability of the SDF to peacekeeping is positively associated with one’s 
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evaluation of SDF’s ability (beta =.201; p<.01). On the other hand, the importance of 
peacekeeping for Defense Act, a major domestic mission, was statistically insignificant. 
Adjustment for those interrelationships increased the sizes of personal motivation from 
.271 to .295 and of conflict with superior from -.135 to -.137. The increases of the 
absolute sizes in the coefficients for those variables indicate that the sense of suitability to 
peacekeeping may allow peacekeepers to expect to pursue their personal goals in 
deployment. Taken together the adjustment for the perception for suitability, the sizes of 
coefficients for balanced motivation and for young generation of peacekeepers slightly 
declined. The coefficients for patriotic enlistment motivation, on the other hand, slightly 
increased.  
In Model 4, I test the predictions of stress level, and personal fulfillment. The 
stress level was not significant while personal fulfillment was significantly and positively 
associated with the perception about the organization’s ability.  Adjustment for 
psychological states during mission decreased the size of the coefficients for deployment 
motivations and patriotic enlistment motivation, and the coefficient for organizational 
suitability to peacekeeping declined from .201 to .181 or by 10 percent. The absolute size 
of the coefficient for young generation of peacekeepers increases after the adjustment of 
psychological states from -.272 to -.283 by 4 percent. Regardless of personal fulfillment, 
younger generation of peacekeepers have negative views of organizational capability. On 
the other hand, the coefficient for the ONUMOZ increased from .247 to .299 or by 20 
percent. Suitability of the SDF to peacekeeping remain significantly and positively 
associated with one’s evaluation of SDF’s ability (Beta =.181, p<.01) after controlling 
psychological states of peacekeepers.  
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The results show that the data analysis did not support hypothesis 4-2.  Japanese 
peacekeepers who show high levels of organization-oriented motivation did not perceive 
the capability of the SDF. Instead, those who are high in both organizational and personal 
motivation for deployment perceived the capability of the SDF positively at a significant 
level. The effect was almost constant across the four models. Regarding the relationship 
between Organizational benefits of peacekeeping and perceived organizational ability, 
the data partially supported hypothesis 4-4. Peacekeepers who perceive the SDF as 
appropriate to peacekeeping show significantly high evaluation about organizational 
capability, while the usefulness of peacekeeping mission for dealing with national 
emergency situations did not affect peacekeepers’ perception of organizational capability. 
In model 4, the coefficient for the balanced motivation declined possibly because they 
were open to evaluate any positive aspect of their deployment experience as beneficial, 
compared to those who show high level of motivation in either personal or organizational 
domain. The data did not support hypothesis 4-6 although the data showed the negative 
effects of these negative deployment experiences on the perceived organizational 
capability.  
Mission Satisfaction  
Table 12 shows the four models that examine the impact of independent variables 
on mission satisfaction. In Model 1, I test the prediction of motivation with adjustment of 
all the control variables. Among four groups of motivations, personal motivation is 
significantly and negatively associated with mission satisfaction (beta=-.213; p<.01).  
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Table 12. OLS Regression of Mission Satisfaction on Deployment Motivation, 
Deployment Experience, and Psychological States.     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b Beta b Beta B Beta b Beta 
Deployment Motivation         
Organization-oriented  
Motivation a 
.008 
(.072) .062 
.006 
(.071) .050 
 .004 
(.071) .031 
 -.003 
(.068) -.003 
Personal Motivation a  -.213** (.092) -.112 
-.193* 
(.091) -.102 
-.182* 
(.090) -.096 
-.228** 
(.086) -.120 
Balanced Motivation a   .006 (.074) .045 
 .005 
(.073) .036 
 .003 
(.073) .024 
 .001 
(.069) .010 
No Motivation a   -.009 (.074) -.066 
 -.008 
(.073) -.059 
 -.006 
(.073) -.049 
 -.006 
(.070) -.045 
Deployment Experience         
Interpersonal Conflict   -.101* (.041) -.111 
-.009* 
(.041) -.110 
-.009* 
(.039) -.102 
Conflict with Superior   -.118** (.045)  -.118 
-.113* 
(.045) -.113 
 -.008 
(.043) -.084 
Unit Cohesion    .003 (.028) .058 
 .003 
(.028) .047 
 .002 
(.027) .037 
Mission Difficulty    -.001 (.045) .002 
 -.001 
(.045) -.002 
 -.003 
(.046) -.032 
Perception about Peacekeeping         
Suitability to peacekeeping      .006 (.044) .065 
 .004 
(.042) .039 
Defense Act     .005* (.022) .107 
 .003 
(.021) .073 
Psychological States         
Relative stress level Stress        -.002 
(.045) -.025 
Personal Fulfillment       .307***(.042) .306 
Control          
Young b  .002 (.051) .018 
 .003 
(.051) .031 
 .005 
(.208) .044 
.002 
(.048) .021 
Education -.009* (.048) -.086 
 -.009 
(.048) -.080 
 -.009 
(.048) -.080 
 -.004 
(.046) -.044 
UNTAC c -.195***(.056) -.167 
-.192***
(.055) -.165 
-.201*** 
(.055) -.172 
 -.172 
(.052) -.147 
ONUMOZ c  -.001 (.083) -.009 
-.001 
(.082) -.007 
 .001 
(.082) .001 
.115***
(.080) .066 
Patriotic Enlistment Motivation   -.001 
(.059) -.014 
-.001 
(.058) -.012 
 -.001 
(.058) -.014 
 -.004 
(.055) -.034 
Constant 2.843  3.037  2.677  1.858  
R2 .057  .100  .117  .202  
Adjusted R2 .041  .078  .092  .176  
Note: N = 545; Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Compared to those who are moderately motivated; b Compared to those who are age 30 and 
above; c Compared to respondents who deployed to Golan Heights (UNDOF). 
b = Unstandardized Coefficients, Beta = Standardized Coefficients. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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This indicates that those who have a higher level of personal motivation are less 
satisfied with the mission on which they deployed. Education level is slightly and 
negatively related to mission satisfaction. It is also noteworthy that patriotic enlistment 
motivation is not related to mission satisfaction. SDF personnel deployed to Cambodia 
(UNTAC) are significantly dissatisfied with their mission (beta=-.195; p<.001).  In 
Model 2, I focus on deployment experiences. Interpersonal conflict with fellow 
peacekeepers and conflict with superior are both significantly and negatively associated 
with mission satisfaction (beta=-.101; p<.05; beta=-.113; p<.01). The coefficients for 
personal motivation and for the UNTAC participants slightly declined (from -.195 to -
.192), while the coefficient for education still hold at the same level.  
The third model (Model 3) adjusted the perceptions about organizational 
suitability to peacekeeping. The perception that peacekeeping is good for defense act is 
slightly significantly but positively associated with mission satisfaction. The coefficients 
for personal motivation, interpersonal conflict, conflict with superior, and education 
slightly declined. In Model 4, I assess the association between psychological states and 
mission satisfaction. Personal fulfillment is significantly and positively associated with 
mission satisfaction, while stress level is unrelated to mission satisfaction. After adjusting  
for psychological states, the absolute value of the coefficient for personal 
motivation increased from -.182 to -.228 or by about 25 percent. The increase in the 
coefficient indicates that personal fulfillment intervenes with the relationship between 
personal motivation and mission satisfaction. The coefficients for conflict with superior 
and defense act declined, but slightly. The coefficient for interpersonal conflict stayed 
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constant (beta = -.009; p<.05). It is noteworthy that the coefficient for the UNTAC 
declined from -.201 to -.172 or by 14 percent.  
In terms of deployment motivation, the analysis did not support hypothesis 4-1 
that peacekeepers who have organization-oriented motivations will be more satisfied with 
the mission than those who have personal motivations. Only personal motivation was 
significantly but negatively associated with mission satisfaction, while high levels of 
organization-oriented and balanced motivation are positively associated with mission 
satisfaction, but the relationships were not statistically significant. Those who were not 
motivated for deployment also showed a negative association with mission satisfaction 
and stayed constant after adjusting stress level and personal fulfillment. Peacekeepers 
who have no motivation for deployment are not satisfied with the mission regardless of 
what happened during the deployment. In the present analysis, peacekeepers with 
personal motivation shows a little conflicting result in Model 4.  
In terms of mission experience, hypothesis 4-5 was partially supported. 
Interpersonal conflict with their peers held its constant and negative association with 
mission satisfaction, while the effect of conflict with superiors disappear after introducing 
the personal fulfillment variable in Model 4. This result indicates that personal conflict 
with superiors is somewhat associated with their feeling of accomplishment during 
deployment. On the other hand, personal conflict with peers negatively effect on mission 
satisfaction regardless of perceived accomplishment.  I initially expected that 
peacekeepers who have a high level of personal motivation tend to have higher 
expectation about the mission, which leads to the negative coefficient to mission 
satisfaction. After adjusting personal fulfillment during deployment, a high level of 
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personal motivation become more negatively associated with mission satisfaction (see 
Model 4).  
The data did not support hypothesis 4-7. Relative stress level did not affect 
mission satisfaction. This result suggests a mixture of unrealistic expectation among 
peacekeepers and a byproduct of retrospective survey. Peacekeepers with high personal 
motivation may have unrealistically high expectations about their deployment. The result 
shows that the more they experienced accomplishment in the mission (higher in personal 
fulfillment), the more they are disappointed with the absence of rewards later in their 
career. If peacekeepers with high personal motivation expected promotion and special 
benefits and treatments after their deployment, the absence of those expected rewards 
may decrease their mission satisfaction considerably.  In the responses to open-ended 
questions, peacekeepers complained about the income tax charged on their deployment 
allowance, the lagged charge of the tax (the tax was charged the following year), absence 
of promotion, coworkers’ envy to their deployment, and unfair assignment for former 
peacekeepers upon return. Since their expectation is all about their career and benefits 
after their deployment, this result may be a byproduct of the retrospective survey. 
Satisfaction level changed over time after the deployment as they discovered the impact 
of their deployment experience on the benefits and career development.  
Unlike perceived organizational ability, patriotic enlistment motivation was not 
related to mission satisfaction at all. Taken together, the results of motivation variables 
suggest that lower mission satisfaction among peacekeepers with personal motivation is 
likely to sustain as long as Japanese peacekeeping participation is limited to specific job 
areas and SDF members in those specialties. Peacekeeping participation has not been a 
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primary factor for promotion for this reason. For the organization, it is a concern that 
peacekeeping participation becomes a primary factor for promotion because of the 
narrowly limited job areas and because such consideration may turn over the priority of 
the missions between the missions directly related to Japanese people’s interest 
(territorial defense, disaster relief) and indirectly related missions (peacekeeping).  In 
terms of deployment experience, the results support the previous research findings based 
on interview data (Kawano, 2002; Kawano 2004). Interpersonal experience and conflict 
with superiors are negatively associated with mission satisfaction by adjusting other 
independent variables and control variables, although the coefficient for conflict with 
superior was slightly reduced by personal fulfillment, which suggests that the negative 
feeling was compromised by the feeling of personal achievement. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions  
 
Informed by microinstitutionalism (Ashfort and Kreiner 1990; Zucker 1991; 
Suchman 1995; Wicks, 2002) and identity theories related to the ‘dirty work’ concept 
(Hughes 1958; Ashforth and Kreiner 1999), the present dissertation has examined the 
linkages between the institutional environment of the Japanese military institution, the 
constabulary ethos of the SDF, the professional identity of service members, and 
adaptation to peacekeeping focusing on organizational legitimacy that has shaped the 
contemporary Japanese armed forces and professional identity of individual service 
members.  
In the wake of the Korean War, the new Japanese armed forces were established 
to fill the manpower shortage of the U.S. Occupational Force through a special legislative 
procedure without the consensus of the Japanese people. The process was viewed as 
undemocratic by the Japanese people (Hata 1976; Tanaka 1997). As a result, in post-
WWII Japan, the SDF has been treated as a government organization with little 
legitimacy; jieikan were also marginalized in society. This initial failure to build social 
acceptance and legitimacy created a strong schematic connection between the Imperial 
military and the newly established armed forces in Japanese society. The founding 
process of contemporary Japanese armed forces took place prematurely: the society had 
yet to fully absorb its own experience and consequences during the war including the 
newly introduced democratic Constitution and the broken relationships with neighboring 
nations. The inherent ambiguity of the legal ground quickly became an Achilles’ heel for 
the SDF to survive and play any military function because such a murky state of 
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legitimacy prevented the organization from generating the conditions to gain normative 
and cultural-cognitive rules and beliefs in its social environment.  
One of the main problems was that the new armed forces were established as a 
“constabulary force,” which is far from the existing definition of the military with which 
the Japanese public was familiar during WWII. The concept requires people to 
understand contradicting roles of the military and ambiguities to separate constabulary 
missions from traditional missions. Failure to gain legal and popular support resulted in 
taking legitimacy away from the SDF. The SDF was neither culturally approved nor fully 
supported by legal bodies. To gain the legitimacy of the SDF, the government promoted a 
complex interpretation of the Constitution and military power; the US Occupation Force 
civilianized military terms in the Japanese armed forces.  
These efforts are noteworthy in the discussion of legitimacy and the structural and 
procedural aspects of organizations. Although the force structure and basic operations of 
SDF were designed based on the US military, adopting these organizational designs were 
not “isomorphism” (Meyer and Rowan 1997) that takes place as a substantial 
organizational change to assimilate to a more dominant and rationalized organization in 
the same profession. It was rather symbolically adopting organizational structure: so 
called ceremonial conformity (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). The SDF became less 
isomorphic to conventional military organizations. The Japanese armed forces had to 
assimilate to their immediate local environment using symbolic management strategies to 
defend their legitimacy in Japanese society. The constabulary nature of the SDF is a 
result of extreme localization to gain legitimacy and social acceptance for organizational 
survival. Regardless of tireless efforts, the SDF continued to be marginalized both as a 
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profession and a social institution in post WWII Japan. The more the SDF protested its 
legitimacy, the more marginalized it became both as a profession and a social institution 
in post WWII Japan by getting into a “vicious cycle of legitimation” by protesting too 
aggressively (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).  
Simultaneously, the military profession was regarded as ‘dirty work’ and  played 
a key role in maintaining an “antimilitaristic culture” (Berger 1998) in contemporary 
Japan. Stigmatizing a particular social group can provide other members in society 
“functional value” such as self-esteem (Croker, et al. 1998). In terms of occupation, dirty 
work is socially significant for the public to keep their purity by separating themselves 
from individuals in dirty work (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). The stigmatization of the 
SDF has served as an enforcer of self-esteem of people in post War Japan by placing the 
military profession as outgroup and motivating positive intergroup comparisons. This 
mechanism helped people remove themselves from Japan’s ultramilitarism before and 
during WWII that caused inhumane conduct to both enemy combatants and non-
combatants. By marginalizing the SDF, the society avoided being stigmatized as a whole, 
at least internally. 
During the Cold War era, Japanese service members used  a neutralization 
technique, “appealing to higher loyalties” (Sykes and Matza 1957), by believing that their 
service is for a higher cause: their loyalty to their country and people to deal with their 
spoiled identity as SDF personnel. Through peacekeeping participation, the SDF are 
engaging in the next step of transforming the stigmatizing attributions. Departing from 
the stigmatized image, many Japanese peacekeepers seemed to slowly but steadily gain 
the “expected possible selves” (e.g., being in a socially accepted and trusted profession, 
  246 
 
enjoying popular support) through their peacekeeping deployment. For SDF personnel, 
peacekeeping deployment served as an opportunity to revoke the existing ‘dirty work’ 
stigma attached to the military profession and build a favorable professional identity. 
Peacekeeping expands the horizon of their possible selves in a professional life that has 
been constrained by a dominant political ideology that has been a driving force of anti-
militaristic collective identity in post-WWII Japan. The institutional stigmatization of the 
military in Japanese has had social benefits that perpetuated the avoidance of serious 
consideration in national defense policy and practice in the changing regional and global 
political environments.  
Unlike American peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers view their deployment 
experience as an empowering and self-enhancing event in their professional life. Findings 
from the statistical analysis show that peacekeepers with high personal motivation for 
deployment are less satisfied with the mission, compared to other peacekeepers. 
Although Kawano (2002) and Satoh (2001) suggested that Japanese peacekeepers were 
generally highly satisfied with their mission, what peacekeepers expected in their 
deployment experience (difference in goal setting) makes a difference in the degree of 
satisfaction.  
In terms of the treatment of service members returned from peacekeeping 
deployment, my dissertation supported Ohi’s (1999) research findings about 
peacekeepers’ frustration and potential sources of demoralization and interpersonal 
conflicts. Particularly in Japan’s case, peacekeeping deployment is not always considered 
to be a primary factor for promotion in the SDF because the personnel who can deploy to 
peacekeeping missions are limited to certain job specialties. In contrast, some 
  247 
 
peacekeepers felt betrayed by the organization because expected promotion, raise, and 
transfer did not happen. Their frustration can be a potential source of demoralization and 
attrition issues in the future. Although peacekeepers do not expect these favorable 
treatments in personnel matters, emotional friction between those who deployed and who 
did not makes their readjustment process stressful. Deployment experience itself often 
becomes a source of envy among service members. In addition, financial compensation 
from the UN and the SDF and extensive leave upon return that peacekeepers receive are 
also targets of coworkers’ envy and created friction between peacekeepers and their 
coworkers in the readjust process to their home unit. These potential stressors and 
obstacles in the readjustment process need organizational attention to minimize 
psychological problems and maintain organizational effectiveness in the SDF.     
While gaining the expected possible selves, SDF personnel’s professional identity 
is more vulnerable than before due to peacekeeping participation. First, Peacekeepers 
admire soldiers from other nations, focusing on their technical excellence, detached from 
the primary purpose of the military profession: warfighting. They compartmentalize the 
tasks and transformed their contact with peacekeepers from other countries into exposure 
to technical excellence. This coping strategy is typical among those who engage in dirty 
work. Appraisal pattern that Japanese peacekeeper exhibited indirectly demonstrates their 
emotion management in their occupation, which separate one task or situation from a 
larger context. This micro-focus assessment seems to protect Japanese peacekeepers from 
a potential identity crisis that they encounter in the peacekeeping mission environment.  
 Second, although SDF personnel understand the organizational concept, they also 
have the sense of being imperfect as military professionals in comparison with soldiers in 
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other armed forces with pronounced warrior ethos such as the US military. It is true, as 
Fruhstuck and Ben-Ari (2000) pointed out, that we can observe the celebration of 
violence in the events and activities that the SDF routinely hold (e.g., Live-Fire exercise, 
joint exercises). They are manifestation of ceremonial conformity to the larger 
community of the military profession. Coupled with the celebration of violence, SDF 
personnel in the study adapted them to a constabulary ethos, while they are eager to 
pursue their technical advancement in their profession. As peacekeeping missions 
increase its proximity to war zones, the gravity to the ideal type of the military may 
heighten. Regarding concerns about Japan’s remilitarization, until today, SDF 
personnel’s “feared possible selves” (e.g., a target of antagonism of the general public; 
soldiers in the Imperial military during WWII) seem to control their professional identity 
strictly constabulary.  
Findings also suggest that the prevalent anti-militarism sentiment in the larger 
society institutionalized stringent rules of engagement (ROE) and increases vulnerability 
of Japanese peacekeepers in the field. As Wicks (2002) demonstrated in the impact of 
Canadian coal miners’ masculine identity on a tragic accident, the institutional element of 
professional identity impose behavioral norms that are not most desirable or effective 
way for safety. To defend organizational legitimacy, Japanese peacekeepers have to 
maintain their constabulary identity and remain vulnerable in the field.  
While I have been working on this project, the SDF have taken a historical step in 
its peacekeeping participation by sending battalion-level troops to Iraq: since March 
2004, there have been more than 1,000 GSDF troops in total deployed to a Southern Iraq 
city, Samawah. Fortunately there have been no SDF casualties, while the presence of 
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SDF troops in Iraq became a target of the public criticism and caused the abduction of 
three Japanese civilians by Iraqi militias in April 2004. Wicks (2002) studied institutional 
bases of Canadian coal miners’ gendered, risk-taking identity underlining a tragic 
explosion and showed institutional forces that coal miners internalized and built 
meanings upon them. Likewise, in the mission situation like Iraq, institutional forces of 
Japanese society influence SDF troops’ professional identity and foster an overly 
optimistic view of possible risk and fatal casualties as a part of constabulary ethos. Such 
institutional influence that is internalized among SDF troops may make SDF troops more 
vulnerable to insurgence in the mission environment. 
A set of regional security concerns has made the Japanese government and 
general public more prone to accept this shift: North Korea admitted kidnapping Japanese 
citizens that took in the 1970s and 1980s and the prolonged negotiation process over 
North Korean nuclear weapon development. Domestically, the SDF have to maintain 
their very low profile, while their operational goal is becoming more toward ‘proactive’ 
defense measures to prevent terrorist attacks against Japan. As the SDF gains legitimacy 
in the ongoing regional security environment and through international peacekeeping 
missions, social scientists need to continue examining the changes in organizational 
culture and identities of service members over time. The main issue is not the positive or 
negative direction of organizational changes, but the degree of changes that require 
organizational members to reconstruct their professional identity that they acquired 
through extensive socialization as members of a stigmatized profession. 
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In this transition of the organization, further research is necessary to examine 
changes in organizational legitimacy and identities of Japanese service members as troop 
contributions to international peacekeeping missions increase.  
 
Limitation of the Present Research and Future Research  
Although Japan experts tend to view social and political issues in Japanese society 
as a unique case, treating Japan as an exceptional case does not contribute to progress in 
the understanding of social processes in different social settings (Katzenstein 1996). The 
present dissertation, as a comparative case study of peacekeeping, contributes to the 
sociological literature of peacekeeping by providing insights into how a highly 
constabulary organizational concept was developed, and differentiated organizational 
adaptation to the mission in comparison with the published research on peacekeeping in 
warfighting oriented armed forces such as the United States. This dissertation also 
contributes to the study of work organizations by exploring the meaning and negotiation 
of identity and on micro-institutional relationships between institutions and individuals in 
a socially stigmatized work organization.   
The absence of real comparison groups might weaken my arguments on the 
relationship between Japanese peacekeepers’ constabulary ethos and peacekeeping 
participation. To overcome the weakness, the present study compares the findings with 
published articles on peacekeeping by conventional actors (e.g., Canada and 
Scandinavian nations) and more militarily active nations (e.g., the US and the UK). The 
secondary survey data used in this dissertation has serious measurement issues because of 
inadequate operationalization of concepts, language and conceptual differences, and 
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design. Nonetheless, it is still useful to use the survey data with full awareness of 
potential measurement problems as worthwhile trade-offs because attitudinal surveys are 
very rarely collected with Japanese peacekeepers. 
Sociological studies on peacekeeping have mostly studied North American and 
European nations and their peacekeepers, while unconventional actors and developing 
countries are still out of the research scope. Taking into account this research tendency, I 
emphasized the diversity of peacekeeping participants and the academic and practical 
values of studying them to improve multilateral efforts for international security. Cultural 
awareness is critical in many aspects of post-Cold War peacekeeping (Segal and Eyre 
1996). In post-Cold War peacekeeping missions, such cultural differences are 
increasingly observed among peacekeeping contingents from different nations.  
American and European research on peacekeeping in general is extensive and 
thorough, but it cannot be automatically applied to different social and cultural contexts 
because the American and some European armed forces are mostly warfighting oriented. 
Thus, as Elron et al. (2000) suggest, case studies of each participant nation become 
increasingly important in successful international peacekeeping missions. Comparative 
research on military peacekeepers should be conducted more actively to better understand 
what general issues of military peacekeepers are cross-nationally and what are uniquely 
attributed to other socio-cultural factors and to the mission environment.  
As Kawano (forthcoming) pointed out, mental health issues are the emerging 
concerns in the organization due to the changing nature of Japanese peacekeeping 
missions. Therefore, for future research, sociological research from a mental health 
perspective will provide a clearer picture on the social disposition of Japanese service 
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members. To make it easier to compare the data with those of peacekeepers from other 
nations, future research should use standardized mental health measures on anxiety and 
depression and measures on self concepts such as Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale 
and mastery scale (Perlin, et al. 1981).  
Although in the present dissertation I hypothesized that SDF members’ identity as 
being military professional is highly salient, individual difference in identity salience is a 
powerful determinant of identity-induced stressors (Stryker 1980). At the same time, 
one’s identity has temporal component that may change over time (Markus and Nurius 
1986). Thus, both the enduring and changing components of Japanese service members’ 
professional identity should be carefully examined in the course of changes in the social 
status and roles of the SDF.  Studying an organization that symbolizes the dirtiness of a 
society will contribute to deepening our understanding of the changes in social and 
cultural structure and of the experience and expression of emotions in the work place (see 
Ashforth and Humphrey 1995).   
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